

SKETCHES
OF THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY SERVICES
OF
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

BY
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LATE AN INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN THE U. S. ARMY,
AND
BENJAMIN DRAKE,
AUTHOR OF THE LIFE OF BLACK HAWK, &c.

“————— quæque vidimus,
Et quorum pars magna fuimus.”


CINCINNATI:
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Caldwell

Handwritten text, possibly a signature or name, in brown ink, located at the top center of the page.





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P R E F A C E .

THE following work has been written at the request of the Harrison committees in Cincinnati and Louisville, and is published under their sanction.

The limited size of the volume, and the rapidity with which the manuscript has been prepared for the press, have prevented the authors from doing entire justice to the subject of their memoir. Their chief aim has been the presentation of such a narrative of the civil and military services of general Harrison, as would enable the people of the United States, to appreciate more thoroughly, the great principles which have governed him in the faithful discharge of the many important trusts confided to him by his country, in the course of a long and eventful career.

In the preparation of this work the authors have been much aided by colonel M'Affee's excellent History of the Late War—by Mr. Dawson's Historical Narrative, which embraces many valuable and authentic documents—and by Judge Hall's elegant Memoir of the Public Services of general Harrison. Several other historical and biographical narratives have been consulted ; and, in addition to these sources of information, the authors have had the benefit of original letters and documents not heretofore embraced in any similar publication. They have also been favored with the personal recollections of several officers of the late war, who participated with

honor in the north-western campaigns. Finally, they themselves happen to have a personal knowledge of many of the scenes and incidents which they have undertaken to describe.

Under these circumstances, whatever may be thought of the literature of the work, they venture to claim for it, at least the merit of authenticity in every substantial particular. Running, as it does, through a period of nearly fifty years, in the history of the West, it will be found to embrace a variety of matter valuable to the general reader, independently of its immediate relation to the distinguished citizen whose remarkable public career has been briefly pourtrayed in its pages.

C. S. T.

B. D.

CINCINNATI, March, 1840.

By a resolution of the Harrison executive committee for Hamilton county, passed on the 27th day of February, 1840, Jacob Burnet, John C. Wright, Nathan Guilford, David Gwynne, and Joseph Graham were requested to procure the immediate publication of a biographical sketch of the civil and military services of WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

In pursuance of their instructions, this committee appointed Charles S. Todd, of Kentucky, and Benjamin Drake, of Ohio, to prepare the proposed work; and in this appointment the Harrison committee for the central district of Kentucky, at Louisville, unanimously concurred.

MARCH, 1840.

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SKETCHES OF GENERAL HARRISON.

CHAPTER I.

His birth.—Parentage.—Education.—Entrance into the army.
—Services under St. Clair and Wayne.—*Battle of the Mau-
mee.*—In command of Fort Washington (now Cincinnati).—
His marriage.—Resignation of his commission in the army.

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON was born on the 9th day of February, 1773, at Berkley, on James River, in the county of Charles City, in the state of Virginia. He is descended lineally from the general Harrison, who was a distinguished actor in the civil wars of England, and was a prominent officer in the armies of the commonwealth.

Benjamin Harrison, the father of the subject of this memoir, was a delegate from Virginia, in the continental congress, in 1774-5-6. As early as the 14th November, 1764, he was one of the committee to prepare a remonstrance *against the odious stamp act*, at that time contemplated by the British cabinet, and from this period he was associated with *Lee, Henry, Nicholas* and others, in energetic efforts, which were directed towards *a vindication of the rights of the people against the encroachments of the crown.*

In the congress of 1775 the office of speaker was vacated by Peyton Randolph, and in the choice of a successor, congress was divided between Benjamin Harrison and John Hancock. In this early period of the struggle for liberty, Mr. Harrison being a delegate from the "Old Dominion," in the south, gave an illustrious evidence of his patriotism by yielding his pretensions in favor of the great patriot from the Bay State of the north; and Mr. Hancock, hesitating for a moment to take the chair, Mr.

Harrison, with practical good humor, "seized the modest candidate in his athletic arms, and placed him in the presidential chair;" then turning to the members, he exclaimed, "WE WILL SHOW MOTHER BRITAIN HOW LITTLE WE CARE FOR HER, BY MAKING A MASSACHUSETTS MAN OUR PRESIDENT, WHOM SHE HAS EXCLUDED FROM PARDON BY A PUBLIC PROCLAMATION."

Mr. Harrison was a member of the committee of that year, whose report formed the basis of our present militia system. He was associated with the immortal Washington, in a committee which arranged a plan for the future support of the army. He was chairman of the committee whose agency brought to our standard the gallant La Fayette, and was afterwards appointed a member of the Board of War. On the 10th of June, 1776, he called up the resolutions by which the colonies were declared INDEPENDENT, and which authorized a DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE to be prepared; and he reported that instrument on the EVER MEMORABLE 4TH OF JULY, 1776. A curious anecdote is on record, which furnishes a graphic description of the temper and intrepidity of the patriots of that day. Elbridge Gerry, a delegate from Massachusetts, as slender as Mr. Harrison was portly, stood beside Harrison whilst signing the Declaration. Harrison turned round to him with a smile as he raised his hand from the paper and said, "when the hanging scene comes to be exhibited, I shall have all the advantage over you. It will be over with me in a minute, but you will be kicking in the air half an hour after I am gone."

Mr. Harrison continued in congress until 1777, when he retired, and having been elected to the House of Delegates of Virginia, was chosen speaker, the duties of which he performed until 1782, when, on the resignation of general Nelson, he was elected governor of Virginia, and was re-elected as long as the constitution would permit. He died whilst a member of the legislature, in 1791.*

WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON was educated at Hampden

* See Sanderson's "Lives of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence.

Sydney college, and then repaired to Philadelphia to pursue the study of medicine under the instruction of the distinguished Dr. Benjamin Rush, and under the guardianship of Robert Morris, the great financier of the revolution, both of whom were signers of the Declaration of Independence. The youth, who had laid the foundations at college for a taste in the literature and history of the ancient classics, was thus afforded an opportunity of drinking deep at these fountains of the genius and spirit of the revolution. He had derived from his patriotic father, the lessons of republican liberty, and in the school of *Rush*, of *Morris*, and of *Washington*, he imbibed a love of country, which led him to encounter difficulty and danger in her defence. About this period the disasters of the north-western army, under the accomplished Harmar, excited a deep sympathy in the public mind, and the youthful Harrison, partaking largely of the generous impulses of the day, resolved to abandon the studies in which he was engaged, and to participate in the perils as well as the sacrifices which were incident to this great border warfare. His guardian and his friends opposed his wish to enter upon this hazardous duty; but he applied in person to general Knox, secretary of war, and to the IMMORTAL WASHINGTON, who granted him a commission of ensign in the first regiment of United States artillery, and in November, 1791, when but nineteen years of age, he marched on foot to Pittsburgh, and by descending the Ohio, joined his regiment, then stationed at Fort Washington.

Shortly before the disastrous defeat of the veteran St. Clair, ensign Harrison formed the resolution to devote his energies to the military service of his country, at a period when his judgment and feelings must have been guided by a high sense of patriotism, and a disinterested love of fame. The theatre of the war was in the remote wilderness, and the character of the enemy such, that laurels were to be won only by great suffering and exposure in situations destitute of the comforts or even the necessities of civilized life. A great national disaster had occurred in 1790, under the gallant Harmar, who was seconded by the heroic conduct of colonel Hardin, him-

self a sacrifice to the treachery of the Indian character. Congress authorized at its next session, the raising of two thousand men, under the denomination of levies, and general St. Clair, governor of the north-western territory, was appointed commander-in-chief.

On the 4th of November, 1791, he was met and likewise defeated, with great loss, by a formidable body of Indians, on the waters of Big Miami river.

This defeat of St. Clair, though congress subsequently acquitted him of all blame, produced a deep impression on the public mind, and, connected with the previous disasters of the war, rendered the service unpopular, drained the public treasury, and brought the country into a crisis which developed the energies of Washington's great intellect. The war had assumed a national importance, inducing the president to select for the chief of the army, a soldier of prudence, of experience and of energy. The choice was balanced for a time between Clark and Wayne, both distinguished leaders in the war of the revolution, though on a different theatre—the former acting under the immediate eye of the father of his country, earning for himself the reputation of intrepidity, with fertility of expedient; the latter having won the distinctive title of the *Hannibal of the West*. The command was eventually assigned to Wayne, who acquired a new wreath of glory for himself, and added to the proofs of the sagacity of Washington.

Ensign Harrison joined his regiment at Fort Washington just in time to witness the return of the fragments of that gallant band, which, marching out in the proud anticipations of victory, was destined to a sad reverse under the veteran St. Clair. Under these discouraging circumstances, and with the near approach of winter, ensign Harrison commenced his public service in the command of an escort, having charge of a train of pack horses destined for Fort Hamilton. It was a duty involving peril and fatigue, by night and by day, and requiring the exercise of sagacity and self-denial. His performance of the arduous task elicited the commendations of general St. Clair, and exhibited an interesting instance of a character in which the ardor of youth was combined with the

maturity of age. In 1792 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and in 1793 joined the legion under general Wayne, and was not long afterwards selected by him as one of his aids-de-camp—illustrating, in an eminent degree, the confidence of that tried soldier, since lieutenant Harrison was only twenty-one years of age. He continued to act as aid to general Wayne during the whole of the ensuing campaign, receiving, as he merited, repeated instances of high encomium from his commander. The first occurred upon the occasion of a detachment having been sent on the 23d of December, 1793, to take possession of the field of battle of the 4th of November, 1791, and to fortify the position. To the new post was given the name of Fort Recovery. The following general order was issued on the return of the troops from that interesting duty:

“The commander-in-chief returns his most grateful thanks to major Henry Burbeck, and to every officer, non-commissioned officer, and private, belonging to the detachment under his command, for their soldiery and exemplary good conduct during their late arduous tour of duty, and the cheerfulness with which they surmounted every difficulty, at this inclement season, in repossessing general St. Clair’s field of battle, and erecting thereon *Fort Recovery*, a work impregnable by savage force; as also for piously and carefully collecting and interring the bones, and paying the last respect and military honors to the remains of the heroes who fell on the 4th of November, 1791, by three times three discharges from the *same artillery* that was lost on that fatal day, but now recovered by this detachment of the legion.

“The commander-in-chief also requests major Mills, captains De Butts and Butler, *lieutenant Harrison*, and Dr. Scott, to accept his best thanks for their voluntary aid and services on this occasion.”

The other instance of commendation of the gallantry of lieutenant Harrison is to be found in the report made by general Wayne to the war department, in relation to the celebrated battle of the Maumee, which we shall presently introduce to the notice of the reader.

The youth, the early habits of study, and the delicate

frame of Mr. Harrison, not less than the perils and privations incident to the border warfare, would have intimidated a spirit less heroic than his, in entering upon the arduous service in the north-west. As illustrative of the aspect of affairs, and of his first appearance in the army, an old soldier of St. Clair, who was present, has remarked :—"I would as soon have thought of putting my wife in the service as this boy ; but I have been out with him, and I find those smooth cheeks are on a wise head, and that slight frame is almost as tough as my own weather-beaten carcass."

General Charles Scott, a veteran of the revolution, who enjoyed the special confidence of Washington, arrived in July from Kentucky with his command of mounted volunteers, and on the 8th of August, general Wayne took up a position at Grand Glaize, seventy miles in advance of Greenville. A strong work was erected at the junction of the Auglaize and Maumee rivers, and general Wayne again opened a communication with the Indians before striking the final blow. "I have thought proper," he said, "to offer the enemy a last overture of peace ; and as they have every thing that is dear and interesting at stake, I have reason to expect they will listen to the proposition mentioned in the enclosed copy of an address dispatched yesterday by a special flag, under circumstances that will insure his safe return, and which may eventually spare the effusion of much human blood." "But should war be their choice, that blood be upon their own heads. America shall no longer be insulted with impunity. To an all powerful and just God, I therefore commit myself and gallant army."

The enemy rejected the offer of peace, and the celebrated Little Turtle, who advised its adoption in a council on the night before the battle, spoke as follows : "We have beaten the enemy twice under separate commanders. We cannot expect the same good fortune to attend us always. The Americans are now led by a chief who never sleeps : the night and the day are alike to him. And during all the time he has been marching upon our villages, notwithstanding the watchfulness of our young men, we have never been able to surprise him. Think

well of it. There is something whispers me it would be prudent to listen to his offers of peace."

We refer the reader to the official report of general Wayne of 27th August, 1794, for a perspicuous account of the celebrated battle of *Maumee*, and deem it sufficient for our present purpose to give an extract relating to the conduct of his aid-de-camp, lieutenant Harrison.

"The bravery and conduct of every officer belonging to the army, from the generals down to the ensigns, merit my highest approbation. There were, however, some whose rank and situation placed their conduct in a very conspicuous point of view, and which I observed with pleasure and the most lively gratitude: among whom I beg leave to mention brigadier general Wilkinson, and colonel Hamtramck, the commandants of the right and left wings of the legion, whose brave example inspired the troops; and to these I must add the names of my faithful and gallant aids-de-camp, captains De Butts and T. Lewis, and *lieutenant Harrison, who, with the adjutant general, major Mills, rendered the most essential service by communicating my orders in every direction, and by their conduct and bravery exciting the troops to press for victory.*"

The praise of which lieutenant, now general, Harrison was the subject in the dispatch from the illustrious Wayne, was of a character to soothe him for the trials and the perils he had encountered, and to stimulate him to increased diligence in the discharge of the high and responsible duties confided to him when placed afterwards in the command of Fort Washington. This commendation received additional weight from the remarks made in the presence of a venerable gentleman, now living, by general Wilkinson and colonel Shaumburg, who said that "Harrison was in the foremost front of the hottest battle—his person was exposed from the commencement to the close of the action. Wherever duty called, he hastened, regardless of danger, and by his efforts and example contributed as much to secure the fortune of the day, as any other officer subordinate to the commander-in-chief."

The victory at *Maumee* was achieved by the discipline of Wayne's army, and the introduction by that sagacious

leader, of a new feature in military tactics, as applied to Indian warfare, which was the result of a plan digested by Washington, Knox, and Wayne. The north-western savage chooses his own time and his own position, and he retreats from it at his own pleasure. To be overcome, he must be outflanked or kept on the wing, as he was by Wayne, by a constant charge of the bayonet. To provide against the contingency of the enemy assailing his flanks, Wayne had adopted the plan of forming his troops at open order, so as to extend his flanks and move with celerity in the woods. These principles were acted upon in the subsequent war conducted by general Harrison, and may be now regarded as the approved mode of fighting the north-western Indians.

A permanent peace with the Indians was the fruit of this great victory. The negotiations commenced in January and terminated in August, 1795. Soon after the close of this campaign, captain Harrison was entrusted by Wayne with the command of Fort Washington, where he was directed to advise the general of all movements connected with the invasion of Louisiana, then projected, and to prevent the forwarding of any military stores by the French agents. As a further evidence of the confidence of Wayne, he specially entrusted captain Harrison with his commands and intentions as to the supply of the troops intended to occupy the posts theretofore held by the British on the northern frontier. Whilst in the command of Fort Washington, (now Cincinnati,) captain Harrison married the daughter of John Cleves Symmes, the founder of the Miami settlements. An anecdote is given in relation to the marriage, illustrative of the independent character of captain Harrison. On the proposal to Mr. Symmes for his consent, Harrison was asked what were his resources for maintaining a wife? Placing his hand upon his sword, he replied, "this, sir, is my means of support." The chivalry and undaunted confidence of the young soldier at once obtained the approbation of Mr. Symmes. Captain Harrison continued in the command of Fort Washington until 1797, when, upon the death of general Wayne, he resigned his commission in the army.

CHAPTER II.

Retires to a Farm—Appointed Secretary of the North-western Territory.—Elected a delegate in Congress—Procures a Law sub-dividing the Public Lands.—Division of the North-western Territory.—Military Land Warrants.—Political sentiments.—Charge of Federalism.

THE war being ended, captain Harrison, like the Father of his country, retired to the peaceful pursuits of agriculture; and on his farm, near Cincinnati, soon acquired that taste for the cultivation of the soil, which through a long life, has prompted him, when not engaged in the public service, to return to the plough. Having turned his sword into the pruning hook, he identified himself with the people in whose defence he had been drawn to the banks of the Ohio. He was not suffered, however, long to enjoy the repose of his log-cabin. Early in 1798, Winthrop Sargent, secretary of the north-western territory, having been appointed governor of the south-western territory, president Adams selected Mr. Harrison to fill the office thus vacated. The appointment made him *ex-officio* lieutenant governor, and in the absence of governor St. Clair from the territory, he discharged the executive duties in a manner that won the approbation of the people. In the month of October, 1799, when, under the ordinance of 1787, the territory was admitted to the second grade of government, the legislative council elected him a delegate to congress.

In January, 1800, Mr. Harrison took his seat in that body, then in session in Philadelphia. His first effort was to effect a change in the mode of selling the public lands, which had hitherto been offered in large tracts—a system well suited to the rich speculator, but adverse to the interest of the poor man, however industrious or enterprising. The subject was one of vital interest not only to the territory, but the whole country. The injustice of this aristocratic mode of selling the public domain, had engaged the attention of Mr. Harrison, prior

to his election ; and having maturely considered the subject he lost no time in calling the attention of congress to it.

From a circular of Mr. Harrison, to the people of the territory, under date of Philadelphia, 14th May, 1800, we make the following quotation, showing the result of his efforts on this important subject :

“ Amongst the variety of objects which engaged my attention, as peculiarly interesting to our territory, none appeared to me of so much importance as the adoption of a system for the sale of the public lands, which would give more favorable terms to that class of purchasers who are likely to become actual settlers, than was offered by the existing laws upon that subject ; conformably to this idea, I procured the passage of a resolution at an early period for the appointment of a committee to take the matter into consideration. And shortly after I reported a bill containing terms for the purchaser, as favorable as could have been expected. This bill was adopted by the house of representatives without any material alteration ; but, in the senate amendments were introduced, obliging the purchaser to pay interest on that part of the money for which a credit was given from the date of the purchase, and directing that one-half the land (instead of the whole, as was provided by the bill from the house of representatives,) should be sold in half sections of three hundred and twenty acres, and the other half in whole sections of six hundred and forty acres. All my exertions, aided by some of the ablest members of the lower house, at a conference for that purpose, were not sufficient to induce the senate to recede from their amendments ; but, upon the whole, there is cause of congratulation to my fellow-citizens that terms, as favorable as the bill still contains, have been procured. This law promises to be the foundation of a great increase of population and wealth to our country ; for although the minimum price of the land is still fixed at two dollars per acre, the time for making payments has been so extended as to put it in the power of every industrious man to comply with them, it being only necessary to pay one-fourth part of the money in hand, and the balance at the end of two, three and four years ; besides this, the odious

circumstance of forfeiture, which was made the penalty of failing in the payments under the old law, is entirely abolished, and the purchaser is allowed one year after the last payment is due to collect the money; if the land is not then paid for, it is sold, and, after the public have been reimbursed, the balance of the money is returned to the purchaser. Four land-offices are directed to be opened—one at Cincinnati, one at Chillicothe, one at Marietta, and one at Steubenville, for the sale of the lands in the neighborhood of those places. In a communication of this kind, it is impossible to detail all the provisions of the law. I have, however, sent a copy of it to the printers at Cincinnati, with a request that they would publish it several weeks."

In contemplating the present condition of the states and territories north-west of the Ohio, too much praise cannot be awarded to the author of this law. Had the system of selling the public lands, in large tracts, been continued, it is certain, that the population and wealth of this immense region would not have been half what they now are. The poor but sturdy and independent farmers, whose axe has felled the forest, and whose plough has upturned the soil, would have been precluded from becoming freeholders within this immense region, which, by the sweat of their brows, is now made to "bud and blossom as the rose." Mr Harrison's land bill met with violent opposition in congress, especially in the senate. But being himself thoroughly conversant with the evils of the existing law, and the manifest justice of the proposed one having secured its author the support of some able and efficient members, it was finally passed, although shorn of a part of its salutary provisions. In the subsequent legislation of congress, regulating the sales of the public lands, all the features, it is believed, of the original report and bill upon this subject, have been incorporated: and in tracing this most beneficent mode of disposing of the public domain, it would be an act of injustice to withhold from Mr. Harrison the proud appellation of being the FATHER OF THE LAND SYSTEM, and the POOR MAN'S FRIEND.

During the same session of congress, Mr. Harrison

obtained an extension of the time of payment, for the pre-emptioners in the northern part of the Miami purchase, which enabled them to secure their farms. In this matter there was some collision of interest between the settlers and the original proprietor, John Cleves Symmes, the father-in-law of Mr. Harrison. He was consequently placed in a delicate and responsible situation. But his conduct was marked by that integrity of purpose, which has ever been one of the striking characteristics of his life. [He zealously sustained the rights of the meritorious purchasers. At the same session, he also effected an important change in the plan of locating military land warrants; and among other acts of a local character, procured the passage of a law, in conformity with numerous petitions from different parts of the district he represented, providing for the division of the north-western territory into two separate governments—the western being called the “Indiana Territory,” the eastern the “Territory of the United States North-west of the Ohio.”]

After the adjournment of congress, Mr. Harrison proceeded to Virginia, on a visit to his family and friends, from whom he had now been separated more than seven years.

Prior to his entering into civil office, Mr. Harrison had identified himself with the great republican party of the country, and was the consistent advocate of popular rights. It has been charged upon him, that he was a federalist and a supporter of the “alien and sedition law,” in the time of the elder Adams. This unfounded allegation, has probably arisen from the fact of his being appointed to office by president Adams. It is well known, however, that Mr. Harrison warmly opposed his election to the presidency; but this consideration did not deter the president from the faithful discharge of his duty. He knew the high qualifications of Mr. Harrison for civic office, and although a political opponent, did not hesitate to call him into public life. At that period in the history of our country, it is well known, men were not, as at the present day, proscribed for opinion's sake. Washington and Adams, in their appointments to office, acted on the principle, afterwards beautifully announced

by Jefferson, in his inaugural address,—“is he honest? is he capable? is he faithful to the constitution?”

But this charge of federalism, has been forever put to rest, by the very highest authority. The honorable Jacob Burnet, than whom no one knew more intimately the political sentiments of Mr. Harrison, says, “it has been asserted entirely at random, ‘that he was a federalist of the old *black cockade order*, in the time of the elder Adams.’ A more unfounded falsehood was never invented. My personal acquaintance with him commenced in 1796, under the administration of Washington. The intimacy between us was great, and our intercourse was constant; and from that time till he left Cincinnati, I was in the habit of arguing and disputing with him on political subjects. I was a federalist—honestly so, from principle, and adhered to the party till it dissolved, and its elements mingled with other parties formed on different principles. I can therefore speak on this point with absolute certainty, and I affirm most solemnly, that under the administration of Washington, and the administration of the elder Adams, William Henry Harrison was a firm, consistent, unyielding republican, of the Jefferson school. He advocated the election of Mr. Jefferson, and warmly maintained his claims against Mr. Adams.”*

CHAPTER III.

Harrison appointed Governor of Indiana Territory.—Commissioner to treat with the Indian Tribes.—His Message to the Legislative Council.—Addresses of the Council to him.—Correspondence with President Jefferson and the War Department.—Indian Treaties.—Re-appointed Governor by Jefferson, and again by Madison.—Recommends the building of a fleet on lake Erie.

It has been seen that the north-western territory was divided by congress, in the spring of 1800. Soon after

* Public speech in Cincinnati.

the passage of that law, president Adams appointed Mr. Harrison governor of the western division, known as the Indiana territory, which then embraced the region of country now included within the boundaries of the states of Indiana and Illinois, and the territory of Wisconsin. In 1803, upon the admission of Ohio into the union, the region of country which now forms the state of Michigan was added to the Indiana territory; and during the subsequent year, governor Harrison was made, *ex-officio*, governor of upper Louisiana.

The population of the Indiana territory, at the period when Mr. Harrison was appointed governor, did not exceed five thousand, and was principally confined to three settlements,—the first on Clark's grant, near the falls of the Ohio; the second at Vincennes; the third on the Mississippi river, extending from Cahokia to Kaskaskia. The wide regions to the north and north-west of these three points, were either occupied by the Indians, or constituted their hunting grounds. Notwithstanding the treaty of Greenville, a spirit of restless hostility towards the United States, prevailed among the Indian tribes, which was constantly fomented by British agents, who visited their villages, and did not hesitate to misrepresent the policy of the American government; and, by presents of merchandize and spirituous liquors, to stimulate the Indians to annoy the white settlements, and resist their further extension to the north-west. Such were the limits of the Indiana territory, and such the temper of the aborigines residing within it, when governor Harrison entered upon his duties.

The powers conferred upon the governor of Indiana were extensive and multifarious. The people had no voice in the management of their affairs. The duty of organizing all the civil institutions belonged to the governor. With the advice of the judges, he was empowered by congress to adopt and publish the necessary civil and criminal laws. He was charged with the appointment of magistrates and other civil officers, and of the militia officers, below the rank of general. The duty of dividing the territory into counties and townships was also assigned to the executive, and being, *ex-officio*, superin-

tendent of Indian affairs, he was compelled to keep up a laborious and extensive correspondence with the general government. Another power, equally responsible, and of a more delicate character, was confided to governor Harrison—that of deciding upon the validity of certain equitable grants of land, held by individuals. There was no check or limitation upon these confirmations. Each case was submitted, without notice, directly to the governor, and his decision and signature, vested a title as safe and unalterable as a patent from the United States. A still further and most extraordinary power, was added to those already enumerated. On the 3d of February, 1803, the president sent a message to the senate of the United States, in the following words :

“ I nominate William Henry Harrison, of Indiana, to be a commissioner *to enter into any treaty or treaties which may be necessary, with any Indian tribes north-west of the Ohio, and within the territory of the United States, on the subject of boundary or lands.*

“ THOMAS JEFFERSON.”

The message containing this nomination, was read on the 4th, and on the 8th received the *unanimous* sanction of the senate. This appointment, without a parallel in the history of our country, exhibits in a striking manner, the unlimited confidence reposed in governor Harrison, by Mr. Jefferson and his counsellors, the senate of the United States.

It is obvious that an able and faithful discharge of such varied and responsible duties, as were devolved upon the governor of Indiana, required a rare combination of moral and intellectual powers. That he should have been four times appointed to this office,—first by Adams; twice by Jefferson, and finally by Madison,—may be taken as conclusive evidence, that governor Harrison possessed the wisdom, discretion, and integrity, necessary for the performance of such high duties. But there are other evidences of the fact. In 1809, eight years after governor Harrison had first entered upon that station, the legislative council and house of representatives of the territory, addressed a resolution to the president and senate of the United States, in which they say :

“They cannot forbear from recommending to, and requesting of the president and senate, most earnestly, in their names, and in the names of their constituents, the re-appointment of their present governor, William Henry Harrison;—because they are sensible he possesses the good wishes and affection of a great majority of his fellow-citizens; because they believe him sincerely attached to the union, the prosperity of the United States, and the administration of its government; because they believe him, in a superior degree, capable of promoting the interest of our territory, from long experience, and laborious attention to our general concerns—from his influence over the Indians, and his wise and disinterested management of that department—and because they have confidence in his virtues, talents, and republicanism.”

About the same time, a meeting of the officers of the militia for the county of Knox, was held in Vincennes, approving of governor Harrison's official conduct.

In July, 1805, the citizens of St. Louis, when their connexion with the governor of Indiana was about to cease, made an address to him, in which they commend the “assiduity, attention and disinterested punctuality,” which he had manifested in the temporary administration of the government of Louisiana.

The conduct of governor Harrison, in administering the affairs of the Indiana territory, was repeatedly approved by the legislative council and house of representatives. In 1805, the former, in reply to the message of the governor, say:

“The confidence which our fellow-citizens have uniformly had in your administration, has been such that they have hitherto had no reason to be jealous of the unlimited power which you possess over our legislative proceedings. We, however, cannot help regretting that such powers have been lodged in the hands of any one, especially when it is recollected to what dangerous lengths the exercise of those powers may be extended.”

The house of representatives, in their reply, make the following remarks:

“Accept, sir, the thanks of the house of representa-

tives for the speech you made to both houses of the legislature on the opening of the present session. In it we discern the solicitude for the future happiness and prosperity of the territory, which has been uniformly evinced by your past administration."

It is unnecessary to occupy more space in citing testimony in favor of the conduct of governor Harrison, while presiding over the territory. In the administration of its affairs, he laid the foundation of a popularity, which after the lapse of thirty years, overspreads the population of the states of Indiana and Illinois, now amounting to more than a million of souls. The course of governor Harrison won for him more than the respect and confidence of the people—it secured their warm and affectionate regard. The moderation, good sense and disinterestedness, with which he exercised the almost unlimited powers conferred upon him, could not fail to produce these results. His appointments were always made with a reference to the public good and the wishes of the people. Neither private friendship nor personal animosity was suffered to influence him, in the discharge of his official duty.

In the management of the Indian affairs of the territory, governor Harrison had unlimited authority to draw on the government for money. Perhaps no individual has ever disbursed so large an amount of the public treasure, as governor Harrison, and had so little difficulty in adjusting his accounts with the war department. This arose from the simple mode in which he kept his accounts. He refused to keep any amount of the public money on hand. When called on to make payments, he drew for the amount, on the department, and forthwith transmitted a copy of the draft, and a receipt for the payment, to Washington in the same letter. By this simple mode, the department was saved the risk and expense of sending money to the west, and the subsequent settlement of long and complicated accounts.

The messages of governor Harrison to the legislature of the territory, during the twelve years of his administration, are replete with sound, practical and statesman-like views; but our limits do not admit of the introduc-

tion of these documents, so creditable to the head and heart of their author.

Those who are familiar with the character of the north-western tribes, stimulated about this time by British influence, and roused to action by the cunning of the Prophet and the genius of Tecumthe, will readily appreciate the difficulties to be encountered by governor Harrison, in preserving peace on the frontiers, and effecting those treaties of cession, which added an immense body of valuable land to the public domain of his country. He had no military force under his command to awe the Indians or avenge their aggressions upon the settlements. It was the moral influence of his character, founded on the justice of his course towards them, which enabled him to bring about those great results which have given so much lustre to the civil administration of governor Harrison, in Indiana. It is a remarkable fact, that during this period, he effected not less than *thirteen treaties* with these tribes, by which the United States acquired the peaceable possession of *sixty millions of acres of land*. These treaties were all made by governor Harrison as *sole commissioner*, and it is creditable to the wisdom and moderation of their author, that the provisions of every one of them received the sanction of the president and senate of the United States.

The reputation of governor Harrison as a civilian and statesman, may be safely rested upon his administration of the affairs of Indiana. His messages to the legislative council and house of representatives, during a period of twelve years—his various communications to the Indian tribes—his voluminous correspondence with the secretary at war, and with the president of the United States, are all eloquent and imperishable records of the extent and accuracy of his knowledge—the force and gracefulness of his pen—the clearness and maturity of his judgment. The powers conferred upon him by the government of the United States, were varied and extraordinary—being legislative, executive, judicial and military, to which may be added that of making treaties with the Indians. They were powers, greater than the constitution confers upon the president of the United States, and

required in the proper exercise of them, a combination of rare and varied talents. Governor Harrison so acquitted himself, in this responsible station, as to leave no stain upon his integrity, and no necessity for eulogy upon the wisdom of his measures.

Soon after Mr. Madison became president, he directed the secretary at war to procure from governor Harrison, his opinion upon the best mode of protecting the north-western frontier from invasion. In a letter, under date of Vincennes, 5th July, 1809, the governor replies at length upon the subject, in which he defines the position and temper of the Indian tribes, and in a minute and lucid manner, examines the military topography of the country along the lakes, and the Mississippi river, and designates the points where forts should be erected and garrisons established. From this very able document, we take the following paragraph, for the purpose of showing at how early a period, the military eye of governor Harrison saw the necessity of the United States obtaining the naval ascendancy on lake Erie.

“ When I was at Detroit in 1803, the British had, and I believe still have, six or seven armed vessels, carrying from eight to twenty-two guns, on lake Erie. With a part of this force, and with the assistance of the Indians, Mackinac would be easily reduced ; as, from its insular situation, reinforcements or supplies could not reach it, if the enemy should possess the superiority of naval force on the upper lakes ; to prevent this, it will be necessary either to build a number of vessels equal to theirs, or, by fortifying the river of Detroit, confine them to lake Erie. A situation proper for this was the object of my enquiry : and Hog island, two miles above Detroit, was pointed out as the most eligible ; there is, also, another favorable situation for commanding the navigation, on the strait below lake St. Clair and lake Huron.”

It was not until the lapse of three years after the date of this letter, that the government acted upon the suggestion of governor Harrison in regard to a fleet upon lake Erie. Had it been attended to when made, it is obvious, that the commencement of the war with Great Britain would not have resulted in that profuse loss of

blood and treasure, which marked the first campaigns on the north-western frontiers.

CHAPTER IV.

Interview between governor Harrison and Tecumthe.—Battle of Tippecanoe.—Various documents concerning the same from individuals—the Legislatures of Indiana and Kentucky; from President Madison, and the historians M'Afee, Dawson, and Hall.

BETWEEN the years 1806 and 1811, governor Harrison's duties as superintendent of Indian affairs, were delicate and responsible. During this period, the British agents were powerfully aided in their efforts to excite the Indians to hostility against the United States, by two remarkable individuals, Tecumthe and his brother Olliwachica, better known as the Prophet. The genius of the one, and the prophetic character of the other, drew around them a band of desperate followers, who finally established themselves at Tippecanoe. The treaty made at Fort Wayne in 1809, by governor Harrison, gave offence to Tecumthe, it being in violation of the great principle of his confederacy, that the Indian lands were the common property of all the tribes, and could not be sold without the consent of all. In August, 1810, he invited Tecumthe to visit Vincennes, to have the difficulty adjusted. The chief, attended by four hundred warriors, armed with war-clubs and tomahawks, presented themselves at the appointed time. It was at this council that Tecumthe declared the governor's statements false, and sprung to his arms, his example being followed by forty of his warriors, who were present at the conference. The firmness of the governor, and the final termination of this extraordinary interview, must be familiar to the reader. It was at the close of this council, when, upon governor Harrison's telling him that he would

refer the question between them, to the president, that Tecumthe replied, "Well, as the great chief is to determine the matter, I hope the Great Spirit will put sense enough into his head, to induce him to direct you to give up this land. It is true he is so far off, he will not be injured by the war: he may sit still in his town, and drink his wine, whilst you and I will have to fight it out." The governor, in conclusion, told Tecumthe that he had one proposal to make, and that was, in the event of a war, to put a stop to that cruel and disgraceful mode of warfare which the Indians were accustomed to wage against women and children, and upon their prisoners. To this proposition, resulting from governor Harrison's benevolent forecast, he cheerfully assented, and it is due to the memory of Tecumthe to add, that he faithfully kept his promise.

Tecumthe left Vincennes boldly avowing his determination to persevere in his effort to combine the tribes, on the principle already alluded to; and in the next year, he visited the southern Indians for this purpose, leaving the Prophet in charge of the party at Tippecanoe, but with instructions to avoid an open rupture with the United States during his absence. In the summer of 1811, the danger to the frontier became so imminent that the president placed some troops under the command of governor Harrison, to be used offensively, however, in such a contingency only, as in his judgment, he might deem indispensably necessary. Governor Harrison consulted with governors Howard and Edwards of Missouri and Illinois, who advised the breaking up of the Prophet's town, or at all events the prevention of the further assemblage of Indians at that point. The governor's force consisted of regulars and militia, a small part of the latter being from Kentucky, with whom came Daviess,* Croghan, O'Fallon, Shipp, Meade, Edwards, and Saun-

* In a letter to the governor, Daviess said: "I make free to tell you that I have imagined there were two men in the west who had military talents, and you, sir, were the first of the two. It is thus an opportunity of service much valued by me. I go as a volunteer, leaving you, sir, to dispose of me as you choose."

ders, gallant young volunteers, who not only distinguished themselves in the action which ensued, but performed a brilliant part in the subsequent war with Great Britain. The governor was also joined by Owen and Wells, both celebrated in the early history of Kentucky.

Passing over the intermediate details, the governor, on the evening of the 6th of November, with a force of nine hundred men, was within a mile and a half of the Prophet's town, where he halted the army, to make a final effort to prevent the necessity of an attack. This effort proved unavailing. The army then marched towards the village. This led to a conference with the Indians, who announced their pacific intentions, and agreed that the terms of peace should be settled on the following day. A halt was ordered, and majors Waller Taylor and Marston Clark, and colonel William Piatt, were directed to examine and select a suitable spot for an encampment. The two former reported that they had found a place, combining all that could be desired, on the bank of a small stream, nearly surrounded by an open prairie, on the north of the town. On this spot, late in the evening of the 6th, the army was encamped. The details of the severe and brilliant action which took place on the following morning, are familiar to the reading public. We have not space to give them. The Indians made a fierce and gallant attack, but were as gallantly met, and finally compelled to retreat.

The officers and soldiers acted with great bravery, and were specially noticed in the official letter of the commander-in-chief. The number of men killed, including those who died of their wounds, was upwards of fifty; the wounded were more than double that number. The loss of the Indians, in killed, was about the same with that of the whites. They left thirty-eight dead on the field of battle. Some were buried in the town, and others, it is supposed, died of their wounds subsequently. The force of governor Harrison on the day of action, amounted to about nine hundred. The traders estimated the Indian force at from eight hundred to one thousand men. Captain Wells, the Indian agent, assured a gentlemen of Ohio, now living, that several of the Indians

engaged in the battle, who visited Fort Wayne after the action, stated their number to have been near twelve hundred, and that the proportion of wounded was unusually great. It is an act of justice to the commander-in-chief to add, that a ball passed through his cravat, bruising his neck, and another struck his saddle and then hit his thigh. The horse on which he rode was severely wounded in the head.

No battle ever fought in the United States, has been more extensively examined or severely criticised than the battle of Tippecanoe. Soon after its occurrence, the enemies of governor Harrison severely censured his conduct, and charged upon him that he permitted the Indians to select his camping ground, and was taken by surprise on the morning of the attack. These charges, although generally discredited, and made by irresponsible persons, called out the testimony of the officers and men engaged in the action, and thus placed all the facts before the public. In regard to the first of these charges, general Waller Taylor, of Indiana, under date of 15th of July, 1823, says : "The Indians did not dictate to the governor the position to encamp the army, the night before the battle of Tippecanoe. After the army reached the Indian town, in the afternoon, perhaps about sun-set, the governor ordered major Clark and myself to proceed to the left, and endeavor to find a suitable place for encampment; we did so, and discovered the place upon which the battle was fought the next morning; upon our return to the army, we reported to the governor our opinion about the place, which we stated to be favorable for an encampment."* This statement is corroborated by colonel William Piatt, late of Cincinnati, who was also in the action. Major Charles Larrabee, a brave officer, who was also present, says, under date of 13th October, 1823 : "Three officers, well able to judge, went out in search of a place, and they reported the one taken up. The situation was such, that if the army had been called upon to make choice of a place to fight the Indians, I venture to say, nine-tenths would have made that their selection." †

* Dawson. † Ib.

In the year following, general Hopkins, of Kentucky, a revolutionary officer, while on an expedition against the Peoria towns in Indiana, visited the battle ground of Tippecanoe, and expressed the opinion that the spot on which general Harrison encamped, was the *best* in the neighborhood of the Prophet's town. In this opinion the officers of this expedition concurred; and such, we are authorized to say, has been the fact with many military men, who have since visited the scene of action.

In reply to the second charge, Joel Cook, Josiah Snelling, R. C. Barton, O. G. Burton, Nathaniel F. Adams, Charles Fuller, A. Hawkins, George Gooding, H. Burchstead, Josiah D. Foster, and Hosea Bloodgood, all of them officers of the fourth regiment, United States infantry, and in the battle of Tippecanoe, say, under their own proper hands: "We deem it our duty to state, as incontestable facts, that the commander-in-chief throughout the campaign, and in the hour of battle, proved himself the soldier and the general—that on the night of the action, by his order, we slept on our arms, and rose on our posts; that notwithstanding the darkness of the night, and the most consummate savage cunning of the enemy in eluding our sentries, and rapidity in rushing through the guards, we were not found unprepared: that few of the men were able to enter our camp, and those few doomed never to return; that in pursuance of his orders, which were adapted to every emergency, the enemy were defeated with a slaughter almost unparalleled among savages. Indeed, one sentiment of confidence, respect, and affection towards the commander-in-chief, pervaded the whole line of the army, any attempt to destroy which, we shall consider as an insult to our understandings, and an injury to our feelings." *

Major Larrabee, under date of Fort Knox, January 8th, 1812, says, "at the commencement of the action, my company were at rest in their tents, with their clothes and accoutrements on, their guns lying by their sides, loaded, and bayonets fixed, and were by my order paraded in line of battle, ready to meet the enemy within

* Dawson.

forty seconds from the commencement of the action, all of which was performed one or two minutes before a man of the company was wounded."*

The officers and non-commissioned officers and privates of the militia corps (Hargrave's excepted) of Knox county, in Indiana, who served in this campaign, held a meeting in Vincennes, 7th December, 1811, and passed the following resolutions, unanimously:

"That it is a notorious fact, known to the whole army, that all the changes of position made by the troops during the action of the 7th ultimo, and by which the victory was secured, were made by the direction of the commander-in-chief, and generally executed under his immediate superintendence.

"That it was owing to the skill and VALOR of the commander-in-chief, that the victory of Tippecanoe was obtained.

"That we have the most perfect confidence in the commander-in-chief, and shall always feel a cheerfulness in serving under him, whenever the exigencies of the country may require it."†

General Thomas Scott, of Indiana, under date of Vincennes, July 25, 1823, says:

"I have thought, and still think, that few generals would have faced danger at so many points as general Harrison did in the action of Tippecanoe. Wherever the action was warmest, was general Harrison to be found, and heard encouraging and cheering the officers and soldiers."‡

Mr. Adam Walker, of Keene, New Hampshire, a printer by profession, who was in the action, says, in his published journal:

"General Harrison received a shot through the rim of his hat. In the heat of the action his voice was frequently heard, and easily distinguished, giving his orders in the same calm, cool and collected manner, with which we had been used to receive them on drill or parade. The confidence of the troops in the general was unlimited."

General John O'Fallon, now residing in St. Louis, a nephew of general George Rogers Clark, and a gallant

* Dawson.

† Ib.

‡ Ib.

officer of the late war, having distinguished himself at the siege of Fort Meigs and the battle of the Thames, in a late speech, at a public meeting in that city, in speaking of general Harrison, says :

“ At the age of nineteen, I first became acquainted with the distinguished patriot in whose behalf we have assembled, and having been by his side through nearly the whole of the late war, I can bear testimony to his cool, undaunted and collected courage, as well as to his skill, as an able, efficient and active officer. After the battle of Tippecanoe, which has thrown so much glory over our country's arms, *it was universally admitted that general Harrison was the only officer that could have saved the army from defeat and massacre.*”

In dismissing this part of our subject, it is proper to say, that at the commencement of the attack, the commander-in-chief had risen, and was seated by the fire in conversation with Wells, Taylor, Owen and Hurst, the three latter his aids-de-camp, and the former commanding the mounted riflemen. These individuals had been awakened by their commander, before four o'clock, and preparations were making, at the moment of the attack, for the troops generally to turn out. Additional testimony, of a high and unimpeachable character, might, if necessary, be adduced to repel the charge of governor Harrison's having been taken by surprise.

Another charge circulated against the commander-in-chief, is, that he put the gallant Daviess on his white horse, in consequence of which that officer lost his life. In reply to this unfounded allegation, it is only necessary to say, that Major Daviess was killed whilst bravely charging on *foot*, and that he was not on general Harrison's horse, nor any other horse during the engagement. This charge has been varied so as to make Owen, instead of Daviess, the individual who was killed on general Harrison's white horse. This is equally untrue. Owen was killed upon his own white horse, and was not, at any time, during the action, on either of general Harrison's horses. The facts in this case have been stated, distinctly, by the commander-in-chief, in a letter to Dr. Scott of Frankfort, Kentucky.

"I had in the campaign, for my own riding, a gray mare and a sorrel horse. They were both fine riding nags, but the mare was uncommonly spirited and active. I generally rode them alternately, day and day about. On the day we got to the town, I was on the mare, and as it was our invariable rule to have the horses saddled and bridled through the night, the saddle was kept upon her, and, like other horses belonging to my family, she was tied to a picket driven into the ground, in the rear of my marquee, and between that and the baggage wagon. In the night the mare pulled up the picket and got loose. The dragoon sentinel awakening my servant George, the latter caught the mare, and tied her to the wagon wheel on the back side. When the alarm took place I called for the mare. George, being aroused from his sleep, and confoundedly frightened, forgot that he had removed her to the other side of the wagon, and was unable to find her. In the meantime, major Taylor's servant had brought up his horse. The major observed that I had better mount him, and he would get another and follow me. I did so. Poor Owen accompanied me, mounted upon a remarkably white horse. Before we got to the angle, which was first attacked, Owen was killed. I at that time supposed that it was a ball which had passed over the heads of the infantry that had killed him; but I am persuaded that he was killed by one of the two Indians who got within the lines, and that it was extremely probable that they mistook him for me. Taylor joined me in a few minutes after, mounted on my gray mare. I immediately directed him to go and get another. He returned to my quarters, and preferring my sorrel horse to another of his own that was there, mounted him, and we thus continued on each other's horses, till near the close of the action. Being then with both my aids-de-camp, Taylor and Hurst, in the rear of the right flank line, the fire of several Indians near to the line was directed at us. One of their balls killed the horse that Taylor was riding, and another passed through the sleeve of his coat, a third wounded the horse I was riding in the head, and a fourth was very near terminating my earthly career."

In December, 1811, the legislative council, and house

of representatives of the Indiana territory, presented an address to governor Harrison, in reference to the battle of Tippecanoe, in which they bear testimony to his "superior capacity," "integrity," and "other qualities which adorn the mind in a superlative degree."

In December, 1811, the Hon. John J. Crittenden moved the following resolution in the legislature of Kentucky, which, after being fully discussed, was carried with only two or three dissenting votes.

"Resolved, that in the late campaign against the Indians on the Wabash, governor William Henry Harrison has, in the opinion of this legislature, behaved like a hero, a patriot and a general; and that for his cool, deliberate, skillful, and gallant conduct in the late battle of Tippecanoe, he well deserves the warmest thanks of the nation." This resolution was approved by governor Scott.

President Madison, on the 18th of December, 1811, in a message to Congress, says, in regard to this battle:

"While it is deeply lamented that so many valuable lives have been lost in the action which took place on the 7th ultimo, congress will see with satisfaction the dauntless spirit and fortitude displayed by every description of the troops engaged, as well as the collected firmness which distinguished their commander on an occasion requiring the utmost exertion of valor and discipline."

M'Afee in his History of the Late War, says: "After much altercation, by which the battle of Tippecanoe was fought over again, and fully investigated, in all the public circles of the western country, the public opinion preponderated greatly in favor of the governor. All the material accusations of his enemies were disproved; and after all the testimony had been heard, the common opinion seemed to be, that the army had been conducted with prudence, and that the battle had been fought as well as it could have been by any general, considering the time and manner of the attack."

Dawson, in his Life of Harrison, says: "The battle of Tippecanoe had a different character from any one that had ever before been fought with the Indians. A victory had never been obtained over them where the force on

both sides was nearly equal, and in no battle that had ever before been fought with them, were there so many killed in proportion to the number engaged." The same writer adds: "That mutual confidence which ought always to subsist between the commander of an army and the troops commanded, perhaps never had been in a higher degree manifested, than at the battle of Tippecanoe. Wherever his presence was required during the action, there was the governor to be found. The plan he had laid down previous to the battle, was so well understood by his men, that, notwithstanding the enemy was not really expected that night, within less than two minutes after the first fire was heard, every man was at his post."

Judge Hall, himself an officer in the late war with Great Britain, in speaking of the battle of Tippecanoe, says: "As far as any commander is entitled to credit, independent of his army, he (general Harrison,) merits and has received it. He shared every danger and fatigue to which his army was exposed. In the battle he was in more peril than any other individual; for he was personally known to every Indian, and exposed himself fearlessly, on horseback, at all points of the attack, during the whole engagement. Every important movement was made by his express order."

Finally, we take leave of this subject, in the language of the same eloquent writer: "The field of Tippecanoe has become classic ground; the American traveler pauses there to contemplate a scene which has become hallowed by victory; the people of Indiana contemplate with pride the battle-ground on which their militia won imperishable honor, and their infant state became enrolled in the ranks of patriotism."*

* Hall's Memoir of Harrison.

CHAPTER V.

Governor Harrison visits Kentucky.—Appointed Major General in the Militia of that state.—Brigadier in the United States army.—Commander-in-chief of the North-western army.—Relieves Fort Wayne.—Leads an expedition against the Wabash Indians.—Appoints Winchester to the command of the left wing of the army.—Refutation of the charge that he had intrigued for Winchester's command.—Reconciles the troops to serve under Winchester.—Plan of campaign.

DURING the early part of the year 1812, the Indians, instigated by British influence, continued their depredations on the north-western frontiers, notwithstanding their signal defeat at Tippecanoe. This led the governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky, to engage in the work of placing their respective states and territories in a posture of defence, or in raising volunteers for border operations. On the 18th of June, a new aspect was given to the affairs of the west, by the declaration of war, made by the United States against Great Britain. This measure, while it was hailed with patriotic enthusiasm, throughout the west, brought with it many fearful apprehensions of danger and bloodshed, in consequence of the defenceless condition of the north-western frontier. It is honorable to the patriotism and military talents of governor Harrison, that in this hour of peril, the people of the west looked up to him, as the soldier who was to protect their homes and repel invasion.

The secretary at war had directed governor Harrison to take command of all the troops of the Indiana and Illinois territories, to carry on the war against the Indians in that quarter; and had also authorized him to call on the governor of Kentucky, for any portion of the quota of five thousand five hundred men of that state, not in service. Under this authority, and on the invitation of governor Scott, he visited Kentucky, in the month of August, to confer in regard to these troops; and was received with distinguished honors by the people and the

public authorities. Previous to this time, about eighteen hundred volunteers, part of the quota of five thousand five hundred men, under the command of general John Payne, had been ordered to rendezvous at Georgetown, preparatory to marching to reinforce general Hull. There was a pervading public sentiment, that governor Harrison should head these troops; but the authority with which he was invested by the president, did not entitle him to command any corps not intended for operations in the western territories. Governor Harrison not being a citizen of Kentucky, the executive of that state had technical difficulties to surmount in giving him the appointment, although wished by the army at Detroit, and sanctioned by the public feeling throughout the state. He accordingly called a council of such members of congress, and officers of the state and general governments, as could be hastily assembled. Among them were ex-governors Shelby and Greenup, Henry Clay, Judge Todd, of the supreme court of the United States, Judge Innis, of the federal court, general Samuel Hopkins, and colonel R. M. Johnson, who unanimously advised governor Scott to give Harrison a brevet commission of major-general in the Kentucky militia; and authorize him to take the command of the detachment under Payne, then marching to Detroit. The appointment was accordingly made on the 25th of August.

At this time, brigadier-general James Winchester, of the army of the United States, was recruiting at Lexington. Having written to the secretary at war, that he intended to assume the command of the troops under Payne, he set off and overtook the detachment at Cincinnati. Upon general Harrison's arrival at that place, on the morning of the 27th, he informed general Winchester of the authority he had received to take command of the Kentucky troops, but invited him to continue with the army. General Winchester, however, returned to Lexington. On the 28th, general Harrison wrote to the secretary at war, announcing the appointment he had received from the governor of Kentucky; and, in a lucid and able manner, suggested a plan of operations for the defence of the north-west. On the 30th, he left Cincinnati,

and joined his troops on the following day, forty miles north of that place. On the 2nd of September, near Piqua, he was overtaken by an express, from the war department, informing him that he had been appointed a brigadier-general in the United States army, and assigned the command of the troops in Indiana and Illinois,—the acceptance of which appointment he held under advisement. On the 3rd, he reached Piqua, when he learned that Fort Wayne was invested by the Indians. Before reaching Piqua, he was informed that general Winchester had been directed by the secretary at war, to command in person, the detachment ordered to reinforce general Hull. This order had been given before the department had been informed of the commission which the governor of Kentucky had conferred upon general Harrison. He immediately wrote to general Winchester, to come to Piqua, and assume the command of the detachment. On the 4th of September, hearing that a body of British and Indians had left Malden, to assist in reducing Fort Wayne, he determined not to wait for Winchester, but to move to the relief of that place, which was reached on the morning of the 12th. The Indians fled upon the approach of the army, without having effected the reduction of the fort.

General Winchester not having arrived, General Harrison determined to employ the troops in destroying the Indian towns on the Wabash and Elk Hart. Colonel Wells led a body of troops to the latter place, and the general, in person, headed those destined to the former. At both places, the Indian settlements were broken up, and large quantities of corn destroyed. After the return of the troops to Fort Wayne, general Winchester arrived and took command of that portion of the army which had been assigned to him by the war department, composed of the regiments of Allen, Lewis and Scott, of the Kentucky troops, Garrard's troop of cavalry of the same state, and a part of the 17th U. S. regiment of infantry, under Wells. The command of the residue of the Kentucky troops, embracing Simrall's regiment of cavalry, and the regiments of infantry under Jennings, Poague and Barbee, was retained by general Harrison, they hav-

ing been placed under him, as governor of Indiana, by the secretary at war. This change of commanders, was very unacceptable to the first named detachment, the troops having become enthusiastically attached to general Harrison. From the general order, issued by him, at Fort Wayne, on the 19th, upon turning over the command to Winchester, the following paragraph is taken.

“If any thing could soften the regret which the general feels at parting with troops which have so entirely won his confidence and affection, it is the circumstance of his committing them to the charge of one of the heroes of our glorious revolution; a man distinguished as well for the service he has rendered the country, as for the possession of every qualification which constitutes the gentleman.”

It required, indeed, all the influence of general Harrison and the officers of the detachment, to reconcile the men to this change of commanders.

On the 24th, a letter was received from the war department, by general Harrison, in reply to his communications from Cincinnati, in which the secretary assured him, that in taking the command of the north-western frontier, he had “anticipated the wishes of the president.” A few days afterwards, he received another dispatch from the department, dated on the 17th of September, announcing that the president had appointed him to the command of the whole western department of the army. Connected with this appointment, was the following order: “Having provided for the protection of the western frontier, you will retake Detroit, and with a view to the conquest of Upper Canada, you will penetrate the country as far as the force under your command will justify.” In a letter to governor Shelby of the same date, the secretary says: “to meet existing contingencies, after consulting the lawful authority vested in the president, it has been determined to vest the command of all forces on the western and north-western frontier, in an officer whose military character and knowledge of the country appeared to be combined with the public confidence. General Harrison has accordingly been appointed to the chief command, with authority to employ offi-

cers, and to draw from the public stores, and every other practicable source, all the means of effectuating the object of his command."

This was in reply to a letter, in which the patriotic governor had suggested to the president the expediency of his appointing a board of war, similar to that appointed by Washington, in 1791, to direct the military operations in this region. It shows the unlimited confidence reposed by president Madison, in general Harrison. The command assigned to him under such flattering circumstances, involved duties of the most responsible kind, and required talents of the highest order.

General M'Afee, an officer in the late war, in referring to this appointment, says: "The services which he was required to perform, were, in the opinion of old, experienced and able officers, the most extensive and arduous, that had ever been required from any military commander in America. The endless number of posts and scattered settlements which he was obliged to maintain and protect, against numerous and scattered bands of Indians, while he was contending with difficulties almost insurmountable, in the main expedition against Malden, were sufficient to employ all the time, and talents, and resources of the greatest military genius at the head of a well appointed army."

When general Harrison was directed to repair to the frontier of Ohio, the secretary at war authorized him to designate an officer to take command of the troops intended to operate in the direction of the Wabash and Illinois rivers. On the 22nd of September, under date from St. Mary's, the general appointed major-general Hopkins, of Kentucky, to this command. At the same time, colonel Russel himself, one of the heroes of King's Mountain, was leading an expedition of mounted rangers, against the Indians of the Peoria towns, in Illinois.

The commander-in-chief, under date of Piqua, 27th of September, announced to the war department, his arrangements for the campaign in the following terms:—"The final arrangement for the march of the army towards Detroit is as follows: The right column, composed of the Pennsylvania and Virginia troops, are directed

to rendezvous at Wooster, a town upon the head waters of Mohecan, John's creek, thirty-five miles north of Mount Vernon, and forty-five miles west of Canton, and proceed from thence by Upper Sandusky, to the rapids of the Miami. The middle column, consisting of twelve hundred Ohio militia, will march from Urbana, where they now are, taking general Hull's track to the Rapids; and the left column, composed of a detachment of regulars, under colonel Wells, and six Kentucky regiments, will proceed from Fort Defiance down the Miami, to the Rapids. The mounted force, under an officer whom I shall select for that purpose, will take the route mentioned in my former letter, from Fort Wayne up the St. Joseph's, and across the waters of the river Raisin. Upon reflection, I am induced to abandon the scheme of attacking Detroit; for should it be successful, as the infantry will not be in readiness to support them, it must necessarily be abandoned, and the inhabitants be more exposed to the depredations of the Indians than they now are. A more useful employment will be, to sweep the western side of the strait and lake, of the Indians who are scattered from Brownstown to the Rapids, rioting upon the plunder of the farms which have been abandoned."

From Fort Wayne, general Winchester proceeded down the Miami of the lake to Defiance, but was impeded in his march by a large body of Indians, and some British troops, with artillery. Of the advance of this force towards Fort Wayne, general Harrison was informed on the same day, by two expresses, one from governor Meigs, enclosing a letter from Cleveland, and the other from general Winchester. General Harrison, on the evening of the same day, started to Defiance with two regiments of infantry, and the whole of the mounted men, and reached that place on the 2nd of October; but the enemy had passed that point, some days before. In the march to Defiance, the troops suffered greatly: the weather was cold and inclement, and the want of tents was severely felt. The general shared the same privations as his troops, and by his fortitude and cheerfulness, served to encourage his men. While at Defiance, news reached the army, that general Harrison had been ap-

pointed to the command of the whole north-western department,—a fact which gave great satisfaction to the troops, and contributed to reconcile them to the arduous service in which they were engaged. When making this appointment, the department had given to general Winchester, the option of remaining with Harrison, or of joining the army on the Niagara frontier. General Harrison, in announcing his appointment to general Winchester, says: "Need I add, that it will give me the most heartfelt pleasure, if you could determine to remain with us." On the 3rd of October, at camp Defiance, under a general order, in yielding up the command of his detachment, general Winchester said:

"I have the honor of announcing to this army the arrival of general Harrison, who is duly authorized by the executive of the federal government, to take the command of the north-western army.

"This officer, enjoying the implicit confidence of the states, from whose citizens this army is and will be collected, and possessing himself, great military skill and reputation, the general is confident in the belief that his presence in this army, in the character of its chief, will be hailed with universal approbation."

General Winchester, preferring the service in the north-west, to that on the Niagara frontier, general Harrison immediately invested him with the command of the left wing of the army, the advance portion of which was then at Fort Defiance.

An accusation has been preferred against general Harrison, by Winchester and his friends, that he had intrigued with the war department to obtain the command, with which he was now invested. This charge is founded on the fact that the officers of the regiments of Poague, Jennings, and Barbee, had requested the president to appoint general Harrison to the supreme command in the west. It is to be borne in mind, that Winchester had no right to command these regiments—they had been distinctly assigned to Harrison by the proper authority. Winchester had no command but of the single detachment sent from Kentucky for the relief of Hull. How then could the memorial of Harrison's own officers, in

favor of his being made commander-in-chief, interfere with the rights of general Winchester, when he never had been invested with, nor promised that station? The memorial did not ask that Winchester should be suspended in the command of his particular detachment, but simply that Harrison should be placed in a new position. This charge has been fully met, however, by the written statements of general Waller Taylor, late of Indiana, the Rev. Samuel Shannon, captain John Arnold, the Rev. James Sugget, and general Thomas Bodley, of Kentucky; all of whom were present with the army at the period of this alledged intrigue. Their statements, made in 1817, '18 and '19, are published at length in Dawson's Life of Harrison. They prove substantially and fully, that when general Winchester arrived at Fort Wayne to take command of the detachment assigned him by the secretary at war, that great disapprobation was expressed by the officers and men, at the circumstance; that the dissatisfaction was so great as to amount almost to open mutiny—that Harrison, by his general orders and his personal appeals to the officers and troops, did much to reconcile them to the change, and, in short, that but for *his* influence and most active exertions, the men would have refused to serve under general Winchester.

It is due to the reputation of general Winchester, to add, that the principal objection of the volunteers to serving under him, arose from the fact of his being an officer in the regular army. They had no personal objection to him. Indeed, it was not so much a dislike to general Winchester, which created the difficulty, as a desire to serve under one who had so recently gained the brilliant victory of Tippecanoe, and was familiar with Indian warfare.

From Defiance, general Harrison returned to St. Mary's, and from thence passed through Piqua and Urbana to Franklinton, which was the line of march for the right wing of the army. His object in returning to this place was to hasten the supplies of provisions, clothing and ammunition, and make other arrangements for the advance of the troops. While at St. Mary's, on his way

to Franklinton, he was informed that Fort Wayne was again invested. He forthwith dispatched colonel Allen Trimble, with five hundred mounted riflemen, to the relief of the place. At Franklinton, he received a dispatch from the worthy officer commanding this expedition, informing him of its partial failure, in consequence of the defection of one half of his troops, who abandoned him upon reaching Fort Wayne. He proceeded, however, with the remainder, and destroyed two Indian villages.

About the same time, intelligence reached the commander-in-chief, of the failure of the expedition under general Hopkins, against the Indian villages on the Illinois river. Another expedition, prosecuting at the same time, and in the same region, under governor Edwards and colonel Russel, surprised the Kickapoo town of Peoria, at the head of Peoria lake, and either killed or dispersed the inhabitants. In connection with these operations, the brilliant defence of Fort Harrison, under the command of the gallant captain, Zachary Taylor, may be named. It covered that young officer with glory, and led to his being honored with the brevet commission of major, in the United States army.

CHAPTER VI.

Movements of the army.—Tupper's expedition to the Rapids.—Campbell's expedition to Mississiniway.—General Harrison recommends a fleet on lake Erie.—Plan of operations for the campaign.—Again urges on the Secretary at War the necessity of a fleet on lake Erie.—Winchester's movement to the Rapids.—His movement to the river Raisin, and defeat on the 22nd of January.—The question examined, on whom rests the blame of that defeat.—Opinion of Wood—M'Afee's opinions.—Address of the Kentucky and Ohio officers.

WE now recur to movements more immediately under the direction of the commander-in-chief. "The troops

advancing on the line of operations, which passed from Delaware, by Upper to Lower Sandusky, composed of the brigades from Virginia and Pennsylvania, and that of Perkins' from Ohio, were designated in general orders, and commonly known as the right wing of the army; Tupper's brigade from Ohio, moving on Hull's road, formed the centre division; and the Kentuckians, under Winchester, were styled the left wing."

Early in November, general Tupper of the Ohio militia, with a detachment of six hundred and fifty men, marched to the rapids of the Miami of the lake, for the purpose of attacking a force of several hundred Indians, and some British troops, who were at that point gathering corn. Before starting, he advised general Winchester of the intended movement. He reached the foot of the Rapids, and made an effort to cross the river in the night, for the purpose of meeting the enemy next morning. Failing in this, he dispatched an express to general Winchester, on the 14th, stating his situation, and asking for a reinforcement.

After further ineffectual attempts to cross the river, and to decoy the enemy across, he returned to his encampment. M'Afee, in his history of the war, thus notices the progress and result of the expedition: "When Tupper's second express reached general Winchester's camp, he found that a detachment of four hundred men had been sent out under the command of colonel Lewis, to march to his support; they proceeded, on the morning of the 15th, down the left bank of the river, and in the course of the night ensign Charles S. Todd was sent with a few men by colonel Lewis to apprise Tupper of his approach, to concert the time and manner of forming a junction of the two corps. Todd found Tupper's camp evacuated, and the bodies of two men, who had been killed and scalped. Todd returning with this information to colonel Lewis, that officer retreated with his command to Winchester's camp. If this expedition did not produce all the good which might have resulted from it, it was of great service in one particular. The detachment of British and Indians, consisting of about four hundred of the latter, and seventy-five of the former, fell back upon the

river Raisin, and gave up the idea of removing the corn from the abandoned farms at the Rapids, which was the object of their being at that place."

About the period of this enterprise, the commander-in-chief resolved to send an expedition against the Indian towns on the Mississiniway river, one of the branches of the Wabash. This measure was rendered the more necessary from the failure of the expedition under general Hopkins, already mentioned. The detachment was placed under lieutenant colonel Campbell, of the 19th United States regiment. It was composed of six hundred mounted men. They left Franklinton on the 25th of November, passed Greenville on the 14th of December, and reached the first village on the Mississiniway, on the 18th, which was attacked, and eight men killed, and forty-two prisoners taken. Two other towns were visited and destroyed, the inhabitants having fled. Before day on the following morning, the Indians attacked colonel Campbell's camp. A severe action of an hour ensued, when the Indians were finally charged with great spirit and dispersed. They left fifteen dead on the ground, others were thrown into the river or carried off. Colonel Campbell had eight killed, and forty-eight wounded. When the detachment reached Greenville, on their return, one-half of it was unfit for duty, being either wounded, frost-bitten, or sick. General Harrison issued a general order, after the expedition was terminated, from which we quote the concluding paragraph. It must be universally admired, not less for the beauty of the sentiment, than the eloquence with which it is expressed :

"But the character of this gallant detachment, exhibiting as it did, perseverance, fortitude and bravery, would, however, be incomplete, if in the midst of victory they had forgotten the feelings of humanity. It is with the sincerest pleasure, that the general has heard that the most punctual obedience was paid to his orders, in not only saving all the women and children, but in sparing all the warriors who ceased to resist; and, that when vigorously attacked by the enemy, the claims of mercy prevailed over every sense of their own danger, and the

heroic band respected the lives of their prisoners. Let an account of murdered innocence be opened in the records of Heaven, against our enemies alone. The American soldier will follow the example of his government, and the sword of the one, will not be raised against the fallen and the helpless, nor the gold of the other paid for the scalps of a massacred enemy."

The troops composing the left wing of the army, having finished the erection of Fort Winchester, were directed by the commander-in-chief, early in December, to march to the Rapids, so soon as provisions for a few weeks had been accumulated. On the 12th of this month, general Harrison, in a letter to the war department, says: "If there were not some important political reason, urging the recovery of the Michigan territory, and the capture of Malden, as soon as these objects can possibly be effected; and that to accomplish them a few weeks sooner, expense was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say, that if a small proportion of the sums, which will be expended in the quarter-master's department, in the active prosecution of the campaign, during the winter, was devoted to the obtaining the command of lake Erie, the wishes of the government in their utmost extent, could be accomplished without difficulty, in the months of April and May. Malden, Detroit and Macinaw, would fall in rapid succession." The necessity of securing the naval ascendancy of lake Erie, had been forcibly pointed out to the government, by general Harrison, as early as the year 1809.

On the 20th, the commander-in-chief established his head quarters at Upper Sandusky. Whilst here, he received a communication from colonel Campbell, informing him of the result of the Mississiniway expedition. He forthwith started for Chillicothe, to consult with governor Meigs about another expedition against the Indians of that quarter. At Franklinton he received a letter from the new secretary at war, Mr. Monroe, in which he is informed that the president, having great confidence in the solidity of his opinion, leaves the object of the campaign entirely to the decision of general Harrison, and promises the support of the government to any measures

he may think proper to adopt. In a letter from Franklin, dated the 4th of January, 1813, the general says to the department: "My plan of operations has been, and now is, to occupy the Miami Rapids, and to deposit there as much provisions as possible; to move from thence with a choice detachment of the army, and with as much provision, artillery and ammunition, as the means of transportation will allow—make a demonstration towards Detroit, and by a sudden passage of the strait upon the ice, an actual investiture of Malden." On the 8th, in another letter, the general says: "Should our offensive operations be suspended until spring, it is my decided opinion, that the most effectual and cheapest plan will be to obtain the command of the lake. 'This being once effected, every difficulty will be removed. An army of four thousand men, landed on the north side of the lake, below Malden, will soon reduce that place—retake Detroit, and, with the aid of the fleet, proceed down the lake to co-operate with the army from Niagara.'" A few days after the date of this letter, the general returned to Upper Sandusky, where troops and supplies for the army were rapidly accumulating.

We again return to the left wing of the army. M'Affee, in his "History of the Late War," says:

"General Harrison had expected, on his first arrival at Upper Sandusky, about the 18th of December, to be met there by an express from general Winchester, with information of his advance to the Rapids, in conformity with the advice which had previously been given him. As no such information had arrived, he soon afterwards dispatched ensign C. S. Todd, division judge advocate of the Kentucky troops, to Winchester's camp, on the Miami below Defiance. Todd was accompanied by two gentlemen of the Michigan territory, and three Wyandott Indians. He proceeded directly across the country, and performed the journey with a degree of secrecy and dispatch highly honorable to his skill and enterprise, having completely eluded all the scouts of the enemy. He was instructed to communicate to general Winchester the following directions and plans from the commander-in-chief: "that as soon as he had accumulated provisions

for twenty days, he was authorized to advance to the Rapids, where he was to commence the building of huts, to induce the enemy to believe that he was going into winter quarters; that he was to construct sleds for the main expedition against Malden, but to impress it on the minds of his men that they were for transporting provisions from the interior; that the different lines of the army would be concentrated at that place, and a choice detachment from the whole would then be marched rapidly on Malden; that in the meantime he was to occupy the Rapids, for the purpose of securing the provisions and stores forwarded from the other wings of the army."

On the 22nd, a moderate supply of provisions and clothing were received by general Winchester. On the 30th, the march for the Rapids was commenced, and, at the same time, Mr. Leslie Combs, a volunteer in the army, was sent to inform the commander-in-chief of the movement; but owing to a severe snow-storm, he did not reach him, at Upper Sandusky, until the 11th of January.

While on his march to the Rapids, a dispatch was received by Winchester, from general Harrison, recommending him to abandon the movement to the Rapids, and fall back to Fort Jennings. This was owing to the information brought by colonel Campbell, from Mississineway, in regard to the Indians; but the recommendation was not followed. On the 10th of January, the detachment under Winchester reached the Rapids. On the 11th, a dispatch was sent to inform the commander-in-chief of the arrival of the troops at that point; but the communication was transmitted by the persons who were taking the worn-out pack horses to Fort McArthur, a place as distant from the Rapids as Upper Sandusky and from which it must then pass through a swampy wilderness of forty miles, to the head quarters of the general, and was finally received by him at the Rapids, the point from whence it started.

On the 12th, general Winchester forwarded another letter by the same kind of conveyance, to the commander-in-chief, at Sandusky, saying, that no reliance could be placed on retaining any of the Kentucky troops, after the expiration of their term of service, in February. This

communication was sent to Lower Sandusky, with this endorsement on the back, "general Tupper will please to forward this letter by express. J. Winchester." It did not reach the commander-in-chief until the morning of the 16th, and was the *first* information which he had received of Winchester's arrival at the Rapids, although general Harrison had directed him to forward intelligence of that event as early as possible, that he might send on the remaining stores and troops.

On the evening of the 13th, two Frenchmen arrived from the river Raisin, with information that the Indians had threatened to attack their town, and asking assistance from general Winchester. On the 14th and 16th, other messengers arrived in camp, making similar appeals. Great ardor now prevailed among the troops to march to Raisin, and a majority of officers concurring, general Winchester agreed to the movement. Raisin is thirty-six miles from the Rapids, and eighteen from Malden. On the morning of the 17th, colonel Lewis, with a detachment of men, moved down to Presque Isle, a distance of twenty miles. Here he ascertained that four hundred Indians were at the Raisin, and that Elliott was expected from Malden, with a detachment to attack the camp at the Rapids. This information was sent back to Winchester, who forwarded it in a dispatch to the commander-in-chief, with information of the movement he was making to Frenchtown. The dispatch was sent by way of Lower Sandusky, and was met at this place by general Harrison, on the morning of the 19th.

On the 18th, Lewis reached Frenchtown, on the Raisin, met the enemy at that place, attacked and defeated them, with considerable loss. On the night of the 18th, a messenger was sent to Winchester with news of the result. The intelligence made the troops under him anxious to move on to Frenchtown. On the 20th, at night, Winchester, with all the troops that could be spared from the Rapids, reached Frenchtown, and encamped in an open lot of ground, on the right of Lewis' detachment, which was defended by some garden pickets. Colonel Wells commanded the reinforcement. To him, general Winchester named, but did not direct a breast-work, for

the defence of his camp. The general himself established his head-quarters in a house on the opposite side of the river, more than a half a mile from his troops. On the 21st, a spot was selected for the whole army to camp in good order, with a determination to fortify on the next day. Certain information was received through the day, that the British were preparing to make an attack, and that it would be made with dispatch. Colonel Wells obtained leave, in the evening, to return to the Rapids, which place he reached that night, and found general Harrison, who had arrived the day before, and had made every exertion in his power to hasten on a reinforcement. It should here be stated, that when general Harrison, on the 11th, was advised by Mr. Combs' dispatch, of general Winchester's movement towards the Raisin, he ordered on some droves of hogs, and held the artillery in readiness to march as soon as he should be advised of the arrival of the detachment at the Rapids. On the 16th, the commander-in-chief was *first* informed of Winchester's arrival at the Rapids, and that he *meditated* a movement against the enemy, and had sent to Perkins, at Lower Sandusky, for a battalion of men. General Harrison immediately gave orders for the artillery to advance by the way of Portage river, with a guard of three hundred men under major Orr. Escorts of provisions were ordered on the same route; but owing to the badness of the roads, slow progress was made. At the same time an express was sent to the Rapids for information, which was to return and meet the commander-in-chief at Lower Sandusky, which place he reached on the following night. On the 18th, a battalion, under major Cotgreave, was started from the Rapids. General Harrison determined to follow, that he might have a personal consultation with Winchester. At four o'clock, on the morning of the 19th, he received a letter from Winchester, announcing Lewis' advance to the Raisin, and the objects of the expedition. He immediately ordered the remaining regiment of Perkins' brigade to march to the Rapids, and proceeded there himself. On his way he met an express, with intelligence of Lewis' battle on the 18th. On the morning of the 20th, he reached the Rap-

ids, and found that Winchester had marched the evening before for the river Raisin, having left Payne in his camp with three hundred men. Major Cotgreave was so impeded by bad roads and ice, that on the night of the 21st, he was yet fifteen miles from Raisin. When general Harrison reached the Rapids, on the 20th, he sent captain Hart express to Frenchtown, that Winchester might be informed of the movements in the rear, and with instructions to the general "to maintain the position at the river Raisin at any rate." On the 21st, a dispatch was received from general Winchester, in which he stated, that if his force was increased to one thousand or twelve hundred, he could maintain the ground he had gained. On the evening of that day, Perkins' brigade reached the Rapids, and the remaining Kentuckians, under Payne, were ordered to march to Winchester, which they did next morning. The corps under Cotgreave and Payne, would have made the army under Winchester considerably stronger than the amount deemed by him sufficient to hold his position. At 12 o'clock, A. M. of the 22nd, news of the attack on Winchester reached the Rapids. General Harrison immediately ordered the regiment of Perkins' brigade to march with all possible expedition, and proceeded himself after the detachment under Payne, which he soon overtook. In a short time some men were met, who announced the total defeat of Winchester's forces, and that the British and Indians were pursuing them to the Rapids. This report induced the general to hasten on with still greater rapidity. In a short time, other fugitives were met, who stated that the defeat was total, and that resistance on the part of our troops had ceased early in the day. A council of the general and field officers was then held, who decided that it was imprudent and unnecessary to proceed any further. Some parties of active and enterprising men were sent forward to assist and bring in those who might have escaped. The rest of the detachment returned to the Rapids.

The tragical events which occurred at Frenchtown, on the 22nd and 23rd, would require, in their detail, more space than can be assigned them in this work. They filled the West with mourning, and have been again and

again recounted, in every part of our land. Winchester had with him in all, nine hundred men. The British and Indians, by whom he was defeated, amounted to near three thousand. The loss of Winchester was two hundred and ninety in killed, massacred and missing. Only thirty-three escaped to the Rapids. The British took five-hundred and forty-seven prisoners, and the Indians forty-five. The loss of the British in killed and wounded is supposed to have been between three and four hundred.

So great a disaster, as the defeat at the river Raisin, created much excitement throughout the country. The question arises, upon whom the blame of this defeat should rest? We propose to say a few words upon this subject. In doing so, we disclaim, in advance, all unkind feeling towards the name and fame of general Winchester, who was a brave soldier of the revolution, and is now "gathered to his fathers,"—two circumstances sufficient to disarm criticism, and allay censure. Our only object is to show that the blame of this calamity cannot, with any justice whatever, be laid upon the commander-in-chief.

General Harrison has been censured for the advance of Winchester to the river Raisin; and, for not reinforcing him when there.

The instructions sent by general Harrison to Winchester, which were delivered to him on the 24th of December, at his camp, a few miles below Fort Defiance, by ensign Todd, were, that he should move to the Rapids, when twenty days' provisions had been accumulated—that when he reached that place, he was to build huts, as if going into winter quarters, and then to construct sleds, for the main but secret expedition of the campaign, an attack upon Malden, contemplated by the commander-in-chief, after the other lines of the army had concentrated at the Rapids. While on his way to the Rapids, general Winchester received another dispatch from general Harrison, recommending him, in consequence of information received from colonel Campbell, of a large body of Indians on the Wabash, under Tecumthe, to abandon the movement to the Rapids, and fall back, with the greater part of his force, to Fort Jennings. This recommendation was disregarded. So far

from any authority being given *him* to make a movement from the Rapids, against the enemy, such a movement was in direct violation of the whole plan of the campaign, as communicated to him. Of course, general Winchester could have had no assurances of support, when making a movement not contemplated by the commander-in-chief, and in violation of his orders.

After general Harrison was informed that Winchester had arrived at the Rapids, which information did not reach him until the night of the 16th of January, and that he *meditated* some movement against the enemy, he did all in his power to hasten forward the necessary reinforcements. He was then at Upper Sandusky, sixty-five miles from the Rapids, and one hundred from Raisin, the point to which Winchester's *meditated* attack was directed. The space between the two former points, was a swampy wilderness, the ground partly frozen, and almost impassable for troops or artillery. The preceding narrative has shown the promptness and energy with which general Harrison pushed forward the reinforcements. His personal exertions to reach the scene of action, were very great. He started from Lower Sandusky in a sleigh, with general Perkins, and a servant, to overtake the battalion under Cotgreave. "As the sleigh went very slow, from the roughness of the road, he took the horse of his servant and pushed on alone. Night came upon him in the midst of the swamp, which was so imperfectly frozen, that the horse sunk to his belly at every step. He had no resource but to dismount and lead his horse, jumping, himself, from one sod to another, which was solid enough to support him. When almost exhausted, he met one of Cotgreave's men coming back to look for his bayonet. The general told him, he would not only pardon him for the loss, but supply him with another, if he would assist him to get his horse through the swamp. By his aid the general was enabled to reach the camp of the battalion."*

The gallant colonel Wood, than whom, on a question of this kind, there is no higher authority, says: "What

* M'Afee.

human means, in the control of general Harrison, could prevent the anticipated disaster, and save that corps, which was already looked upon as lost, as doomed to inevitable destruction? Certainly none—because neither orders to halt, nor troops to succor him, could be received in time, or at least that was the expectation. He was already in motion, and general Harrison still at Upper Sandusky, seventy miles in his rear. The weather was inclement—the snow was deep—and a large portion of the black swamp was yet open. What could a Turenne or an Eugene have done, under a pressure of embarrassing circumstances, more than Harrison *did*?”

After the action of the 18th, there were powerful reasons why general Winchester should not abandon his position. “The protection of the French inhabitants was now an imperative duty. The advance to their town had been made at their solicitation; and when the battle had commenced, many of them joined the American forces, and fought with great gallantry; and afterwards they attacked and killed the straggling Indians, wherever they met them. Their houses were open to our men, and they offered to give up the whole of the provisions, which yet remained to them, upon condition that they should not again be abandoned to the fury of the savages, or subjected for what they had done, to be immured in the prisons of Malden. The amount of provisions to be secured was believed to be very considerable. The duty of protecting the faithful inhabitants, however, had been so strongly impressed by their conduct, on the minds of general Winchester and his men, that an order to retreat would not, perhaps, have been very promptly obeyed.”

General M’Affee, another meritorious officer of the late war, in referring to this disastrous action, says:

“From the whole of the facts, which are now before the reader, he will be able to judge for himself, with respect to the causes of the disaster. The advance to the river Raisin was a very important movement; it was made from the best and most urgent motives; but it is questionable whether it was not too hazardous and premature. It was a rule with general Harrison, and undoubtedly a very good one, never, in Indian warfare, to

send out a detachment, unless indispensably necessary, and then to make it sufficiently strong to contend with the whole force of the enemy. The rule was peculiarly applicable in this instance. Frenchtown was within eighteen miles of Malden, the head quarters of the enemy, while it was more than double that distance from the Rapids, and about one hundred miles, on an average, from the other corps of the American army. The idea of reinforcing an advanced corps at that place, to support it against any speedy movement of the enemy, was hence altogether chimerical. It should have been strong enough in the first instance, or with the reinforcements to be immediately sent after it from the Rapids, to maintain its ground, against the whole disposable force of the enemy, for a week at least. And this was probably the case. The greatest error, judging from the information we possess, after the affair is over, does not appear to have been so much the advance of the detachment, as the neglect to fortify the camp. The force actually on the ground, if well posted and well defended by fortifications, and amply supplied with ammunition, could certainly have resisted such an attack as was made, until reinforcements had arrived. On the 21st, general Winchester thus addressed general Harrison: 'All accounts from Brownstown and Malden agree in stating, that the enemy is preparing to retake this place; if he effects his purpose, he will pay dear for it. A few pieces of artillery, however, would add to our strength, and give confidence to our friends in this place.' Though possessed of this information, and lying so near the enemy, that they could march at any time in the evening, and attack him before day next morning, yet he suffered his men to go to rest that night in an open camp, in which they had lain a whole day since his arrival at that place."

Colonel Wood says, again:

"Unsuspecting, and elated with this flash of success, the troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such quarters on the west side of the river, as might please him best; whilst the general, not liking to be amongst a parcel of noisy, dirty freemen, took his quarters on the east side! not the least regard being paid to de-

fence, order, regularity, or system in the posting of the different corps." After speaking of the battle and massacre, he proceeds: "thus was there a corps of one thousand men, the elite of the army, totally sacrificed, in the most wanton manner possible; and that too, without the slightest benefit to their country or posterity. With only one third or one fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen or heard the least of an enemy, and with but a very inadequate supply of ammunition; how he ever could have entertained the most distant hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is to me one of the strangest things in the world. An adept in the art of war is alone authorized to deviate from the ordinary and established rules, by which that art for a great length of time has been usefully and successfully applied.

"Winchester was destitute of every means of supporting his corps long at the river Raisin, was in the very jaws of the enemy, and beyond the reach of succor. He who fights with such flimsy pretensions to victory, will always be beaten, and eternally ought to be."

On the 13th of February, the field and platoon officers of all the Kentucky regiments, from which the detachment sent to the river Raisin, was formed, held a meeting and made the following address to general Harrison. It is dated at the Miami Rapids, and signed by R. M. Gano, M. D. Hardin, Patrick Gray, Thomas Morris, George Pugh, Joseph Redding, Thomas Story, James W. Gillaspie, James King, Joel Garnett, Peter Dudley, Thomas Brooks, R. C. Holder, Thomas Gest, S. W. McGowan, William Caldwell, Daniel Bowen, and Alexander Welch. They were near the scene of action, had every means of knowing the facts in the case, and were mourning over their friends, killed or massacred at the Raisin, when this address was made to the commander-in-chief:

"Although various causes have reduced the regiments to which we respectively belong to a very small number, we had flattered ourselves, when we marched from our late encampment, on Portage river, to this place, that

you would have been enabled immediately to have led us on, and to have given us an opportunity, under your immediate eye, to have avenged the injury sustained by our friends and our country, on the river Raisin, in the last month; to have regained the ground lost, and to have seen and aided you in repairing the loss sustained. Had circumstances justified you in proceeding, we could not have doubted the result under your auspices, and we should have remained with you, regardless of the time we had served, or the fatigues we had undergone, and uninfluenced by any pecuniary considerations. But, as events not within your control, seem to forbid immediate active operations, the time we have remained in the wilderness, as the advance of the north-western army, requires our return to civilized life and to our homes. When permitted to return, we shall, after a service of six months under you, carry back to our friends and our country, a confirmation of those high opinions of your military worth, which were formed upon a first acquaintance.

“Should circumstances again call us to the field, we should be highly gratified at being placed under your immediate command. In the meantime, permit us to assure you, that we entertain for you, individually, the highest sentiments of personal respect and esteem.”

In the month of February, the two brigades of Ohio militia, under Tupper and Perkins, were discharged. The general and field officers, on the 20th, at camp Miami Rapids, made an address to general Harrison. We quote the concluding paragraph:

“Great was the undertaking, and numerous the obstacles which opposed your progress: a wilderness of nearly one hundred and fifty miles was to be traversed, which, with its swamps and morasses, presented difficulties far greater than the Alps. Great as were these obstacles, relying on the willingness of your troops to endure any hardships, to reach the enemy, you rightly judged that they might be surmounted. A few weeks past, every circumstance united to promise you an immediate accomplishment of your designs. Large supplies of provisions, and numerous munitions of war were so far ad-

vanced as to be within your control; your troops, with an unbounded reliance on your judgment and skill, were eager to be led up to the enemy, and waited but your order to march; your exertions had been great, and every thing promised the suffering soldier a speedy reward for his toils. At this important moment the unfortunate movement of general Winchester to the river Raisin, with its unhappy consequences, (a movement we believe without your orders or concurrence) broke the successful chain of operations, and presented new and unlooked-for difficulties before you.

“On retiring from service, sir, we are happy in assuring you of our fullest confidence, and that of our respective commands, in the measures you have taken; they have been cautious, skillful, and guarded, such as would at this time have carried our arms to the walls of Malden, had not the unhappy occurrences at the river Raisin checked your progress, and for a short time thwarted your plans of operation. That you may soon teach the enemy the distinction between an honorable and savage warfare, by planting our standard in the heart of their country, and regain the honor and territory we have lost, and, as a just tribute to valor, toils and suffering, receive the grateful thanks of a generous and free people, is among the first, the warmest wishes of our hearts.”

This address is signed by Edward W. Tupper, Simon Perkins, Charles Miller, John Andrews, William Rayen, Robert Safford, N. Beasley, James Galloway, Solomon Bentley, George Darrow, W. W. Cotgreave, and Jacob Frederick.

The conclusions to which every candid mind must come, after a careful perusal of the preceding narrative, and the high testimony by which it is accompanied, are the following: 1. That general Winchester's movement to the river Raisin was in violation of the orders of general Harrison and the plan of the campaign. 2. That when informed of the movement, general Harrison did all in his power to reinforce the detachment under Winchester. 3. That after the movement had been made, and the battle of the 18th had occurred, it was inexpedient to abandon the place. 4. That if general Winches-

ter had taken the necessary steps to fortify his camp, and arrange his troops, the defeat of the 22nd of January would not, in all human probability, have taken place.

It is due to the reputation of general Winchester, to add, that in this unfortunate and unauthorized movement to the river Raisin, he was sustained, generally, by the officers and men of his corps. They were a gallant band, panting for an opportunity, before their return to Kentucky, to meet their country's enemy: this feeling, with the still nobler one of protecting the women and children of Frenchtown, from the tomahawk and scalping knife, contributed to overcome the moral firmness of general Winchester, and led him to a disobedience of orders: the same extenuation, however, cannot be pleaded for his conduct, in neglecting the most ordinary precautions for the safety of his camp, when within striking distance of a powerful and ferocious enemy, of whose meditated attack he had certain intelligence.

CHAPTER VII.

Movements of the North-western army, after the defeat at the river Raisin.—Establishment of Camp Meigs.—Kentucky and Ohio Militia discharged.—Termination of the first campaign.—Preparations for the next.—Colonel Morrison's opinion.—Siege of Fort Meigs.—Arrival of Kentucky troops under General Clay.—Dudley's defeat.—Brilliant sorties, 5th May.—Proctor's demand of a surrender.—His abandonment of the siege.—Gallant conduct of General Harrison.

ON the night of the 22nd of January, a council was called at the Rapids, by general Harrison, to determine whether it was probable the enemy would attack the camp at that place, and whether the force then in camp, consisting of nine hundred men, and a single piece of artillery, would be able to make an effectual resistance? The force of the enemy in the battle, was stated to be

from two to three thousand, with six pieces of artillery, principally howitzers. It was decided unanimously, to retire a short distance on the road, upon which the artillery and reinforcements were approaching. This movement was deemed to be prudent, from the fact that Winchester, with a larger force, had been defeated by the same enemy; and it was to be presumed that they would advance against the position at the Rapids, or do what was more to be deprecated, send the Indians to intercept those entrusted in the rear, with the artillery and provisions. The position which had been occupied, and partially fortified, at the Rapids, by general Winchester, was not capable of defence, and was situated on the wrong side of the river. Any rise in the river, or the breaking up of the ice, would have cut off general Harrison from his supplies of men and provisions; and although in such an event, his own reinforcements could not reach him, the Indians, at points above and below, could cross the river, and assail his rear. The council having determined upon the propriety of a retrograde movement, every military principle demanded that the provisions which could not be removed, should be destroyed, so as to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

General Harrison, having retired to Portage river, strongly fortified his camp, to wait for the artillery and a detachment of troops under general Leftwich. An unfortunate rain had arrested their progress twenty-five miles beyond this point, and general Leftwich did not arrive until the 30th of January, with his brigade, a regiment of Pennsylvania troops, and the greater part of the artillery. At this period, the benevolence of general Harrison's character was manifested in his sending Dr. McKeehan, of the Ohio militia, with a flag to Malden, to ascertain the condition of the wounded, and to carry them a sum of money in gold, to procure accommodations; but the flag was not respected, and he was robbed of his money.

On the first of February, general Harrison advanced with his whole force, amounting to seventeen hundred men, and encamped at the foot of the Rapids, on the south-east side, at the place which was called Camp Meigs. He still cherished the hope that the season

might so far favor his efforts as to enable him to execute the long contemplated expedition against Malden; and for this purpose ordered up all the troops in the rear, except some companies left to maintain the forts on the Auglaize and the St. Mary's. By the 15th of February, he intended to advance, disperse the Indians, destroy the shipping, and establish a post near Brownstown, until the season would permit the advance of the artillery. This was ordinarily the period when the most intense frosts rendered the lakes and swamps perfectly firm; but the weather continued so rainy, that the roads were broken up and traveling rendered unsafe. The period for which the Kentucky and Ohio troops had engaged to serve, was about to expire, and the roads and swamps were rendered almost impassable, even with a single horse. The balance of the troops, nor the necessary supplies, had not arrived at the Rapids. The general was, therefore, compelled reluctantly to abandon, for this season, any further advance towards Malden; thus terminating a campaign attended with great expense to the government, and severe hardships to the general and his men. But great as were the difficulties of prosecuting a winter campaign, in that swampy region, the industry of the general and the firmness of the men, would have surmounted them, but for the unfortunate movement to the river Raisin, and its disastrous results. The delay occasioned to the departure of the artillery and troops from the right wing, by general Winchester forwarding notice to head quarters, of his arrival at the Rapids, by the driver of the pack horses, led to the unfortunate defeat of Raisin; and with it, the defeat of the campaign. The critical period when the swamps were frozen over, was not seized for sending up the artillery and troops, and this was not done, because general Harrison did not receive intelligence in due time, of the approach of Winchester.

In taking leave of the events connected with the first campaign, and before entering upon the incidents of the second, we may be permitted to add a few reflections. Looking at the result, it is to be regretted, that a winter campaign was attempted. It was commenced at the precise season of the year, when the pru-

dent caution of Washington and Wayne arrested the progress of the army, in 1793; but the orders and views of the war department were such, as to leave no doubt of the solicitude of the government to recover Detroit, and capture Malden, in the course of the winter. Under these impressions, general Harrison made the most energetic efforts to be prepared with men, and supplies, and artillery, to avail himself of the critical period when the frosts should pave the roads and the lake. That this propitious moment would have arrived early in February, but for the disaster at Raisin, we have the testimony of colonel Morrison, a revolutionary officer, and quarter-master general, who, in reply to enquiries on the subject, by general Harrison, says : * “The plans and arrangements indispensable to an advance on the enemy, were so far consummated, at the period of general Winchester’s defeat, as to authorize a general movement. I have a perfect recollection of your calling on me as quarter-master, a short time previous to that disaster, to know whether I possessed the means, and would promise to supply the army with provisions, on their march upon the enemy. On receiving an affirmative answer, you hastened to the head of the centre line, and marched for the Rapids, where I understood you expected to meet general Winchester, and where a deposit of provisions, &c., was commenced when the defeat took place.” By the plan of the campaign, and the desultory expeditions projected against the Indian villages, the settlements were protected, and the enemy kept in the dark as to ulterior operations. General Harrison covered the frontiers more effectually, and advanced more rapidly to the grand result, than did general Wayne, whose convoys were assailed, and who consumed nearly two years in the necessary preparations for the main campaign. On this subject colonel Morrison is equally explicit : † “The positions selected for protecting the frontier settlements, were universally admitted to be judicious; and as a proof that they were so, it is remarkable, that during the autumn and winter of 1812–’13, in a frontier of great extent, there was scarcely

* Dawson, 451. † Ib.

an instance of the inhabitants being molested by the enemy. The general arrangements for concentrating the troops at the Rapids of the Miami, as soon as stores and provisions could be procured to justify an advance, were such, in my opinion, as evinced a correct knowledge of the country and character of the enemy, and great military talents on the part of general Harrison."

After the termination of the campaign, the efforts of general Harrison were directed to the fortifying of the position at the foot of the Rapids—to the arrangement of the remaining troops, and the accumulation of provisions at Camp Meigs, for the next campaign. It was necessary, however, to wait until the rise of the Auglaize and St. Mary's, for water conveyance, but some progress was made from Sandusky on the ice of the lake. Troops were posted on the Auglaize and St. Mary's—on Hull's road, at Upper and Lower Sandusky; but the principal force was concentrated at Camp Meigs, the fortification of which was entrusted to captain Wood, of the engineers. This was the best position for the protection of the frontiers, and its maintenance was indispensable as a depot for the artillery, military stores, and provisions, which could not now be removed. In the latter part of February, general Harrison prepared an expedition, under captain Langham, for the purpose of proceeding upon the ice of the lake, to destroy the enemy's vessels at Malden. The detachment reached Bass island, where, unfortunately, it was ascertained that the lake next to the Canada shore, was entirely open; the detachment consequently returned.

"In the month of February, a change had been made in the war department, general John Armstrong having been appointed to the important office of secretary of that department. This secretary having received the letter of general Harrison of the 11th of February, announcing the suspension of offensive operations, in his reply of the 5th of March, declares his conviction of the necessity of that course, and proceeds in that and subsequent letters to mark out the course which was intended to be pursued for the following campaign. The opinions heretofore given by general Harrison in relation to the

mode of conducting the war against Upper Canada, were adopted. Captain Perry, of the navy, was already at Presque Isle, preparing the timber for the construction of those vessels with which he afterwards obtained such imperishable renown. In the letter of the secretary above referred to, general Harrison was informed that the fleet would be ready for service by the middle of May. The land forces, which were to form his command, were also designated; they were to consist of the 17th and 19th regiments, of which at that time but a small part had been raised; the 24th regiment, which was then on its march from Tennessee to join the north-western army, and three regiments of twelve month's men *to be* raised in Kentucky and Ohio. The post of Cleveland was fixed on as the proper place for building the boats which were intended to convey the troops to the opposite shore of Canada. It was the opinion of the secretary that the recruits which would be engaged for the new regiments could serve to protect the posts until offensive operations should commence. The employment of militia was not to be resorted to but after it was ascertained that the regular troops could not be procured. It will be observed, that the *plan* of the ensuing campaign was precisely the one which had been recommended by general Harrison in the letters heretofore quoted in this work. But the arrangements for the intermediate time were not at all suited to his wishes. Referring to the list of forces *to be* raised, the History of the War says: With these nominal forces was the general required to maintain the north-western posts, with the provisions and military stores now accumulated in them; and to protect the frontiers against the Indians, and make demonstrations against Malden. Fortunately, general Harrison, before he received these instructions, had called for reinforcements of militia from both Kentucky and Ohio; but the whole number expected, would not be sufficient to garrison the different posts completely.

“In answer to these instructions, the general remonstrated against abandoning the use of the militia, and leaving the frontiers in such a defenceless situation. He represented the numerous Indian tribes, residing contig-

uous to our out posts, who were either hostile, or would soon become so, when not overawed by an American army. As soon as the lake became navigable, the enemy from Malden could also make a descent with the utmost facility on Fort Meigs, the important deposit of the artillery and military stores, from which they could not be removed through the swamps, and to which it was necessary to carry on the high waters in the spring, the immense supplies deposited on the Auglaize and St. Mary's. The works at the Rapids had been constructed for a force of two thousand men; for the general had thought it necessary to maintain a force at that place, which would be able to contend in the field with all the disposable force of the enemy, in order to prevent him from getting into its rear, and destroying the weaker posts which more immediately protected the frontiers. The government was assured, that the regular force on which they relied, could not be raised in time, even for the intended expedition; and that as large supplies were not prepared at points where they could be transported by water, the surest plan would be to march a large militia force, which not being delayed and dispirited for the want of supplies, would behave well, and effectually accomplish the objects of the campaign. The probability that the force on which the government relied, would be too small to effect its object, was represented as a great obstacle in the way of the recruiting service, which at best was found to be very tedious.

“In the following extract from a letter of general Harrison to governor Shelby, the general expressed himself more explicitly on this subject. ‘My sentiments upon the subject of the force necessary for the prosecution of the war, are precisely similar to yours. It will increase your surprise and regret, when I inform you that last night’s mail brought me a letter from the secretary of war, in which I am restricted to the employment of the regular troops raised in this state to reinforce the post at the Rapids. There are scattered through this state, about one hundred and forty recruits of the 19th regiment, and with these I am to supply the place of the two brigades from Pennsylvania and Virginia, whose term of service

will now be daily expiring. By a letter from governor Meigs, I am informed, that the secretary of war disapproved the call for militia, which I had made on this state and Kentucky, and was on the point of countermanding the orders. I will just mention one fact, which will show the consequences of such a countermand. There are upon the Auglaize and St. Mary's rivers eight forts, which contain within their walls property to the amount of half a million of dollars from actual cost, and worth now to the United States four times that sum. The whole force which would have charge of all these forts and property, would have amounted to less than twenty invalid soldiers.' '*

Colonels McArthur and Cass were appointed brigadier generals to command the troops destined to form the north-western army, and governor Howard was appointed a brigadier to be assigned to the command of the Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri territories. The expedition under captain Langham having satisfied general Harrison that the enemy would not attack Fort Meigs until the opening of the lake, in the spring, he placed general Leftwich, of the Virginia brigade, in command of Fort Meigs, and proceeded to the interior to promote the recruiting service, to visit his family, then suffering under severe disease, and to hasten the movements of the militia from Kentucky, detached to supply the place of the Virginia and Pennsylvania troops, whose period of service was about to expire. As he had anticipated, he received intelligence on the 30th of March, that the lake would soon be open—at the same time he learned that the militia would leave at the expiration of their service, and that the enemy had captured two of our men near the fort. He sent expresses to urge on the militia from Kentucky. Major Johnson, with three companies of the Kentucky militia, having arrived, they were mounted on pack-horses, and proceeded with all possible expedition. The squadron of colonel Ball was, also, ordered to repair to Fort Meigs, where the men could act as infantry. The general hastened to Fort Amanda, on the Auglaize, and

* Dawson and M'Affee.

being joined at that place by colonel Miller with the regulars from Chillicothe, embarked with them and one hundred and fifty Ohio militia, under colonel Mills. In the event of the fort being besieged, it was his intention to attack the British batteries in the same way in which he afterwards directed it to be done by colonel Dudley. The general was received in the fort with great joy on the 12th of April, and found that the Virginia general and troops had gone, but that two hundred and thirty of the Pennsylvania line had volunteered to remain until the arrival of the expected reinforcements. As soon as major Ball and major Johnson arrived, the Pennsylvania troops were honorably discharged. After the departure of generals Leftwich and Crooks, the command had devolved on major Stoddard, of the United States artillery, whose force consisted of the remaining Pennsylvanians, a battalion of twelve month's volunteers under major Alexander, a company of artillerists, and small fragments of the 17th and 19th regiments of infantry, amounting in all to five hundred men.

Early in April intelligence had been received at the fort, of the designs of the enemy. General Proctor was embodying the Canadian militia, and Tecumthe had joined him with six hundred warriors from the Wabash. As soon as the enemy was discovered approaching in force, on the 28th of April, general Harrison dispatched captain William Oliver, the field commissary of the army, to communicate with general Clay, commanding the Kentucky reinforcements, who were presumed to be approaching by the Auglaize. This duty required the agent to possess an intimate knowledge of the country, and an intrepidity and firmness peculiar to Indian warfare. These qualities were conspicuous in captain Oliver, and the selection was creditable to the discernment of general Harrison.

Captain Oliver was accompanied by one Indian and one white man, and performed the duty assigned to him with signal success. He found general Clay at Fort Winchester, to whom he communicated the fact of the investment of Fort Meigs, and the urgent importance of forwarding the reinforcement with all practical dispatch.

As soon as captain Oliver had left the fort, it was invested by the enemy. On the next morning, the general issued a general order, from which the following is an extract:

“Can the citizens of a free country, who have taken arms to defend its rights, think of submitting to an army composed of mercenary soldiers, reluctant Canadians goaded to the field by the bayonet, and of wretched, naked savages? Can the breast of an American soldier, when he casts his eyes to the opposite shore, the scene of his country’s triumphs over the same foe, be influenced by any other feelings than the hope of glory? Is not this army composed of the same materials with that which fought and conquered under the immortal Wayne? Yes, fellow-soldiers, your general sees your countenances beam with the same fire, that he witnessed on that glorious occasion; and although it would be the height of presumption to compare himself to that hero, he boasts of being that hero’s pupil. To your posts then, fellow-citizens, and remember that the eyes of your country are upon you.”*

The enemy erected their batteries on the north-west side of the river, and encamped with their main body at Old Fort Miami, two miles below. The Indians were thrown across the river and invested the fort on that side. The erection of the necessary defences in Fort Meigs, was confided to captain Wood, of the engineers: captain Gratiot of that corps being too unwell for constant duty. Whilst the British were preparing their batteries, the Indians annoyed the garrison by climbing the trees, several hundred yards distant from the fort, and were enabled to do some mischief. Speaking on this subject, captain, afterwards colonel, Wood, humorously observes: “their ethereal annoyance, however, proved a great stimulus to the militia; for although they did their duty with alacrity and promptitude, yet their motions were much accelerated by it—and let who will make the experiment, it will be invariably found, that the movements of militia will be quickened by a brisk fire of musketry about their

* M’Affee, 259.

ears.”* Colonel Wood adds: “on the morning of the 1st of May, it was discovered that the British batteries were completed; and about ten o’clock they appeared to be loading, and adjusting their guns on certain objects in the camp. By this time our troops had completed a grand traverse, about twelve feet high, upon a base of twenty feet, three hundred yards long, on the most elevated ground through the middle of the camp, calculated to ward off the shot of the enemy’s batteries. Orders were given for all the tents in front to be instantly removed into its rear, which was effected in a few minutes, and that beautiful prospect of cannonading and bombarding our lines, which but a moment before had excited the skill and energy of the British engineer, was now entirely fled, and in its place nothing was to be seen but an immense shield of earth, which entirely obscured the whole army. Not a tent nor a single person was to be seen. Those canvass houses, which had concealed the growth of the traverse from the view of the enemy, were now protected and hid in their turn. The prospect of *smoking us out*, was now at best but very faint. But as neither general Proctor nor his officers were yet convinced of the folly and futility of their laborious preparations, their batteries were opened, and five days were spent in arduous cannonading and bombarding to bring them to this salutary conviction. A tremendous cannonade was kept up all the rest of the day, and shells were thrown till eleven o’clock at night. Very little damage, however, was done in the camp; one or two were killed and three or four wounded—among the latter was major Amos Stoddard of the 1st regiment of artillery—a revolutionary character, and an officer of much merit. He was wounded slightly with a piece of shell, and about ten days afterwards died with the lock-jaw.

“The fire of the enemy was returned from the fort with our eighteen pounders with some effect, though but sparingly—for the stock of eighteen pound shot was but small, there being but three hundred and sixty of that size in the fort when the siege commenced, and about

* M’Affee, 261.

the same number for the twelve pounders. A proper supply of this article had not been sent with the artillery from Pittsburgh. The battery of the enemy supplied us with twelve pound shot; but they had no eighteens, all their large guns being twenty-fours. On the second day they opened their fire again with great fury, and continued it all day, but without any better effect. With a plenty of ammunition, we should have been able to have blown John Bull almost from the Miami. It was extremely diverting to see with what pleasure and delight the Indians would yell, whenever in their opinion considerable damage was done in the camp by the bursting of a shell. Their hanging about the camp, and occasionally coming pretty near, kept our lines almost constantly in a blaze of fire; for nothing can please a Kentuckian better than to get a shot at an Indian—and he must be indulged.”*

The enemy had transferred some of his guns to the south side of the river, and opened batteries upon the right flank of the camp. Every journal which was kept of the events in that memorable siege, speaks of the energy, skill, and coolness which marked the conduct of the commanding general. The first cannon ball fired by the enemy, struck the general's tent. Captain McCullough, of the Ohio troops, was killed whilst conversing with him, and upon another occasion, he was struck on the hip by a spent ball, which is always known to produce the greatest pain. Measures were taken to prevent a surprise, and specific instructions given to the commanding officers to meet that contingency. General Harrison awaited with the most anxious solicitude to receive intelligence of the approach of general Clay, with a reinforcement of twelve hundred men. Late on the night of the 4th, captain Oliver and major D. Trimble, with a few men, arrived in a skiff, having left general Clay above the Rapids, who had instructed them to inform the general that he would arrive by 4 o'clock in the morning. The arrival of this strong reinforcement was embraced by general Harrison, as the occasion for carrying into ef-

* M'Affee, 263.

fect the sorties previously planned, and which have rendered the defence of Fort Meigs so memorable in the history of the war.

Captain Hamilton, of the Ohio militia, was immediately dispatched to general Clay, to direct him to detach eight hundred men on the left bank of the river, about a mile above the fort. This detachment, with Hamilton as its guide, was then to be marched "to the British batteries, carry them, spike the cannon, cut down the carriages, and then return to their boats and cross over to the fort." The residue of the brigade was to be landed on the right bank of the river, and conducted by the subaltern, who went with Hamilton to the fort. It was the design of the general to cause sorties to be made against the enemy on the south-east side of the river, simultaneously with that by the detachment from general Clay, under colonel Dudley, on the opposite shore. For this purpose, a detachment was prepared and placed under the direction of colonel Miller, of the 19th United States infantry, to consist of two hundred and fifty of the 17th and 19th regiments, one hundred twelve month's volunteers, and captain Sebree's company of Kentucky militia. These troops were drawn up in a ravine, under the east curtain of the fort, out of reach of the enemy's fire, to await further orders. In the meantime, general Clay had been detained by the difficulty of passing the Rapids in the night. Captain Hamilton reached him at eight o'clock, and colonel Dudley was detached with eight hundred men to attack the batteries on the north side of the river. General Clay, with Boswell's regiment, succeeded, after some skirmishing with the Indians, in effecting his entrance into the fort. These troops, with Nearing's company of regulars, and the battalion of volunteers under major Alexander, were employed immediately in driving off a large body of Indians, who had approached within one hundred and fifty yards of the fort. This duty was executed with gallantry, under the immediate eye and direction of the commanding general, who, from his position, discovered a body of British troops passing from the batteries to the east of the fort, to the aid of their allies, thus exposing the rear of the detach-

ment. An order for immediate retreat was sent by his aid, John J. Johnson, but his horse being killed under him before its delivery, the intelligence was conveyed by another aid, major Graham.

Just as this affair terminated, the troops in the fort were cheered by the shouts of the Kentuckians in charging the batteries on the opposite shore. At this point every plan was successfully carried into effect, and nothing prevented the detachments from returning under the bank to their boats and crossing over to the fort, but that the men unfortunately suffered themselves to be drawn into the woods by the fire of scattering Indians, until a reinforcement of British troops from the old fort, gained their rear, and killed or captured nearly all of them. About fifty were slain, five hundred and fifty captured, and one hundred and fifty escaped to their boats, and crossed in safety to the fort. After the fall of colonel Dudley, the command devolved on major Shelby. As soon as it was seen that the attack by Dudley had induced the enemy to send reinforcements from the east side, the general directed the detachment under colonel Miller, to advance from the ravine. The British batteries at this point were protected by a company of British grenadiers; another of light infantry, two hundred strong; these were flanked by two hundred Canadian militia, and by one thousand Indians under Tecumthe. The detachment advanced with loaded but trailed arms, and in a few moments the batteries, two officers and fifty regular troops were taken; and when we regard the disparity of force, the advantageous position of the enemy, and the dreadful execution in so few minutes, it is but justice to this gallant corps, to speak of it as having acquired equal honor with that of any other detachment during the war. In the progress of the severe battle fought by this detachment, captain Sebree's company sustained themselves against four times their number, until relieved by the gallantry of a company of regulars, under lieutenant Gwynne.* The return of this detachment to the fort, terminated the battles of the day, and immediately gene-

* Major David Gwynne.

ral Proctor sent major Chambers with a flag of truce, and upon his introduction to general Harrison, the following conversation took place:

“*Major Chambers.*—General Proctor has directed me to demand the surrender of this post. He wishes to spare the effusion of blood.

“*General Harrison.*—The demand, under present circumstances, is a most extraordinary one. As general Proctor did not send me a summons to surrender on his first arrival, I had supposed that he believed me determined to do my duty. His present message indicates an opinion of me that I am at a loss to account for.

“*Major Chambers.*—General Proctor could never think of saying any thing to wound your feelings, sir. The character of general Harrison, as an officer, is well known. General Proctor’s force is very respectable, and there is with him a larger body of Indians than has ever before been embodied.

“*General Harrison.*—I believe I have a very correct idea of general Proctor’s force: it is not such as to create the least apprehension for the result of the contest, whatever shape he may be pleased hereafter to give to it. Assure the general, however, that he will never have this post *surrendered* to him upon any terms. Should it fall into his hands, it will be in a manner calculated to do him more honor, and to give him larger claims upon the gratitude of his government, than any capitulation could possibly do.”

The total amount of our killed and wounded on the south-east side was two hundred and seventy, of whom eighty-one were killed—sixty-four of these being slain in the sorties, and one hundred and twenty-four wounded; the remainder, eighty-one, killed and wounded within the fortified camp.

“In the general order which was published on the 9th, the commander mentions with the highest approbation the conduct of the troops in general, and gives them his thanks, as he does the following officers by name, viz: Wood and Gratiot, of the engineers; captains Cushing and Hall, of the artillery; colonel Miller and major Todd, of the 19th infantry; major Ball, of the United States

dragoons;* colonel Mills, and majors Lodwick and Ritzer, of the Ohio militia; major Johnson of the Kentucky militia; captains Croghan, Bradford, Langham, Elliott, and Nearing; lieutenants Campbell, Gwynne, Kercheval, Lee, and Rees; ensigns Ship, Hawkins, Harrison, Mitchell, and Stockton, of the United States infantry; to brigadier general Clay, colonel Boswell, and major Fletcher, and the captains Dudley, Simmons, and Metcalf, of Clay's brigade. Adjutant Brown, Mr. Peters, conductor of artillery, and to serjeants Timberlake, Henderson, James, and Meldrum, and Mr. Lion, principal artificer; to the Petersburg and Pittsburgh volunteers, captain Sebree and his company of Kentucky militia; also to major Hukill, acting inspector general; lieutenant O'Fallon, acting deputy adjutant general, and to his aide-de-camp, major Graham and John J. Johnson, Esq.

"Upon the subject of colonel Dudley's misfortune, the author of the History of the War in the West, thus expresses himself: "the defeat of colonel Dudley very naturally became the subject of much speculation in Kentucky; and a considerable diversity of opinion existed, respecting the causes of the disaster and the actors concerned in it. The subject, however, appears very plain. Those who were in the defeat, commonly attributed it, very justly, to their own imprudence and zeal, which were not properly controlled, and directed by the orders and example of their leader. There was nothing difficult or hazardous in the enterprise—the whole misfortune resulted from the imprudent manner of its execution. The batteries were easily taken, and the retreat was perfectly secure; but the detachment wanted a head to direct and restrain its Kentucky impetuosity to its proper object."

The following judicious observations are made in

* By inadvertence, a very gallant portion of Ball's squadron was not noticed in this general order. It should have included captain Garrard, lieutenants Badey, Hickman, and McClanahan, and cornet Thornton, commanding a troop of twelve month's volunteers, from Bourbon county, Kentucky. This corps merited and received, on other occasions, the thanks of the commanding general.

M'Affee's History: "it was fortunate for the American cause, that the enterprise of general Proctor against Fort Meigs was delayed so long. Had he been ready to sail as soon as the lake became navigable, and so timed his movements as to arrive at the fort during the first week in April, immediately after the last militia of the winter campaign were discharged, and before general Harrison arrived with reinforcements, he must have succeeded against that post. The garrison was then left very weak, being considerably less than five hundred effectives. The works, too, were then very incomplete, and entirely too large for that number, as the fortified camp included seven or eight acres of ground. The place was still with propriety denominated *camp Meigs*, more frequently than it was styled a fort. Its capture would have been a most serious loss, as it contained nearly all the artillery and military stores of the north-western army, beside a large amount of provisions. General Harrison repeatedly in the winter, pressed on the attention of the government, the necessity of preparing a force to take the place of the militia then in service; but instead of doing this, we have seen that the new secretary, at the critical moment when the last of those troops were disbanded, restricted general Harrison to the use of regulars, which were still to be levied in a country, where it is almost impossible to raise a regiment of regulars through the whole year. Without the aid of the Ohio and Kentucky militia, which the general called into service without the authority, and contrary to the views of the war department, it is highly probable that the important post at the Rapids would have been lost."

In the message of the president of the United States, to congress, at their subsequent session, he says, "the issue of the late siege at Fort Meigs, leaves us nothing to regret but a single act of inconsiderate valor."

CHAPTER VIII.

Council with friendly Indians.—Reported investment of Fort Meigs.—Second siege of Fort Meigs.—Attack on Fort Stephenson.—Croghan's letter.—Statement of the general, staff, and field officers, about the attack on Fort Stephenson.—Ohio Militia at Grand Camp.—Preparations for crossing the lake.—Perry's victory.—Army reaches Malden.—Proctor pursued.—Council at Sandwich.—Shelby, Cass, and Perry's letters.

WHILE at Franklinton, in June, general Harrison held a council with the chiefs of the friendly Indians, of the Delaware, Shawanese, Wyandot, and Seneca tribes, in which he stated to them that the time had arrived for all those who were willing to engage in the war, "to take a decided stand for or against the United States,"—that the "president wished no false friends—that the proposal of Proctor to exchange the Kentucky militia for the tribes in our friendship, indicated that he had received some hint of their willingness to take up the tomahawk against us; and that to give the United States a proof of their good disposition, they must remove with their families into the interior, or the warriors must accompany him in the ensuing campaign; and fight for the United States. To the latter condition the chiefs and warriors unanimously agreed; and said they had long been anxious for an invitation to fight for the Americans. Tarhe, the oldest Indian in the western country, who represented all the tribes, professed in their name the most indissoluble friendship for the United States. General Harrison then told them he would let them know when they would be wanted in the service; "but you must conform to our mode of warfare. You are not to kill defenceless prisoners, old men, women or children." He added, that by their conduct he would be able to tell, whether the British could restrain the Indians from such horrible cruelty. For if the Indians fighting with him, would forbear such conduct, it would prove, that the

British could also restrain theirs if they wished to do it. He humorously told them he had been informed that general Proctor had promised to deliver him into the hands of Tecumthe, if he succeeded against Fort Meigs, to be treated as that warrior might think proper.*—“Now if I can succeed in taking Proctor, you shall have him for your prisoner, provided you will agree to treat him *as a squaw*, and only put petticoats upon him; for he must be a coward who would kill a defenceless prisoner.”†

In the month of June, while at Franklinton, general Harrison was informed that Fort Meigs was again invested. Although he doubted the intention of the enemy to attack that place, at this time, he promptly started a reinforcement to its relief, and on the 28th reached there in person. It proved to be a false alarm, and the general returned to Lower Sandusky, on the 1st of July, and on the following day, set off for Cleveland, on business connected with the public stores, and the building of boats for transporting the army across the lake. On the 23rd, a body of eight hundred Indians were seen to pass Fort Meigs, for the purpose, it was supposed, of attacking Fort Winchester. Two days afterwards, the British and Indians appeared in great numbers, before Fort Meigs, then commanded by general Clay. In the meantime, captain Oliver, accompanied by captain McCune, was sent to apprise the commander-in-chief of the fact; and reached him at Lower Sandusky, with certain informa-

* We find the following note in Dawson, on this subject:—“There is no doubt that when Proctor made the arrangement for the attack on Fort Meigs with Tecumthe, the latter insisted, and the former agreed, that general Harrison, and all who fought at Tippecanoe, should be given up to the Indians to be burned. Major Ball of the dragoons ascertained this fact from the prisoners, deserters, and Indians, all of whom agreed to its truth.”

On the supposition that this statement be true, it proves that Tecumthe meditated the violation of the agreement he made with general Harrison, at Vincennes, in 1810, that in the event of a war, prisoners, and women and children, should be protected. On no other occasion is he known to have departed from the spirit of his engagement.

† M'Afee.

tion that the united force of the enemy, principally Indians, was not less than five thousand—a greater number than had ever before assembled on any occasion during the war. General Harrison, with remarkable accuracy of judgment, as the result proved, came to the conclusion, that this investment of Fort Meigs was a feint, made by the enemy, to call his attention to that place, while Lower Sandusky or Cleveland, was really the point on which the next attack would be made. He immediately removed his head quarters to Seneca, nine miles above Lower Sandusky. From this place he could fall back and protect Upper Sandusky, or pass by a secret route, to the relief of Fort Meigs—two points to be defended,—Lower Sandusky being comparatively of little importance. Major Croghan was left at Lower Sandusky, with one hundred and sixty regulars, for the defence of Fort Stephenson. There were about six hundred troops at Seneca—a force too small to advance upon Fort Meigs. Captain McCune was sent back to general Clay, with the information, that as early as the commander-in-chief could collect a sufficient number of troops, he would relieve the fort. The day after the return of the express, the enemy raised the siege. As had been anticipated by general Harrison, the British sailed round into Sandusky bay, while the Indians marched across the swamps of Portage river, to aid in the projected attack on Lower Sandusky.

As early as the 21st of April, of this year, general Harrison, in a letter to the secretary of war, in speaking of the ulterior operations of the campaign, remarked: "I shall cause the movements of the enemy to be narrowly watched; but in the event of their landing at Lower Sandusky, that post cannot be saved. I will direct it in such an event, to be evacuated. The stores there are not of much consequence, excepting about five hundred stand of arms, which I will cause to be removed as soon as the roads are practicable,—at present it is impossible." These arms were subsequently removed. Just before the express from Fort Meigs reached general Harrison, he, in company with major Croghan and other officers, had examined Fort Stephenson, and concluded that it

could not be defended against heavy artillery ; and, if the British should approach it by water,—which would raise a presumption, that they had brought their heavy artillery—the fort must be abandoned and burnt, provided a retreat could be effected with safety. In the orders left with major Croghan, it was stated : “ Should the British troops approach you in force with cannon, and you can discover them in time to effect a retreat, you will do so immediately, destroying all the public stores.* You must be aware, that the attempt to retreat in the face of an Indian force, would be vain. Against such an enemy your garrison would be safe, however great the number.”

On the 29th, general Harrison was informed that the siege of Fort Meigs had been abandoned. The scouts sent out by him, reported that from the indications, they believed an attack was meditated by the Indians, then lying in numbers on the south side of Fort Meigs, upon Upper Sandusky. Upon this information, a council of war was called, composed of McArthur, Cass, Ball, Paul, Wood, Hukill, Holmes and Graham, who were unanimously of opinion, that as Fort Stephenson was untenable against heavy artillery, and as it was relatively an unimportant post, that the garrison should not be reinforced, but withdrawn, and the place destroyed. The following order was forthwith sent to major Croghan :—“ Sir : Immediately on receiving this letter, you will abandon Fort Stephenson, set fire to it, and repair with your command this night to head quarters. Cross the river, and come up on the other side. If you should find or deem it impracticable to make good your march to this place, take the road to Huron, and pursue it with the utmost circumspection and dispatch.” The bearer of this dispatch losing his way, it did not reach major Croghan until eleven o'clock of the next day. The major was then of opinion that he could not retreat with safety, as the Indians were around the fort, in considerable numbers. A majority of his officers concurred in the opinion that to retreat was unsafe, and that the post could be

* The amount of stores at this place was inconsiderable ; every thing valuable had been previously removed.

maintained until at least further instructions were received from head quarters. The major, therefore, promptly returned the following answer: "Sir: I have just received yours of yesterday, ten o'clock, P. M., ordering me to destroy this place, and make good my retreat, which was received too late to be carried into execution. We have determined to maintain this place, and, by heavens, we can." The strong language of this note was used on the supposition that it might fall into the hands of the enemy. It reached the general on the same day, who, not fully understanding the motives under which it was written, sent colonel Wells next morning, escorted by colonel Ball, and a detachment of dragoons, with the following order:

July 30th, 1813.

"SIR:—The general has just received your letter of this date, informing him that you had thought proper to disobey the order issued from this office, and delivered to you this morning. It appears that the information which dictated the order was incorrect; and as you did not receive it in the night, as was expected, it might have been proper that you should have reported the circumstance and your situation, before you proceeded to its execution. This might have been passed over; but I am directed to say to you, that an officer who presumes to aver, that he has made his resolution, and that he will act in direct opposition to the orders of his general, can no longer be entrusted with a separate command. Colonel Wells is sent to relieve you. You will deliver the command to him, and repair with colonel Ball's squadron to this place. By command, &c.

"A. H. HOLMES, *Ass't. Adjutant General.*"

In passing down, the dragoons met with a party of fourteen Indians, and killed twelve of them. When major Croghan reached head quarters, he explained to the general his motives in writing the note, which were deemed satisfactory. In the meantime, the scouts had reported to general Harrison that the Indians had not gone in the direction of Upper Sandusky. Upon receiv-

ing this information, major Croghan was directed to resume his post, with written instructions of the same import as had been previously given.

On the evening of the 31st of July, some scouts sent out by general Harrison, discovered the British within twenty miles of Fort Stephenson, approaching the place by water. It was after twelve o'clock, however, on the next day, August 1st, before these scouts, in returning to Seneca, by Lower Sandusky, communicated this information to major Croghan, and in a few hours afterwards the fort was actually invested by the British and Indians. A flag was now sent from the enemy demanding a surrender. The messenger was informed that the commandant and garrison were determined to defend it to the last extremity. The attack was promptly commenced, and gallantly sustained. The result was glorious to the American arms, and covered the gallant Croghan and his officers and men, with honor. Only one man was killed, and but seven wounded, belonging to the garrison. The loss of the enemy was not less than one hundred and fifty in killed and wounded.

General Harrison, when informed of the attack on Fort Stephenson, paused before moving to its relief. He was hourly expecting considerable reinforcements from the interior, but had not with him at Seneca, a disposable force of more than eight hundred men, the fifth of whom were cavalry, who, in the thick woods extending the greater part of the way, between that place and Lower Sandusky, would have been of little use. The remainder of these eight hundred men were raw recruits. To have marched upon an enemy, several thousand strong, with such a force, would, in all human probability, have resulted in its total destruction. Again, in moving to Fort Stephenson, he must necessarily leave the camp at Seneca with one hundred and fifty sick soldiers in it, exposed to the Indian tomahawk; while Upper Sandusky, at which were ten thousand barrels of flour, besides other supplies of public stores, indispensable for the main objects of the campaign, was equally liable to be attacked and destroyed by Tecumthe, who, with two thousand

warriors, was then lying in the swamp, between that point and Fort Meigs, ready to strike upon either Seneca or Upper Sandusky, in the event of general Harrison's moving to Fort Stephenson. Under these circumstances, he was bound by every military principle, to retain that position in which he could, with the most certainty, accomplish the best results. He therefore determined to wait, for a time, at least, the progress of events, hoping that reinforcements would arrive before the fort could be reduced. . On the night of the 2nd, he was informed that the enemy was retreating, and early next morning, having in the night been reinforced by three hundred Ohio militia, he set out for the fort attended by the dragoons, and directing the remainder of the disposable force to follow under generals Cass and McArthur. Upon reaching the fort, the general was told by a wounded sergeant of the British troops, that Tecumthe was in the swamp, south of Fort Meigs, ready to strike at Upper Sandusky, on the first opportunity. This information, corroborative of what he had before heard, induced the commander-in-chief to direct general McArthur, who had not yet reached the fort, to return to Seneca with all possible dispatch.

In his official report of this affair, general Harrison said: "It will not be among the least of general Proctor's mortifications to find that he has been baffled by a youth, who has just passed his twenty-first year. He is, however, a hero worthy of his gallant uncle, George R. Clark." The president immediately conferred the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel, on major Croghan.

Shortly afterwards an attack was made in some public prints upon the conduct of general Harrison, in regard to the defence of Fort Stephenson. Major Croghan promptly replied to it, by forwarding to a newspaper in Cincinnati, a communication, under date of Lower Sandusky, August 27th, 1812, in which he gives the reason already stated, for disobeying general Harrison's order to destroy the fort, and retreat to Seneca, and says:

"I have with much regret seen in some of the public prints, such misrepresentations respecting my refusal to evacuate this post, as are calculated not only to injure me in the estimation of military men, but also to excite

unfavorable impressions as to the propriety of general Harrison's conduct relative to this affair.

"His character as a military man is too well established to need my approbation or support. But his public services entitle him at least to common justice. This affair does not furnish cause of reproach. If public opinion has been lately misled respecting his late conduct, it will require but a moment's cool, dispassionate reflection, to convince them of its propriety. The measures recently adopted by him, so far from deserving censure, are the clearest proofs of his keen penetration, and able generalship."

The letter concludes with the following paragraphs, alike honorable to the soldier and the gentleman :

"It would be insincere to say that I am not flattered by the many handsome things which have been said about the defence which was made by the troops under my command ; but I desire no plaudits which are bestowed upon me, at the expense of general Harrison.

"I have at all times enjoyed his confidence so far as my rank in the army entitled me to it. And on proper occasions received his marked attention. I have felt the warmest attachment for him as a man, and my confidence in him as an *able commander* remains unshaken. I feel every assurance that he will at all times do me ample justice ; and nothing could give me more pain than to see his enemies seize upon this occasion to deal out their unfriendly feelings and acrimonious dislike—and as long as he continues (as in my humble opinion he has hitherto done) to make the wisest arrangements and most judicious disposition, which the forces under his command will justify, I shall not hesitate to unite with the army in bestowing upon him that confidence which he so richly merits, and which has on no occasion been withheld."

About the same time, the following article was published in one of the public prints of Cincinnati :

"LOWER SENECA TOWN, *August 29th, 1813.*

"The undersigned, being the general, field, and staff, officers, with that portion of the north-western army under the immediate command of general Harrison, have

observed with regret and surprise, that charges, as improper in the form, as in the substance, have been made against the conduct of general Harrison during the recent investment of Lower Sandusky. At another time, and under ordinary circumstances, we should deem it improper and unmilitary thus publicly to give any opinion respecting the movements of the army. But public confidence in the commanding general is essential to the success of the campaign, and causelessly to withdraw or to withhold that confidence, is more than individual injustice; it becomes a serious injury to the service. A part of the force, of which the American army consists, will derive its greatest strength and efficacy from a confidence in the commanding general, and from those moral causes which accompany and give energy to public opinion. A very erroneous idea respecting the number of the troops then at the disposal of the general, has doubtless been the primary cause of those unfortunate and unfounded impressions. A sense of duty forbids us from giving a detailed view of our strength at that time. In that respect, we have fortunately experienced a very favorable change. But we refer the public to the general's official report to the secretary of war, of major Croghan's successful defence of Lower Sandusky. In that will be found a statement of our whole disposable force; and he who believes that with such a force, and under the circumstances which then occurred, general Harrison ought to have advanced upon the enemy, must be left to correct his opinion in the school of experience.

“On a review of the course then adopted, we are decidedly of the opinion, that it was such as was dictated by military wisdom, and by a due regard to our own circumstances and to the situation of the enemy. The reasons for this opinion it is evidently improper now to give, but we hold ourselves ready at a future period, and when other circumstances shall have intervened, to satisfy every man of its correctness who is anxious to investigate and willing to receive the truth. And with a ready acquiescence, beyond the mere claims of military duty, we are prepared to obey a general,

whose measures meet our most deliberate approbation, and merit that of his country.

LEWIS CASS, Brig. Gen. U. S. A.
SAMUEL WELLS, Col. 17 R. U. S. I.
THOS. D. OWINGS, Col. 28 R. U. S. I.
GEORGE PAUL, Col. 17 R. U. S. I.
J. C. BARTLETT, Col. Q. M. G.
JAMES V. BALL, Lieut. Col.
ROBERT MORRISON, Lieut. Col.
GEORGE TODD, Maj. 19 R. U. S. I.
WILLIAM TRIGG, Maj. 28 R. U. S. I.
JAMES SMILEY, Maj. 28 R. U. S. I.
RD. GRAHAM, Maj. 17 R. U. S. I.
GEO. CROGHAN, Maj. 17 R. U. S. I.
L. HUKILL, Maj. & Ass. Insp. Gen.
E. D. WOOD, Maj. Engineers."

These two documents, spontaneously given, and from the highest possible authority, must, with all honorable minds, relieve the commander-in-chief from the censure which partizan illiberality, attempted to cast upon him, in this affair. It is plucking no leaf from the laurels which the gallantry of the youthful Croghan entwined around his brows, in the defence of Fort Stephenson, to claim for his commander, the credit of having acted, on this occasion, with prudence, fidelity, and profound military skill.

As soon as this invasion of the territory of Ohio was known, governor Meigs called upon the militia of the state to repel the enemy. The appeal was promptly and nobly responded to, but the abandonment of the siege of Fort Meigs, and the gallant defence of Fort Stephenson, rendered their services unnecessary. When the militia were disbanded, without an opportunity of meeting the foe, or being employed in the main expedition against Canada, there was much discontent among them. To allay this feeling, general Harrison met them at Upper Sandusky; and, through the governor, made known the reasons for their being disbanded. These were, mainly, that to retain in camp all the Ohio troops, then embodied, was impossible, as the embarkation on the lake

could not be effected under fifteen or eighteen days, and so large a force, even for a short time, would consume the provisions provided for the support of the campaign. The delay in moving upon Canada arose from a cause which general Harrison could not then publicly explain, lest it should reach the enemy. Under the plan of the campaign, he was not to cross the lake until he had the full co-operation of commodore Perry's fleet. The period when this could be obtained was uncertain. Under such circumstances, the retention of so large a body of militia, in camp, would have defeated the plan of the campaign. At the same time, the commander-in-chief bore his testimony to the fact, that the exertions made by governor Meigs to assemble the militia, and the promptitude with which the call had been met, was truly astonishing, and reflected the highest credit on the state. Some of the disbanded officers, however, met together, notwithstanding this explanation, and in a moment of popular discontent, passed resolutions to the effect, that they were greatly disappointed in not being kept in service, and that there was something mysterious in the conduct of general Harrison. The cool reflection of these officers, and a subsequent knowledge of the whole plan of the campaign, have long since caused them to regret their course on this occasion; and, to admit with a frankness honorable to their character, that they had done great injustice to the commander-in-chief.

Active preparations for the expedition against Upper Canada were now making. The call by general Harrison, on the governor of Kentucky, for volunteers, was promptly responded to, by the venerable Shelby, who, in a patriotic appeal to the people of that state, appointed the 31st of August for the rendezvous of the troops at Newport. Public attention was now directed with great intenseness, to the rival fleets on lake Erie. About the 2nd of August, the vessels under commodore Perry were finally equipped. On the 5th, general Harrison visited the fleet, and furnished the commander with a company of soldiers, to act as marines, who were afterwards acknowledged to have performed a valuable service. Colonel Johnson, with his mounted regiment, was recalled

from Kentucky, to the frontiers. Every exertion was made along the whole line from Cleveland to Fort Meigs, to hasten on the stores, while governor Shelby was steadily advancing with a strong body of mounted men towards the scene of action. In the midst of these active preparations, in which the energy of the commander-in-chief was everywhere perceptible, he received on the 12th of September, at Seneca, a note in which commodore Perry says:

“We have met the enemy and they are ours—two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and a sloop.”

This important and glorious news spread, with the rapidity of an electric shock, throughout the whole line of the army, and as it reached the various detachments, pressing on to the shore of the lake, it quickened their speed, and awakened a burning desire to achieve a victory equally brilliant over the enemy under Proctor. On the 20th, the embarkation commenced from the mouth of Portage river. On the 26th, the army reached the Middle Sister,—having touched at Put-in-bay, where a general order of debarkation, of march and of battle, was issued by the commander-in-chief, which, for lucid minuteness and military acumen, has been pronounced by competent judges, to be unsurpassed in its kind. On the morning of the 27th, the final embarkation of the army commenced, in sixteen vessels and upwards of eighty boats. The sun shone in all his autumnal beauty, and a gentle breeze hastened onward the ships to that shore, on which it was anticipated the banner of our country would have to be planted, amid the thunder of British arms, and the yells of ferocious Indians. While moving over the bosom of the lake,—every eye enchanted with the magnificence of the scene, and every heart panting for the coming opportunity of avenging their country's wrongs,—the beloved commander-in-chief caused the following address to be delivered to his army:

“The general entreats his brave troops to remember, that they are the sons of sires whose fame is immortal; that they are to fight for the rights of their insulted *country*, while their opponents combat for the unjust pretensions of a master. Kentuckians! remember the river

Raisin ; but remember it *only*, whilst victory is suspended. 'The revenge of a soldier cannot be gratified upon a fallen enemy.'

When this stirring appeal was read, on each vessel, and in each boat, the shouts of "Harrison and victory," rose, successively, from an army of freemen, and went booming over the rippling waters. 'The landing was effected at four o'clock, with a celerity and an order, as remarkable as the spectacle was beautiful and grand ; and, about sundown, the army entered Malden in triumph, heralded by the national air of "yankee doodle." The enemy had fled—the town was nearly deserted, and the fort a pile of smouldering ruins. On the 29th, the army reached Sandwich, in pursuit of the retreating foe.

At this place, a council was held, on the question of a choice of routes, over which to pursue Proctor. The one up the Thames was finally selected. Personal animosity towards the commander-in-chief, subsequently gave rise to the charge, that in this council, he was opposed to the pursuit of the enemy, and was reluctantly forced into it, by the venerable hero of King's Mountain, who commanded, in person, the Kentucky troops on this memorable expedition. That the reader may see the falsity of this allegation, we here break the thread of our narrative, to introduce the following letters, which contain the most ample refutation of a charge as unfounded as it is malicious :

FRANKFORT, *April 21, 1816.*

"DEAR GENERAL:—Your letter of the 15th instant has been duly received, in which you stated that a charge has been made against you, 'that you were forced to pursue Proctor from my remonstrances,' and that I had said to you upon that occasion, 'that it was immaterial what direction you took, that I was resolved to pursue the enemy up the Thames ;' and you request me to give you a statement of facts in relation to the council of war held at Sandwich.

"I will, in the first place, freely declare that no such language ever passed from me to you, and that I enter-

tained throughout the campaign, too high an opinion of your military talents, to doubt for a moment your capacity to conduct the army to the best advantage. It is well recollected, that the army arrived at Sandwich in the afternoon of the 29th of September, and that the next day was extremely wet. I was at your quarters in the evening of that day; we had a conversation relative to the pursuit of the enemy, and you requested me to see you early the next morning. I waited on you just after daybreak—found you up, apparently waiting for me; you led me into a small private room, and on the way observed, ‘We must not be heard.’ You were as anxious to pursue Proctor as I was, but might not have been entirely satisfied as to the route. You observed that there were two ways by which he might be overtaken: one was down the lake by water, to some post or point, of the name of which I am now not positive; thence to march across by land twelve miles to the road leading up the Thames, and intercept him. The other way by land, up the strait, and up the Thames. I felt satisfied, by a pursuit on land, that he could be overhauled, and expressed that opinion, with the reasons on which it was founded, and we readily agreed in sentiment; but you observed, as there were two routes by which he might be overtaken, to determine the one most proper was a measure of great responsibility, that you would take the opinion of the general officers as to the most practicable one, and you requested me to collect them in one hour at your quarters. I assembled them accordingly, to whom you stated your determination to pursue Proctor, and your object in calling them together; and after explaining the two routes by which he might be overtaken, you observed, ‘that the governor thinks, and so do I, that the pursuit by land up the Thames, will be most effectual.’ The general officers were in favor of a pursuit by land; and in the course of that day, colonel Johnson, with his mounted regiment, was able to cross over from the Detroit side to join in the chase. He might, however, have been ordered the day before, during the rain, to cross over with his regiment; but of this I have not a distinct recollection. The army I know was on its march by

sunrise on the morning of the 2nd of October, and continued the pursuit (often in a run,) until the evening of the 5th, when the enemy was overtaken. During the whole of this long and arduous pursuit, no man could make greater exertions, or use more vigilance than you did to overtake Proctor, whilst the skill and promptitude with which you arranged the troops for battle, and the distinguished zeal and bravery you evinced during its continuance, merited and received my highest approbation.

“In short, sir, from the time I joined you to the moment of our separation, I believe that no commander ever did or could make greater exertions than you did to effect the great objects of the campaign. I admired your plans, and thought them executed with great energy; particularly your order of battle, and arrangements for landing on the Canada shore, were calculated to inspire every officer and man with a confidence that we could not be defeated by anything like our own number.”

“Until after I had served the campaign of 1813, I was not aware of the difficulties which you had to encounter as commander of the north-western army. I have since often said, and still do believe, that the duties assigned to you on that occasion, were more arduous and difficult to accomplish than any I had ever known confided to any commander; and with respect to the zeal and fidelity with which you executed that high and important trust, there are thousands in Kentucky, as well as myself, who believed it could not have been committed to better hands.

“With sentiments of the most sincere regard and esteem, I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

ISAAC SHELBY.

“*Major General William Henry Harrison.*”

NEWPORT, *R. D.* August 18, 1817.

“MY DEAR SIR:—I have received your letter of the 11th ult. in which you request me to reply to the following questions, viz: first, ‘Whether the statements made by governor Shelby in his letter to you of the 21st of April, 1816, be substantially correct?’ to which I re-

ply in the affirmative. Secondly, 'Whether you did ever, either in the council held at Sandwich, or in private conversation with me, evince anything like an indisposition to pursue the British army by one of the two routes which were under consideration?'—to which I answer in the negative. In a conversation which I held with you the morning prior to the assembling of the general council at Sandwich, you appeared particularly desirous of attempting to cut off the retreat of the British army by the route from port Talbot. To your arguments in favor of this measure, I opposed our limited means of transportation, and the great difficulty and uncertainty of the lake navigation at this season of the year. These obstacles appeared to induce you to have recourse to the measure which was afterwards adopted.

"Although I have little or no pretensions to military knowledge as relates to an army, still I may be allowed to bear testimony to your zeal and activity in the pursuit of the British army under general Proctor, and to say, the prompt change made by you in the order of battle, on discovering the position of the enemy, always has appeared to me to have evinced a high degree of military talent. I concur most sincerely with the venerable governor Shelby, in his general approbation of your conduct as far (as it came under my observation,) in that campaign. With great regard, I am, my dear sir, your friend,

"O. H. PERRY.

"Major General W. H. Harrison."

Extract of a letter from Governor Cass to General Harrison, dated Detroit, August 31, 1817.

"Upon the subject of the council which was held at Sandwich, I cannot speak with precision; I think that for some cause, I do not now recollect, I was not present at its deliberations. But I do recollect that at all the interviews I had with you, you were ardent and zealous for the pursuit of Proctor; nor did I ever hear that a doubt had been expressed by you upon that subject, till long after the events themselves had passed away. In the letter from governor Shelby to you, which has been published, the governor has stated so correctly and

distinctly, the propositions which were made for the pursuit of Proctor, that there is less necessity for me to enter into a detail of them. The main body of the enemy's army had left Amherstburg some days before we landed, and were understood to be upon the river French. If conducted with common prudence, it was my opinion then, and it is my opinion yet, that they might have moved with such celerity as to have rendered it impracticable for us to have overtaken them. A deep indentation of the lake some distance below Malden would have brought us within a few miles of the road upon which Proctor retreated, and considerably advanced of the position where we overtook him. The propriety of pursuing him along the road he had taken, or of endeavoring to intercept him by the other route, was the subject of conversation on our first arrival at Sandwich. But whenever I conversed with you, the latter route was mentioned as one which deserved examination rather than one upon which any decided opinion had been formed. Upon a consideration of its uncertainty at that season of the year, it was soon abandoned. I was with you frequently, and conversed with you freely, during our continuance at Sandwich, and I am confident you never hesitated in your determination to pursue Proctor. So far as my feeble testimony can aid in removing erroneous impressions, which have injured you, it is given with pleasure. From the time I joined the army under your command, its operations were conducted with as much celerity as possible, and so far as respects yourself, its fiscal concerns, I am confident, were managed with the most scrupulous integrity."

CHAPTER IX.

Battle of the Thames.—Documents as to the same.—General Harrison sails for Buffalo.—Marches to Fort George.—Ordered to his District.—Descends lake Ontario to Sackett's Harbor.—Passes to Cincinnati, via. New York, Philadelphia, and Washington.—Interference with his command by General Armstrong.—Perry's letter.—M'Arthur's letter.—Johnson's letter.—Croghan's letter.—Harrison's letter of resignation to the President.—Governor Shelby's letter to the President.

WHEN the army reached Sandwich, on the 29th, general M'Arthur was detached with his brigade to retake possession of Detroit, which for thirteen months had been in the possession of the British and Indians. The latter did not leave it until startled by a few rounds from one of our vessels. On the same day, the general, seizing the first moment to abrogate the martial law in force by Proctor, re-established the civil government of Michigan, to the great joy and relief of the inhabitants.

Colonel Johnson, with his mounted regiment, crossed the strait early on the 1st of October, and rejoined the army. On the 2nd of October, the pursuit was resumed. On a fork of the Thames, near Chatham, a large party of Indians were found prepared to dispute the passage of that stream. A few shot from Wood's artillery dispersed them. This was the place appointed by Proctor, in his conference with Tecumthe, to make a stand. "Here," said the former, "they would either defeat general Harrison, or there lay their bones." Tecumthe approved of the position, and said, "when he should look at the two streams, they would remind him of the Wabash and Tippecanoe."* The pursuit was continued with unabated speed,—the troops being frequently on a run, until the 5th, when near the Moravian towns,

* A deep, unfordable creek falls into the Thames, near Chatham.

twelve miles beyond the crossing of the Thames, the enemy was overtaken.

The position selected by the enemy was eminently judicious. The British troops, amounting to eight or nine hundred, were posted with their left upon the river, which was unfordable at that point; their right extended to, and across a swamp, and united there with a body of Indians, led by the celebrated Tecumthe, amounting to eighteen hundred or two thousand. The British artillery was placed in the road along the river, near to the left of their line. At from two to three hundred yards from the river, a swamp extends nearly parallel to it, the intermediate ground being dry. This position of the enemy, with his flank protected on the left by the river, and on the right by the swamp filled by the Indians, was evidently calculated to call for a display of military talent in the opposing general, and of valor in his troops. As the wings could not be turned, general Harrison made his arrangements to concentrate his forces against the British line. The 1st division, under major-general Henry, was formed in three lines at one hundred yards from each other—the front line consisting of Trotter's brigade, the second line of Chiles's brigade, and the reserve of King's brigade. These lines were in front of, and parallel to, the British troops. The second division, under major general Desha, composed of Allen's and Caldwell's brigades, was formed *en potence*, or at right angles to the first division. Governor Shelby, as senior major general of the Kentucky troops, was posted at this crotchet, formed between the first and second divisions. Colonel Simrall's regiment of light infantry was formed in reserve, obliquely to the left division and covering the rear of the front division; and after much reflection as to the disposition to be made of colonel Johnson's mounted troops, they were directed, as soon as the front line advanced, to take ground to the left, and, forming upon that flank, to endeavor to turn the right of the Indians. A detachment of regular troops of the 26th United States infantry, under colonel Paul, occupied the space between the road and the river for the purpose of seizing the enemy's artillery; and simultaneously with this movement,

forty friendly Indians were to pass under the bank to the rear of the British line, and by their fire induce the enemy to suppose their own Indians had turned against them. At the same time, colonel Wood had been instructed to make preparations for using the enemy's artillery, and take their own line by a flank fire. By refusing the left or second division, the Indians were kept *in the air*, that is, in a position in which they would be useless. It will be seen, as the general anticipated, that they awaited in their position the advance of the second division, whilst the British left was contending with the American right. The Indians afterwards inquired why this division did not charge their line. This disposition of the troops was a combination of the modern tactics in Europe, with that prescribed by Washington and adopted by general Wayne. Johnson's corps consisted of nine hundred men, and the five brigades under governor Shelby, amounted from fifteen to eighteen hundred, in all not exceeding two thousand seven hundred.

In the midst of these arrangements, and just as the order was about to be given to the front line to advance, at the head of which general Harrison had placed himself with his staff, major Wood approached him with the intelligence, that having reconnoitred the enemy he had ascertained the remarkable fact, that the British lines, instead of the usual close order, had been drawn up at *open order*. This departure from ordinary military principles in the formation of the British troops, at once induced general Harrison to adopt the novel expedient of charging the British lines with Johnson's mounted troops. This determination was communicated to colonel Johnson, who was directed to draw up his regiment "in close column, with its right fifty yards from the road, (that it might be, in some measure, protected by the trees from the artillery,) its left upon the swamp, and to charge full speed upon the enemy."

At this juncture, general Harrison, with his aids-de-camp, attended by general Cass and commodore Perry, advanced from the right of the front line of infantry, to the right of the front of the column of mounted troops led by lieutenant colonel James Johnson and major Du-

val Payne. General Harrison personally gave the directions for the charge to be made "when the right battalion of the mounted men received the fire of the British; the horses in the front of the column recoiled from the fire; another was given by the enemy, and our column at length getting in motion, broke through the enemy with irresistible force. In one minute the contest in front was over. The British officers seeing no prospect of reducing their disordered ranks to order," and seeing the advance of infantry "and our mounted men wheeling upon them and pouring in a destructive fire, immediately surrendered."*

The result of this charge decided the fate of the day. It uncovered the Indian left, and necessarily compelled a retreat, although the battle continued to rage severely to the left along the Indian line. Colonel Richard M. Johnson, by the extension of his line, had come in contact with the Indians, who had made some impression upon him and the left of Trotter's brigade. As soon as the charge upon the right had taken effect, general Harrison dispatched an order to governor Shelby to bring up Simrall's regiment to reinforce the point pressed by the Indians, and then the general passed to the left to superintend the operations in that quarter. The governor, however, had anticipated the wishes of the general, and bringing up Simrall's regiment, met the general near the crotchet, and soon after the battle ceased. The commanding general then directed a portion of the right battalion, under major Payne, to pursue general Proctor, who had fled under the escort of a troop of dragoons and some mounted Indians. The pursuit was so hot for six miles beyond the Moravian town, that the British general was compelled to abandon his sword, papers, and carriage, which, with sixty-three prisoners, several Indians killed, and an immense amount of stores, was the result of this daring enterprise by seven officers and three privates, who alone continued the pursuit after the first few miles.

Our loss in this decisive battle, was from seventeen to

* Official dispatch.

twenty killed, and thirty to forty wounded. The British loss was six hundred and forty-five, of which eighteen were killed and twenty-six wounded; and the Indians left on the ground and in the pursuit, between fifty and sixty killed, and, estimating the usual proportion of wounded, their total loss must have been near two hundred. Among our gallant dead, was colonel Whitley, and lieutenant Logan. Colonel R. M. Johnson and captains J. Davidson and Short, were severely wounded. Tecumthe, a brigadier-general in the British service, and the formidable chief of the Indian confederacy, fell in this memorable battle, by which an important territory was restored to the United States, the uppermost Canada was conquered, and the blessings of peace extended to the frontier settlements in the north-west.

From a review of the arrangements and incidents in this battle, it will be seen that the plan of refusing the left wing, was attended with the happiest consequences. The force of the enemy consisted principally of Indians in position, with the right of their line thrown forward obtusely from the point where they united with the British: the latter appeared to constitute the weakest wing of the enemy; and therefore general Harrison exhibited military genius in so arranging his troops as to suspend or avoid a conflict with the Indians, and concentrate his strength against the British line. The severe loss inflicted by the Indians on colonel Johnson's left, and the small part of the infantry with which they came in contact, abundantly shews what would have been the loss of life, if the left wing had advanced upon the Indian line.

We introduce in this place, an extract of the official letter of general Harrison, bearing testimony to the conduct of his officers and soldiers in this battle.

"In communicating to the president through you, sir, my opinion of the conduct of the officers who served under my command, I am at a loss how to mention that of governor Shelby, being convinced that no eulogium of mine can reach his merit. The governor of an independent state, greatly my superior in years, in experience, and in military character, he placed himself under my

command, and was not more remarkable for his zeal and activity, than for the promptitude and cheerfulness with which he obeyed my orders. The major-generals Henry and Desha, and the brigadiers Allen, Caldwell, King, Chiles, and Trotter, all of the Kentucky volunteers, manifested great zeal and activity. Of governor Shelby's staff, his adjutant-general, colonel M'Dowell, and his quarter-master general, colonel Walker, rendered great service, as did his aids-de-camp, general Adair and majors Barry and Crittenden. The military skill of the former was of great service to us, and the activity of the two latter gentlemen could not be surpassed. Illness deprived me of the talents of my adjutant-general, colonel Gaines, who was left at Sandwich. His duties were, however, ably performed by the acting assistant adjutant-general, captain Butler. My aids-de-camp, lieutenant O'Fallon and captain Todd, of the line, and my volunteer aids, John Speed Smith and John Chambers, Esq. have rendered me the most important service from the opening of the campaign. I have already stated that general Cass and commodore Perry assisted me in forming the troops for action. The former is an officer of the highest merit, and the appearance of the brave commodore cheered and animated every breast.

"It would be useless, sir, after stating the circumstances of the action, to pass encomiums upon colonel Johnson and his regiment. Veterans could not have manifested more firmness. The colonel's numerous wounds prove that he was in the post of danger. Lieutenant-colonel James Johnson and the majors Payne and Thomson were equally active, though more fortunate. Major Wood, of the engineers, already distinguished by his conduct at Fort Meigs, attended the army with two six pounders. Having no use for them in the action, he joined in the pursuit of the enemy, and with major Payne of the mounted regiment, two of my aids-de-camp, Todd and Chambers,* and three privates, continued it for seve-

* Captain Langham, and lieutenants Scroggin and Bell, inadvertently omitted in this letter, were noticed in a subsequent general order, as being in the pursuit."

ral miles after the rest of the troops had halted, and made many prisoners.

“I left the army before an official return of the prisoners, or that of the killed and wounded, was made out. It was however ascertained that the former amounts to six hundred and one regulars, including twenty-five officers. Our loss is seven killed and twenty-two wounded, five of which have since died. Of the British troops twelve were killed and twenty-two wounded. The Indians suffered most—thirty-three of them having been found upon the ground, besides those killed on the retreat. On the day of the action, six pieces of brass artillery were taken, and two iron twenty-four pounders the day before. Several others were discovered in the river, and can be easily procured. Of the brass pieces three are the trophies of our revolutionary war, that were taken at Saratoga and York, and surrendered by general Hull. The number of small arms taken by us and destroyed by the enemy must amount to upwards of five thousand; most of them had been ours, and taken by the enemy at the surrender of Detroit, at the river Raisin, and colonel Dudley's defeat. I believe that the enemy retain no other military trophy of their victories than the standard of the 4th regiment. They were not magnanimous enough to bring that of the 41st regiment into the field, or it would have been taken.

“You have been informed, sir, of the conduct of the troops under my command in action; it gives me great pleasure to inform you, that they merit also the approbation of their country for their conduct, in submitting to the greatest privations with the utmost cheerfulness. The infantry were entirely without tents, and for several days the whole army subsisted on fresh beef without bread or salt. I have the honor to be, &c.

“WILLIAM H. HARRISON.

“P. S. General Proctor escaped by the fleetness of his horses, escorted by forty dragoons and a number of mounted Indians.

“*General James Armstrong, Secretary of War.*”

Colonel Wood, whose military eye discovered that position of the enemy which induced general Harrison to change the mode of attack, introduced into his journal the following criticism upon the events of the day :

“It is really a novel thing that raw militia, stuck upon horses, with muskets in their hands instead of sabres, should be able to pierce British lines with such complete effect, as did Johnson’s men in the affair upon the Thames ; and perhaps the only circumstance which could justify that deviation from the long established rules of the art military, is the complete success of the result. Great generals are authorized to step aside occasionally—especially when they know that their errors will not be noticed by their adversary.”

Commodore Perry, in a letter to general Harrison of 18th August, 1817, says :

“The prompt change made by you in the order of battle on discovering the position of the enemy, has always appeared to me to have evinced a HIGH DEGREE OF MILITARY TALENT. I concur with the venerable Shelby in his general approbation of your conduct in that campaign.”

Mr. Madison, in his annual message to congress, thus notices, with rare discrimination and justice, the prominent actors in this scene :

“The success on lake Erie having opened a passage to the territory of the enemy, the officer commanding the north-western army transferred the war thither, and rapidly pursuing the hostile troops, fleeing with their savage associates, forced a general action, which quickly terminated in the capture of the British, and dispersion of the savage force.—This result is signally honorable to major-general Harrison, by whose military talents it was prepared ; to colonel Johnson and his mounted volunteers, whose impetuous onset gave a decisive blow to the ranks of the enemy ; and to the spirit of the volunteer militia, equally brave and patriotic, who bore an interesting part in the scene ; more especially to the chief magistrate of Kentucky, at the head of them, whose heroism, signalized in the war which established the independence of his country, sought, at an advanced age, a share in hardships and battles, for maintaining its rights and its safety.”

Mr. Cheves alludes to this event in a speech in congress, in the following terms :

“The victory of Harrison was such as would have secured to a Roman general in the best days of the Republic, the honors of a triumph ! He put an end to the war in the uppermost Canada.”

And the patriotic Simon Snyder, governor of Pennsylvania, introduces the subject to the legislature in these terms :

“Already is the brow of the young warrior, Croghan, encircled with laurels, and the blessings of thousands of women and children, rescued from the scalping knife of the ruthless savage of the wilderness, and from the still more savage Proctor, rest on Harrison and his gallant army.”

The capture of the British, and dispersion of the Indian force on the Thames, enabled general Harrison to proceed to the Niagara frontier with the brigade of McArthur, the rifle regiment under colonel Wells, and the battalion under colonel Ball. On this, as on a former occasion, he anticipated the wishes of the government ; for although he had received no instructions since the preceding July, his own judgment led him to transfer his disposable force to the Niagara strait, after he had accomplished the objects of the campaign. The want of the necessary provisions, and the season being too far advanced to encounter the upper lakes, had previously determined the general and commodore Perry, to abandon the expedition against Macinaw. General Cass was stationed at Detroit with his brigade, and the civil government of Michigan and the military occupation of the uppermost Canada, committed to his charge.

General Harrison sailed in Perry's fleet and reached Erie on the 22nd, and Buffalo on the 24th of October, and proceeded immediately to Newark, when he assumed the command of the troops at that place, and Forts George and Niagara, then under the command of general McClure, of the New York militia. He received at this point from general Armstrong, secretary of war, a copy of the dispatch of the 22nd of September, which had been lost with captain Brown, in the attempt to pass up to

Detroit, in October. This letter suggested the propriety of general Harrison proceeding to the Niagara strait, after he had secured Malden and the army under Proctor. Another letter received about this time from the secretary of war, under date of the 20th of October, adds the authority of general Armstrong's military opinion, so far as it was entitled to weight, to the propriety of general Harrison having convened a council of war at Sandwich, to determine upon the route by which Proctor should be pursued. We introduce an extract of the letter to show that Armstrong recommended the very route which was not taken :

“SACKETT'S HARBOR, *October 20, 1813.*”

“We are, perhaps, too remote to profit by each other's suggestions ; but it does not appear to me that Sandwich is the point at which Proctor will stop, if you pursue him. From Point aux Pins, on lake Erie, there is a good road to Chatham, on the Thames, the distance not more than twenty-four miles. Were this gained and traveled back to Sandwich, the enemy's means of subsistence might be destroyed, and himself compelled to surrender—but of the practicability of this, you are the best judge. My opinion is suggested by the map.”

The secretary of war, in a letter of the 30th of October, recommended to general Harrison to move against the enemy, at Burlington Heights, near the head of lake Ontario, the capture or destruction of which, he says, would be a glorious *finale* to his campaign. But whilst the most active preparations were making to effect this object, another letter from the secretary, on the 3rd of November, four days later, required general Harrison to send McArthur's brigade to Sackett's Harbor, concluding with the declaration that the “general would be permitted to make a visit to his family, which he understood as an order to retire to his own district.”* His letters of the 15th of November, 1813, to general M'Clure, show the sense in which general Harrison regarded this letter, which “left him no alternative as to the disposition of McArthur's brigade,” and which he considered as “or-

* M'Affee, 405.

dering him to return to the westward." Generals Harrison and McClure were actively engaged in preparations against the enemy in conformity to Armstrong's suggestion on the 30th of October, when these arrangements were arrested by the requisition contained in the letter of the 3rd of November, and the arrival of commodore Chauncey, with his squadron, on the 14th of November. The commodore "was extremely pressing that the troops should immediately embark, declaring that the navigation at that season, to small vessels, was very dangerous."* The general accompanied the troops to Sackett's Harbor, and returned to his district by the way of New York, Philadelphia, and Washington. In the two former cities, he received those evidences of public gratitude which belong only to public benefactors. Early in January he resumed, at Cincinnati, the command of the 8th military district.

The course of public opinion during the winter, indicated very decidedly that general Harrison ought to be invested with the chief command in the next campaign. Commodore Perry, who had witnessed the exertions, the skill and bravery of general Harrison, addressed to him about this period, a letter, in which he says, "You know what has been my opinion as to the future commander-in-chief of the army. I pride myself not a little, I assure you, on seeing my predictions so near being verified; yes, my dear friend, I expect to hail you as the chief who is to redeem the honor of our arms in the north." The veteran general McArthur, another eye-witness to the career of general Harrison, wrote to him early in 1814, from Albany, New York, from which the following is an extract: "You, sir, stand the highest with the militia of this state of *any* general in the service, and I am confident, that no man can fight them to so great an advantage; and I think their extreme solicitude may be the means of calling you to this frontier." But from causes, which it is difficult at this time to explain, general Armstrong's feelings and opinions in relation to general Harrison, had undergone a material change. His letter of the 14th May, 1814,

* 5th vol. Niles. 333.

enclosing the plan of the campaign, as submitted to the president on the 30th of April, fully authorizes the inference that general Harrison would not be assigned any command in the *active* operations of the approaching campaign. All of the troops in the 8th military district, excepting garrisons for Detroit and Malden, were to be held in readiness to move down the lake to Buffalo, and general McArthur was *designated* for the command of those corps, including the 17th, 19th, 24th, and 28th regiments of regulars. This arrangement of all the *disposable force in the north-west*, while it left general Harrison to remain in the 8th military district, was made after the receipt at the war office of his letter of the 13th of February, 1814, in which he expresses his views and feelings arising from the interference of the secretary in withdrawing general Howard from his command. That letter concludes with the following declaration: "Apart from the considerations of my duty to my country, I have no inducement to remain in the army, and if the prerogatives of my rank and station as the commander of a district, be taken from me, being fully convinced that I can render no important service, I should much rather be permitted to retire to private life."*

This was the condition of things, when the secretary persevered in interfering with his prerogatives, as the commander of the district, by dispatching to major Holmes, a subordinate officer at Detroit, an order to take two hundred men from that post, and proceed on board commodore Sinclair's fleet, destined to Macinaw. This proceeding on the part of the secretary, was a gross invasion of military propriety; and whatever may have been the design, it authorized general Harrison to suppose it was not the intention of the secretary to respect his rank as commander of the district. The order not only passed by the general, but was derogatory to the rank of colonel Croghan, the immediate commander of the post. That gallant young officer spoke of this course without reserve; and in a letter to general Harrison, made the following appropriate remarks: "Major

* Dawson, 435.

Holmes has been notified by the war department, that he is chosen to command the land troops which are intended to co-operate with the fleet against the enemy's force on the upper lakes. So soon as I may be directed by you to order major Holmes on that command, and to furnish him with the necessary troops, I shall do so; but not till then shall he, or any other part of my force, leave the sod."* In another letter to general Harrison, he remarks: "I know not how to account for the secretary of war's assuming to himself the right of designating major Holmes for this command to Macinaw. My ideas on the subject may not be correct; yet for the sake of the principle, were I a general commanding a district, I would be very far from suffering the secretary of war, or any other authority to interfere with my internal police."† This order to major Holmes would authorize the inference that the secretary may have had other correspondence with him or other inferior officers of the district. It was evidently a course of conduct indicating a very different state of feeling towards the only successful general of the previous campaigns, from that implied by the unlimited powers confided to him in 1812-'13. Of the impolicy and great indelicacy, of a secretary at war interfering in the internal arrangements of the district confided to a commanding general, abundant evidence is afforded in the unmilitary order given to colonel Johnson in June, 1813, to march to St. Louis. Colonel Johnson and his regiment were anxious to participate in the contemplated movements into Canada, and were exceedingly mortified with this order, interfering as well with their wishes as with the internal police of the commanding general. It was on this trying occasion that colonel Johnson, on the 4th of July, appealed to general Harrison, to countermand the order; but the general regarded it as so imperative that he would not disobey it. In the colonel's letter, he expressed the wish, to "serve under a general who was *brave, skilful, and prudent*;" but general Harrison would only so far modify the order, as to permit colonel Johnson and his regiment to take Ken-

* M'Afee, 417.

† M'Afee, 418.

tucky in the route to St. Louis, in the hope that the horses might be recruited, and additional volunteers obtained. In the history of the late war in the west, it is stated, that "he had scarcely reached Kentucky, before general Harrison had been authorized to recall him, by a letter from the war department, in which the secretary expressed his *regret that the order for his march* had ever reached general Harrison, and that the latter, *knowing the impropriety of the order*, had not on that ground, delayed its execution." *

Immediately upon the receipt by general Harrison, of the notification of the order to major Holmes, he sent to the war department a resignation of his commission in the army; accompanied by a letter of the same date, to the president of the United States. The felicity of style, and nobleness of sentiment which characterize that letter, warrant its introduction into these sketches:

"HEAD QUARTERS, CINCINNATI, May 11, 1814.

DEAR SIR:—I have this day forwarded to the secretary of war, my resignation of the commission I hold in the army.

"This measure has not been determined on, without a reference to all the reasons which should influence a citizen, who is sincerely attached to the honor and interests of his country; who believes that the war in which we are engaged is just and necessary; and that the crisis requires the sacrifice of every private consideration, which could stand in opposition to the public good. But after giving the subject the most mature consideration, I am perfectly convinced, that my retiring from the army is as compatible with the claims of patriotism, as it is with those of my family, and a proper regard for my own feelings and honor.

"I have no other motives in writing this letter, than to assure you, that my resignation was not produced by any diminution of the interest I have always taken in the success of your administration, or of respect and attachment for your person. The former can only take

* M'Affee, 337.

place, when I forget the republican principles in which I have been educated ; and the latter, when I shall cease to regard those feelings, which must actuate every honest man, who is conscious of favors that it is out of his power to repay.

Allow me, &c.

“HARRISON.

“*James Madison, Esq. President U. S. .*”

As soon as governor Shelby understood that general Harrison had forwarded his resignation, he addressed a letter to the president, urging him to decline an acceptance. The president was on a visit to Virginia, to which place the letters from general Harrison and governor Shelby were forwarded, and that of the latter was not received, until after *Armstrong*, without the previous consent of the president, had taken upon himself the high prerogative of accepting the resignation. The president expressed his great regret that the letter of governor Shelby had not been received at an earlier date, as in that case the valuable services of general Harrison would have been preserved to the nation in the ensuing campaigns.

As that letter was written by a veteran soldier who had served under general Harrison, and also under Gates, Greene, and Marion, of the revolutionary war, by which he was enabled to judge of their comparative merits, we insert it, that the present generation may form some idea of the loss sustained by the nation, in the resignation of general Harrison, produced by the course of general Armstrong in the war office.

“FRANKFORT, *May 15, 1814.*

DEAR SIR:—The interest I feel for the prosperity of our beloved country, at all times, but especially in the common cause in which she is at present engaged, will, I flatter myself, be a sufficient apology for addressing you this letter. The motives which impel me, arise from considerations of public good, and are unknown to the gentleman who is the subject of the letter.

“It is not my intention to eulogize general Harrison ;

He is not in need of that aid, his merits are too conspicuous not to be observed ; but it is my intention to express to you with candor, my opinion of the general, founded on personal observation.

“A rumor has reached this state, which, from the public prints, appears to be believed, that the commanding general of the northern army, may be removed from that command. This circumstance has induced me to reflect on the subject, and to give a decided preference to major general Harrison, as a successor. Having served a campaign with general Harrison, by which I have been enabled to form some opinion of his military talents, and capacity to command, I feel no hesitation to declare to you, that I believe him to be one of the first military characters I ever knew ; and, in addition to this, he is capable of making greater personal exertions than any officer with whom I have ever served. I doubt not but it will hereafter be found, that the command of the north-western army, and the various duties attached to it, has been one of the most arduous and difficult tasks, ever assigned to any officer in the United States ; yet he surmounted all.

“Impressed with the conviction, that general Harrison is fully adequate to the command of the northern army, should a change take place in that division, I have ventured thus freely to state my opinion of him, that he is a consummate general, and would fill that station with ability and honor ; and, that if, on the other hand, any arrangement should take place in the war department, which may produce the resignation of general Harrison, it will be a misfortune which our country will have cause to lament. His appointment to the command of the northern army, would be highly gratifying to the wishes of the western people, except some who may, perhaps, be governed by sinister views.

“I confess the first impressions upon my mind, when informed of the defeat of colonel Dudley’s regiment, on the 5th of May last, were unfavorable to general Harrison’s plans ; but on correct information, and a knowledge of his whole plans, I have no doubt but they were well concerted, and might, with certainty, have been executed

had his orders been strictly obeyed. I mention this subject because Mr. H. Clay informed me that he had shown you my letter, stating the impressions which the affair had first made upon my mind, on information that was not correct.

"Hoping that my opinion of this meritorious officer would not be unacceptable to you, I have candidly expressed, and hoping the apology stated in the preceding part of this letter, will justify the liberty taken of intruding opinions unsolicited.

"I have the honor to be, most respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"ISAAC SHELBY.

"*His Excellency, James Madison, President U. S.*"

CHAPTER X.

Commissioner to treat with the Indians.—Elected to Congress in 1816.—Investigation of his conduct in that body.—Effort in favor of the pension laws.—Speech in regard to Kosciuszko.—Speech on General Jackson's conduct in the Seminole war.—Favors the independence of the South American Republics.—A gold medal, and the thanks of Congress awarded him.—Elected to the Legislature of Ohio.—Unfounded charge of having voted to sell white men imprisoned for debt.—Elected to the Senate of the United States.—Refutes Randolph's charge of federalism.—Minister to Colombia.—Letter to Bolivar.—Recalled by General Jackson.

HAVING, from the causes stated in the previous chapter, resigned his commission in the army, general Harrison returned to his farm at North Bend, fifteen miles below Cincinnati. During the summer of 1814, government appointed general Harrison, governor Shelby, and general Cass, to treat with the Indian tribes in the northwest. Governor Shelby declining on account of his official station, general Adair was selected to fill his place.

A treaty was shortly afterwards concluded by them, with the Indians, at Greenville. After the peace in 1815, general Harrison was placed at the head of another commission, to treat with the Indians in regard to the restoration of the territory possessed by them before the war. The council was held in Detroit, and a treaty made, which embraced nine important tribes.

In 1816, general Harrison was elected to congress, from the district in which he resided, having received more than a thousand votes over the aggregate number given to his six competitors. An army contractor having about this time made some charges against general Harrison's conduct, while in command in the west, he promptly invited an investigation. The committee in the house of representatives, by their chairman, R. M. Johnson, now vice-president of the United States, say in their report on this charge, made 23rd of January, 1817: "The committee are unanimously of opinion, that general Harrison stands above suspicion, as to his having had any pecuniary or improper connection with the officers of the commissariat, for the supply of the army; that he did not wantonly or improperly interfere with the rights of contractors; and that he was in his measures governed by a proper zeal and devotion to the public interest." When the report was read, Mr. Hulbert, of Massachusetts, a member of the committee, made some explanations, and concluded with the following remark: "The most serious accusation against the general was, that while he was commander-in-chief in the west, regardless of his country's good, he was in the habit of managing the public concerns with a view to his own private interest and emolument. Mr. Hulbert said he could not refrain from pronouncing this a false and cruel accusation. He was confident that directly the reverse was true. There was the most satisfactory evidence, that the general, in the exercise of his official duties, in his devotion to the public interest, had neglected his private concerns to his material detriment and injury. In a word, said Mr. Hulbert, I feel myself authorized to say, that every member of the committee is fully satisfied, that the conduct of general Harrison in relation to

the subject matter of this inquiry, has been that of a brave, honest, and honorable man; that, instead of deserving censure, he merits the thanks and applause of his country."

Soon after general Harrison took his seat in congress, he was placed at the head of the committee on the militia. Early in the session, he moved the following resolution, which was agreed to :

"Resolved, That the military committee be instructed to report a bill providing by law for the relief of such of the officers and soldiers who, having faithfully served in the armies of the United States, are now in distressed circumstances, and who, not having received wounds or disabilities whilst in actual service, are excluded from the benefits of the pension laws."

This resolution led the way for that measure "which encircles the fame of this republic with a glory the ancient republics could not boast of, by exhibiting to the world the most beautiful example on record, of a NATION'S GRATITUDE."

During this session, there was a bill before the house to increase the compensation of members of congress, from *six* to *nine* dollars per day; and on motion to strike out "nine" and insert "six" dollars as the daily pay, general Harrison said, that "in explaining what would otherwise appear an inconsistency in the vote he was about to give, he was aware that in order to preserve in congress talents of a proper grade, and to enable men of moderate property to come to that body without loss, a higher compensation was necessary than had heretofore been allowed to members of congress. But, said he, holding as we do, the key of the treasury, we ought not to do ourselves even justice, before we do it to others *whose claims are stronger, and of longer standing.* WHENEVER JUSTICE SHALL BE DONE TO THE SUFFERERS IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION, AND NOT TILL THEN, I SHALL BE PREPARED TO DO JUSTICE TO OURSELVES."

Shortly afterwards, general Harrison offered a resolution for a committee to report "what measures it may be proper to adopt to manifest the public respect for the memory of general Thaddeus Kosciusko, formerly an offi-

eer in the service of the United States, and the uniform and distinguished friend of liberty and the rights of man." On the presentation of this resolution, he made a most touching and eloquent appeal to the house, which concluded in these words :

"Such was the man, sir, for whose memory I ask from an American congress a slight tribute of respect. Not, sir, to perpetuate his fame, but our gratitude. His fame will last as long as liberty remains upon the earth ; as long as a votary offers incense upon her altar, the name of Kosciusko will be invoked. And if, by the common consent of the world, a temple shall be erected to those who have rendered most service to mankind—if the statue of our great countryman shall occupy the place of the 'most worthy,' that of Kosciusko will be found at his side, and the wreath of laurel will be entwined with the palm of virtue, to adorn his brow."

The career of general Harrison, in congress, proved that he was eminently qualified for the duties of a legislator. He exhibited, while a member of that body, an intimate familiarity with the civil and military affairs of the country, and the possession of a vigorous and cultivated mind. As a debater, he was ready, fluent, and forcible—always courteous and dignified, eminently happy in illustrating his arguments by the history of other nations, both ancient and modern, with the philosophy of which, his mind is deeply and accurately imbued. His speeches on the organization of the militia of the United States, the pension bill, the Seminole war, the recognition of the independence of the South American republics, may all be cited as masterly productions, teeming with deep pathos, pure patriotism, and eloquent argument.

"While general Harrison was in the house of representatives, the important debate arose, on the resolution to censure general Jackson for his conduct in the Seminole war ; and he delivered on this subject a most elaborate and eloquent speech. It was one of the finest efforts elicited by that interesting occasion ; but is chiefly admirable for its impartial and patriotic spirit. While he disapproved the course of general Jackson, and comment-

ed on his conduct with the manly independence of a free-man, he defended such of the acts of that distinguished citizen as he thought right, and did justice to his motives. His concluding remarks were as follows :

“ If the highest services could claim indemnity for crime, then might the conqueror of Plataea have been suffered to continue his usurpations until he had erected a throne upon the ruins of Grecian liberty. Sir, it will not be understood that I mean to compare general Jackson with these men. No ; I believe that the principles of the patriot are as firmly fixed in his bosom as those of the soldier. But a republican government should make no distinctions between men, and should never relax its maxims of security for any individual, however distinguished. No man should be allowed to say that he could do that with impunity which another could not do. If the father of his country were alive, and in the administration of the government, and had authorized the taking of the Spanish posts, I would declare my disapprobation as readily as I do now. Nay, more—because the more distinguished the individual, the more salutary the example. No one can tell how soon such an example may be beneficial. General Jackson will be faithful to his country ; but I recollect that the virtues and patriotism of Fabius and Scipio, were soon followed by the crimes of Marius and the usurpation of Sylla. I am sure, sir, that it is not the intention of any gentleman upon this floor to rob general Jackson of a single ray of glory ; much less to wound his feelings, or injure his reputation. And whilst I thank my friend from Mississippi, (Mr. Poindexter,) in the name of those who agree with me, that general Jackson has done wrong, I must be permitted to decline the use of the address which he has so obligingly prepared for us, and substitute the following, as more consonant to our views and opinions. If the resolutions pass, I would address him thus : ‘ In the performance of a sacred duty imposed by their construction of the constitution, the representatives of the people have found it necessary to disapprove a single act of your brilliant career ; they have done it in the full conviction that the hero who has guarded her rights in the field, will

bow with reverence to the civil institutions of his country—that he has admitted as his creed, that the character of the soldier can never be complete without eternal reference to the character of the citizen. Your country has done for you all that a country can do for the most favored of her sons. The age of deification is past; it was an age of tyranny and barbarism: the adoration of man should be addressed to his Creator alone. You have been feasted in the Pritanes of the cities. Your statue shall be placed in the capitol, and your name be found in the songs of the virgins. Go, gallant chief, and bear with you the gratitude of your country. Go, under the full conviction, that as her glory is identified with yours, she has nothing more dear to her but her laws, nothing more sacred but her constitution. Even an unintentional error shall be sanctified to her service. It will teach posterity that the government which could disapprove the conduct of a Marcellus, will have the fortitude to crush the vices of a Marius.’

“These sentiments, sir, lead to results in which all must unite. General Jackson will still live in the hearts of his fellow-citizens, and the constitution of your country will be immortal.”*

In 1816, a resolution was introduced into the senate of the United States, voting gold medals and the thanks of congress, to Harrison and Shelby. Owing to the opposition of the war party, in that body, and certain charges preferred against general Harrison, his name was stricken out by two votes in *committee of the whole*. On the question to concur in the amendment to strike out Harrison’s name, it was lost by one vote. Here the proceedings of this session closed, general Harrison’s name being retained, and the resolution laid over. On the 24th of March, 1818, Mr. Dickerson, formerly governor of New Jersey, and late secretary of the navy under an appointment from president Jackson, renewed the subject by offering anew, the same resolution, which he sustained by a strong eulogium on the military services of general Harrison; and, on the 30th, it passed the senate by a

* Hall’s Memoir.

unanimous vote. On the 31st, the house concurred in the resolution with only *one* dissenting voice, and on the 6th of April it received the approval of the president. It is in these words:

Resolved, by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, that the thanks of congress be, and they are hereby presented to major general William Henry Harrison, and Isaac Shelby, late governor of Kentucky, and, through them, to the officers and men under their command, for their gallantry and good conduct in defeating the combined British and Indian forces under major general Proctor, on the Thames, in Upper Canada, on the 5th day of October, one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, capturing the British army, with their baggage, camp equipage, and artillery; and that the president of the United States be requested to cause two medals to be struck, emblematical of this triumph, and presented to general Harrison and Isaac Shelby, late governor of Kentucky.

H. CLAY,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JOHN GAILLARD,

President of the Senate, pro tempore.

April 4, 1818.—Approved,

JAMES MONROE.

When governor Shelby heard of the effort in the senate to strike out general Harrison's name, he wrote to his old commander, under date of May 16th, 1816, as follows: "Don't let the conduct of the senate disturb your mind. I hope their resolution has been laid over as to both of us. The moment I heard of the course it was like to take, I wrote instantly to Mr. Clay, and expressed my regret that it had been introduced, and how mortified I should feel to be noticed, if you were not included, who had rendered ten times more service to the nation than I had." This letter is as creditable to the generous disinterestedness of the governor, as it is to the public services of general Harrison.

In the autumn of 1819, general Harrison was elected to the legislature of Ohio. One of his votes, while in

that body, having been greatly perverted, for party purposes, we deem it proper, in this place, to set the matter right. The charge is, that while in the senate of Ohio, he voted *in favor of a law to sell white persons imprisoned under a judgment for debt, for a term of years, if unable otherwise to discharge the execution.* This charge is untrue in every part. The law had no reference whatever to *debtors*—no such proposition was ever before the legislature of Ohio, nor could such a law be passed without a palpable violation of the constitution. It had respect solely to the mode of disposing of *public offenders*, who had been found guilty by a jury of citizens, of crimes against the laws of the state. By the act then in force, criminals of different ages, sex and color, were crowded together in a common jail, where they were kept until their fines and the costs of prosecution were paid. The new law, in favor of which general Harrison voted, contained a section, providing, that in cases where criminals were sentenced to confinement in jail, until payment was made of fine and costs of prosecution—this being a part of the sentence,—the commissioners of the county were authorized to compel them to work upon the public roads; or, in their discretion, to hire them out to the best bidder, until their wages would discharge the fines, for the non-payment of which they were kept in prison. This disposition of young offenders, and especially of females, was certainly more humane than to suffer them to lie in jail—to work on the public roads, with a chain and ball upon their legs, or to be publicly whipped, as was provided for in the law for which this was to be the substitute. Whatever may be thought of its policy, one thing is absolutely certain—the law for which general Harrison voted, had no reference to persons imprisoned for debt. Subsequently to the time when this vote was given, the general, in an exposition of it, remarked, “I have said enough to show that this obnoxious law would not have applied to ‘unfortunate debtors of sixty-four years,’ but to *infamous offenders* who depredate upon the property of their fellow-citizens, and who, by the constitution of the state, as well as the principle of existing laws, were subject to *involuntary servitude.* I must con-

fess I had no very sanguine expectations of a beneficial effect from the measure, as it would apply to convicts who had obtained the age of maturity; but I had supposed that a woman, or a youth, who, convicted of an offence, remained in jail for the payment of the fine and costs imposed, might with great advantage be transferred to the residence of some decent, virtuous private family, whose precept and example would gently lead them back to the paths of rectitude."

In the autumn of 1822, general Harrison being a candidate for congress, published a short address to the voters of his district, in which he sums up his political principles. We subjoin a portion of it, breathing the pure spirit of sound republicanism:

"I believe, that upon the preservation of the union of the states depends the existence of our civil and religious liberties; and that the cement which binds it together is not a parcel of words written upon paper or parchment, but the brotherly love and regard which the citizens of the several states possess for each other. Destroy this, and the beautiful fabric which was reared and embellished by our ancestors crumbles into ruins. From its disjointed parts no temple of liberty will again be reared. Discord and wars will succeed to peace and harmony—barbarism will again overspread the land; or, what is scarcely better, some kindly tyrant will promulgate the decrees of his will, from the seat where a Washington and a Jefferson dispensed the blessings of a free and equal government. I believe it, therefore, to be the duty of a representative to conciliate, by every possible means, the members of our great political family, and always to bear in mind that *as the union was effected only by a spirit of mutual concession and forbearance, so only can it be preserved.*"

In the year 1824, the legislature of Ohio elected general Harrison to the senate of the United States, in which body, soon after taking his seat, he succeeded general Jackson as chairman of the committee on military affairs. While a member of that body, among other measures, he strongly advocated a bill giving a preference, in the appointment of cadets to the military academy at West

Point, to the sons of those who had fallen in battle, in their country's service.

While in the senate, John Randolph, of Virginia, took occasion to renew an old charge against general Harrison, of his having been a black-cockade federalist of '98, and of having voted for the alien and sedition laws of that period. As soon as Mr. Randolph had taken his seat, general Harrison rose, and with remarkable coolness and temper, considering the virulent and unprovoked character of the attack, he observed: "that the extraordinary manner in which his name had been brought before the senate, by the senator from Virginia, probably required some notice from him, though he scarcely knew how to treat such a charge as had been advanced against him seriously. The gentleman had charged him with being a black-cockade federalist of '98, and with having voted for the standing army and the alien and sedition laws. He had not so fertile a memory as the gentleman from Virginia, nor could he at command call up all the transactions of nearly thirty years ago. He could say, however, that at the time alluded to, he was not a party man in the sense the senator from Virginia used—he was a delegate of a territory which was just then rising into importance, and having no vote on the general questions before congress, it was neither his duty nor the interest of those whom he represented, to plunge into the turbulent sea of general politics which then agitated the nation. There were questions of great importance to the north-western territory then before congress, questions upon the proper settlement of which, the future prosperity of that now important portion of the Union greatly depended. Standing as he did, the sole representative of that territory, his greatest ambition was to prove himself faithful to his trust, by cherishing its interests, and nothing could have been more suicidal or pernicious to those he represented, than for him to exasperate either party by becoming a violent partisan, without the power of aiding either party, because he had no vote on any political question. This was his position, and although he had his political principles as firmly fixed as those of the gentleman from Virginia, it was no business of his to

strike where he could not be felt, and where the blow must recoil upon himself and those whom he represented. He wore no cockade, black or tri-colored, at that day—and never wore one but when he was in the military service of his country. But he was seriously charged with the heinous offence of associating with *federal* gentlemen. He plead guilty—he respected the revolutionary services of president Adams, and had paid him that courtesy which was due to him as a man and as chief magistrate. He also associated with such men as John Marshall and James A. Bayard—was the acknowledgment of such guilt to throw him out of the pale of political salvation?

“On the other hand, he was on intimate terms with Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Gallatin, and with the whole Virginia delegation, among whom he had many kinsmen and dear friends. They were his principal associates in Philadelphia, in whose mess he had often met the gentleman who was now his accuser, and with whom he had spent some of the happiest hours of his life. It was true, as the senator alledged, he had been appointed governor of the north-western territory by John Adams—so had he been by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. He was not in congress when the standing army was created, and the alien and sedition laws were passed, and if he had been he could not have voted for them, and would not if he could. It was not in his nature to be a violent or proscriptive partizan, but he had given a firm support to the republican administrations of Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. He hoped the senator from Virginia was answered—he was sure the senate must be wearied with this frivolous and unprofitable squabble.”

In the latter part of the year 1828, president Adams appointed general Harrison minister plenipotentiary to the republic of Colombia. He reached Marycabo in December, and from thence proceeded to Bogota. Immediately after the inauguration of president Jackson, in 1829, he recalled general Harrison, and appointed Mr. Thomas Moore, of Kentucky, in his place.

While in Colombia, the proposition was entertained by one of the political parties, of putting aside the con-

stitution, and raising Bolivar to a dictatorship. During the agitation of this question, general Harrison, as the personal friend of Bolivar, and not in his official capacity, addressed him a letter on the subject of this change of government. This document, which has been extensively circulated and greatly admired in the United States, is written with great force and elegance of diction, and breathes the pure spirit of republican liberty. We have only room to cite the concluding paragraphs of this masterly production :

“ In relation to the effect which this investment of power is to have upon your happiness and your fame, will the pomp and glitter of a court, and the flattery of venal courtiers, reward you for the troubles and anxieties attendant upon the exercise of sovereignty, everywhere, and those which will flow from your peculiar situation ? Or power, supported by the bayonet, for that willing homage which you were wont to receive from your fellow-citizens ? The groans of a dissatisfied and oppressed people will penetrate the inmost recesses of your palace, and you will be tortured by the reflection, that you no longer possess that place in their affections, which was once your pride and your boast, and which would have been your solace under every reverse of fortune. Unsupported by the people, your authority can be maintained only, by the terrors of the sword and the scaffold. And have these ever been successful under similar circumstances ? Blood may smother, for a period, but can never extinguish the fire of liberty, which you have contributed so much to kindle in the bosom of every Colombian.

“ I will not urge, as an argument, the personal dangers to which you will be exposed. But I will ask, if you could enjoy life, which would be preserved by the constant execution of so many human beings—your countrymen, your former friends, and almost your worshipers ? The pangs of such a situation will be made more acute, by reflecting on the hallowed motive of many of those who would aim their daggers at your bosom. That, like the last of the Romans, they would strike, not from hatred to the man, but love to the country.

“From a knowledge of your own disposition, and present feelings, your excellency will not be willing to believe, that you could ever be brought to commit an act of tyranny, or even to execute justice with unnecessary rigor. But trust me, sir, that there is nothing more corrupting, nothing more destructive of the noblest and finest feelings of our nature, than the exercise of unlimited power. The man who, in the beginning of such a career, might shudder at the idea of taking away the life of a fellow-being, might soon have his conscience so seared by the repetition of crime, that the agonies of his murdered victims might become music to his soul, and the drippings of his scaffold afford “blood enough to swim in.” History is full of such examples.

“From this disgusting picture, permit me to call the attention of your excellency to one of a different character. It exhibits you as the constitutional chief magistrate of a free people. Giving to their representatives the influence of your great name and talents, to reform the abuses which, in a long reign of tyranny and misrule, have fastened upon every branch of the administration. The army, and its swarm of officers, reduced within the limits of real usefulness, placed on the frontiers, and no longer permitted to control public opinion, and be the terror of the peaceful citizen. By the removal of this incubus from the treasury, and the establishment of order, responsibility, and economy, in the expenditures of the government, it would soon be enabled to dispense with the odious monopolies, and the duty of the *Alcavala*, which have operated with so malign an effect upon commerce and agriculture; and, indeed, upon the revenues which they were intended to augment. No longer oppressed by these shackles, industry would everywhere revive: the farmer and the artizan, cheered by the prospect of ample reward for their labor, would redouble their exertions: foreigners, with their capital and skill in the arts, would crowd hither, to enjoy the advantages which could scarcely elsewhere be found: and Colombia would soon exhibit the reality of the beautiful fiction of Fenelon—Salentum rising from misery and oppression, to prosper.

ity and happiness, under the councils and direction of the concealed goddess.

“What objections can be urged against this course? Can any one, acquainted with the circumstances of the country, doubt its success, in restoring and maintaining tranquillity? The people would certainly not revolt against themselves; and none of the chiefs who are supposed to be factiously inclined, would think of opposing the strength of the nation, when directed by your talents and authority. But it is said, that the want of intelligence amongst the people unfits them for the government. Is it not right, however, that the experiment should be fairly tried? I have already said, that this has not been done. For myself, I do not hesitate to declare my firm belief, that it will succeed. The people of Colombia possess many traits of character, suitable for a republican government. A more orderly, forbearing, and well-disposed people are nowhere to be met with. Indeed, it may safely be asserted, that their faults and vices are attributable to the cursed government to which they have been so long subjected, and to the intolerant character of the religion, whilst their virtues are all their own. But admitting their present want of intelligence, no one has ever doubted their capacity to acquire knowledge, and under the strong motives which exist, to obtain it, supported by the influence of your excellency, it would soon be obtained.

“To yourself, the advantage would be as great as to the country; like acts of mercy, the blessings would be reciprocal; your personal happiness secured, and your fame elevated to a height which would leave but a single competition in the estimation of posterity. In bestowing the palm of merit, the world has become wiser than formerly. The successful warrior is no longer regarded as entitled to the first place in the temple of fame. Talents of this kind have become too common, and too often used for mischievous purposes, to be regarded as they once were. In this enlightened age, the mere hero of the field, and the successful leader of armies, may, for the moment, attract attention. But it will be such as is bestowed upon the passing meteor, whose

blaze is no longer remembered, when it is no longer seen. To be esteemed eminently great, it is necessary to be eminently good. The qualities of the hero and the general must be devoted to the advantage of mankind, before he will be permitted to assume the title of their benefactor; and the station which he will hold in their regard and affections will depend, not upon the number and the splendor of his victories; but upon the results and the use he may make of the influence he acquires from them.

“If the fame of our Washington depended upon his military achievements, would the common consent of the world allow him the pre-eminence he possesses? The victories at Trenton, Monmouth, and York, brilliant as they were—exhibiting, as they certainly did, the highest grade of military talents, are scarcely thought of. The source of the veneration and esteem which is entertained for his character, by every description of politicians—the monarchist and aristocrat, as well as the republican, is to be found in his undeviating and exclusive devotedness to the interest of his country. No selfish consideration was ever suffered to intrude itself into his mind. For his country he conquered; and the unrivalled and increasing prosperity of that country is constantly adding fresh glory to his name. General; the course which he pursued is open to you, and it depends upon yourself to attain the eminence which he has reached before you.

“To the eyes of military men, the laurels you won on the fields of Vargas, Bayaca, and Carebobo, will be forever green; but will that content you? Are you willing that your name should descend to posterity, amongst the mass of those whose fame has been derived from shedding human blood, without a single advantage to the human race? Or, shall it be united to that of Washington, as the founder and the father of a great and happy people? The choice is before you. The friends of liberty throughout the world, and the people of the United States in particular, are waiting your decision with intense anxiety. Alexander toiled and conquered to attain the applause of the Athenians; will you regard as nothing the opinions of a nation which has evinced its supe-

riority over that celebrated people, in the science most useful to man, by having carried into actual practice a system of government, of which the wisest Athenians had but a glimpse in theory, and considered as a blessing never to be realized, however ardently to be desired? The place which you are to occupy in their esteem depends upon yourself."

It has been stated that general Harrison was recalled from Colombia in consequence of his interference in the internal affairs of the republic. This is not the fact. He reached Bogota on the 5th of February, 1829. President Jackson was inaugurated on the 4th of March of that year, and Mr. Moore was appointed to this office on the 8th. It is therefore impossible that the president could even have known of general Harrison's *arrival* at the seat of government, when he was recalled. Mr. Moore reached Bogota in September, and on the 26th of that month, general Harrison had his audience of leave. On that occasion, the president of the council said to him: "In expressing to you, sir, the sentiments of the council towards your government, it is agreeable to me to declare, that the hopes formed by Colombia, when the appointment was announced of so distinguished a general, and one of the most eminent citizens of the oldest republic of America, have been realized by your residence in this capital, as envoy extraordinary, and minister plenipotentiary near this government; and, therefore, it is highly satisfactory to me, to show the high esteem which your personal qualities have inspired." At the time when this address was made, Bolivar was absent from Bogota, and the president of the council was administering the affairs of the government. His address to general Harrison, the concluding paragraphs of which have been quoted, clearly demonstrates that our minister had discharged the duties of his station with dignity, prudence and ability.

CHAPTER XI.

Colonel Johnson's speech in Congress.—General Harrison's Cheviot address.—His address in 1832, in regard to slavery.—Vincennes speech about Abolition.—His speech at the 47th anniversary celebration of the settlement of Ohio.—Historical discourse on the aborigines of the Ohio.

AFTER general Harrison's return from Colombia, he retired to his farm and resumed the peaceful pursuits of agriculture. In June, 1831, he was chosen to deliver the annual discourse before the Hamilton county Agricultural Society. In this address, he gave evidence of being a sound practical farmer, combining theory and practice, in regard to crops and herds, with the same ready success, that in other days he had applied military principles to the movement of armies. A single extract from this valuable discourse, is all that our limits will permit:

“The encouragement of agriculture, gentlemen, would be praiseworthy in any country: in our own it is peculiarly so. Not only to multiply the means and enjoyment of life, but as giving greater stability and security to our political institutions. In all ages and in all countries, it has been observed, that the cultivators of the soil, are those who were least willing to part with their rights, and submit themselves to the will of a master. I have no doubt also, that a taste for agricultural pursuits, is the best means of disciplining the ambition of those daring spirits, who occasionally spring up in the world, for good or for evil, to defend or destroy the liberties of their fellow-men, as the principles received from education or circumstances may tend. As long as the leaders of the Roman armies were taken from the plough, to the plough they were willing to return. Never in the character of general, forgetting the duties of the citizen, and ever ready to exchange the sword and the triumphal purple, for the homely vestments of the husbandman.

“The history of this far-famed republic is full of instances of this kind; but none more remarkable than our own age and country have produced. The fascinations of power and the trappings of command, were as much despised, and the enjoyment of rural scenes, and rural employments as highly prized by our Washington, as by Cincinnatus or Regulus. At the close of his glorious military career, he says, ‘I am preparing to return to that domestic retirement which it is well known I left with the deepest regret, and for which I have not ceased to sigh through a long and painful absence.’

“Your efforts, gentlemen, to diffuse a taste for agriculture amongst men of all descriptions and professions, may produce results more important even than increasing the means of subsistence, and the enjoyment of life. It may cause some future conqueror for his country, to end his career

“Guiltless of his country’s blood.”

* * * * *

“To the heart-cheering prospect of flocks and herds feeding on unrivalled pastures, fields of grain, exhibiting the scriptural proof that the seed had been cast on good ground—how often is the eye of the philanthropic traveler disgusted with the dark, unsightly manufactories of a certain poison—poison to the body and the soul. A modern Æneas or Ulysses might mistake them for entrances into the Infernal Regions; nor would they greatly err. But unlike those passages which conducted the Grecian and Trojan heroes on their pious errands, the scenes to which these conduct the unhappy wretch who shall enter are those, exclusively, of misery and woe. No relief to the sad picture; no Tartarus *there*, no Elysium *here*. It is all Tartarian darkness, and, not unfrequently, Tartarian crime. I speak more freely of the practice of converting the material of the ‘staff of life’ (and by which so many human beings yearly perish) into an article which is so destructive of health and happiness, because in that way I have sinned myself; *but in that way I shall sin no more.*” *

* Some years since, general Harrison established a distillery

In 1831, pending an application in congress for the settlement of the accounts of J. Symmes Harrison, late Receiver of public monies at Vincennes, colonel Richard M. Johnson, now vice-president of the United States, in alluding to the father of the late Receiver, spontaneously bore the following well merited tribute to his old commander :

“ Who is general Harrison? The son of one of the signers of the declaration of independence, who spent the greater part of his large fortune in redeeming the pledge he then gave, of his ‘ fortune, life and sacred honor,’ to secure the liberties of his country.

“ Of the career of general Harrison I need not speak—the history of the west, is his history. For forty years he has been identified with its interests, its perils and its hopes. Universally beloved in the walks of peace, and distinguished by his ability in the councils of his country, he has been yet more illustriously distinguished in the field.

“ During the late war, he was longer in active service than any other general officer; he was, perhaps, oftener in action than any one of them, and never sustained a defeat.”

In 1833, general Harrison delivered, by appointment, at Cheviot, Hamilton county, Ohio, an address in commemoration of the 4th of July, which was subsequently published by the committee of arrangements. It presents a summary of the causes which led to the revolutionary war, and a lucid exposition of the constitution of the United States. His interpretation of that instrument is in strict accordance with the celebrated resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky, of 1798.

Being desirous of making a fair representation of the views of general Harrison, on all important public matters, we now introduce two documents touching his opin-

on his farm, to convert his surplus corn into whiskey. Soon perceiving the bad consequences of such a manufactory, upon the surrounding population, he cheerfully encountered pecuniary sacrifice by abolishing his manufactory of that baneful article.

ions on the subject of slavery. In the year 1822, when he was a candidate for congress, his opponents, for the purpose of defeating his election, charged him with being a pro-slavery man—that he had owned slaves, and had been in favor of introducing slavery into Indiana. In refutation of this sweeping charge, general Harrison published an address, from which we take all of that portion relating to the subject of slavery. It is in these words:

“ Being called suddenly home to attend my sick family, I have but a moment to answer a few of the calumnies which are in circulation concerning me.

“ I am accused of being friendly to slavery. From my earliest youth to the present moment, I have been the *ardent friend of Human Liberty*. At the age of eighteen, *I became a member of an Abolition Society* established at Richmond, Virginia; the object of which was to ameliorate the condition of slaves and *procure their freedom by every legal means*. My venerable friend, Judge Gatch, of Clermont county, was also a member of this society, and has lately given me a certificate that I was one. *The obligations which I then came under I have faithfully performed*. I have been the means of liberating many slaves, *but never placed one in bondage*. I deny that my vote in congress in relation to Missouri and Arkansas, are in the least incompatible with these principles. Congress had no more legal or constitutional right to emancipate the negroes in those sections of Louisiana without the consent of their owners, than they have to free those of Kentucky. These people were secured in their property by a solemn covenant with France when the country was purchased from that power. To prohibit the emigration of citizens of the southern states to the part of the country, the situation and climate of which, was peculiarly suited to them, would have been highly unjust, as it had been purchased out of the common fund. Particularly, too, when it is recollected that all the immense territory to the north-west of the Ohio had been ceded by Virginia, and with an unexampled liberality, she had herself proposed, that by excluding slavery from it, to secure it for the emigration of those

states which had no slaves. Was it proper, then, when her reserved territory was in a great measure filled up, to exclude her citizens from every part of the territory purchased out of the common fund? *I was the first person to introduce into congress the proposition that all the country above Missouri* (which having no inhabitants was free from the objection made to Missouri and Arkansas) *should never have slavery admitted into it.* I repeat what I have before said, that as our union was only effected by mutual concession, so only can it be preserved.

“My vote against the restriction of Missouri in forming her constitution was not a conclusive one; there would have been time enough, had I continued to be a member, before the question was decided, for my constituents to have instructed me, and I should have rejoiced in an opportunity of sacrificing my seat to my principles, if they had instructed me in opposition to my construction of the constitution. Like many other members from the non-slaveholding states, of whom I mention Shaw, Holmes, Mason of Massachusetts, Laman of Connecticut, and Baldwin of Pennsylvania, I could see nothing in the constitution which I had sworn to support, to warrant such an interference with the rights of the states, and which had never before been attempted. And where is the crime in one set of men not being able to interpret the constitution as other men interpret it? As we had all *sworn* to support it, the crime would have been in giving it a construction which our consciences would not sanction. And let me ask, for what good is this question again brought up? It has been settled, as all our family differences have been settled, on the firm basis of mutual compromise. And patriotism, as well as prudence, devoted the effects of that *awful discussion* to eternal oblivion. Is it not known, that from that cause the great fabric of our Union was shaken to its foundation? Is it not known that Missouri would not have submitted to the restriction, and that the other slave-holding states had determined to support her? But for this compromise, the probability is, that at this moment we might look upon the opposite shore of Ohio, not for an affectionate sister state, but on an

armed and implacable rival. What patriotic man would not join the gallant *Eaton* in execrating the *head and the hand* that could devise and execute a scheme productive of a calamity so awful?

“Upon the whole, fellow-citizens, our path is a plain one; it is that marked out as well by humanity as duty. We cannot emancipate the slaves of the other states without their consent, but by producing a convulsion which would undo us all. For this much to be desired event, we must wait the slow but certain progress of those good principles which are every where gaining ground, and which assuredly will ultimately prevail.”

It is proper to remark, that this society, originally established by the Quakers, but not confined to them, was, according to the statement of Judge Gatch, a “*Humane Society* ;” and it seems to have been of a character to which no exceptions were taken in Virginia. A number of the citizens of Richmond were members, and its principles were not understood to be at all in conflict with the rights guarantied to the owners of slaves, by the constitution and the laws of the land. Within a few months after his first connection with this society, general Harrison, then but eighteen years of age, removed from Virginia, since which time he has never attended one of its meetings, nor been either directly or indirectly connected with any society touching the question of slavery.

The other document upon this subject, is taken from a speech made by general Harrison, at Vincennes, Indiana, in May, 1835, on the occasion of a public dinner having been given to him by the citizens of that place.

“I have now, fellow-citizens, a few more words to say on another subject, and which is, in my opinion, of more importance than any other that is now in the course of discussion in any part of the Union. I allude to the societies which have been formed, and the movements of certain individuals in some of the states in relation to a portion of the population in others. The conduct of these persons is the more dangerous, because their object is masked under the garb of disinterestedness and benevolence; and their course vindicated by arguments and

propositions which, in the abstract, no one can deny. But, however fascinating may be the dress with which their schemes are presented to their fellow-citizens, with whatever purity of intention they may have been formed and sustained, they will be found to carry in their train mischief to the whole Union, and horrors to a large portion of it, which, it is probable, some of the projectors and many of their supporters have never thought of; the latter, the first in the series of evils which are to spring from their source, are such as you have seen perpetrated on the fair plains of Italy and Gaul, by the Scythian hordes of Attila and Alaric; and such as most of you apprehended upon that memorable night, when the tomahawks and war clubs of the followers of Tecumthe were rattling in your suburbs. I regard not the disavowals of any such intention upon the part of the authors of these schemes, since, upon the examination of the publications which have been made, they will be found to contain the very facts, and very arguments which they would have used, if such had been their object. I am certain that there is not, in this assembly, one of these deluded men, and that there are few within the bounds of the state. If there are any, I would earnestly entreat them to forbear; to pause in their career, and deliberately consider the consequence of their conduct to the whole Union, to the states more immediately interested, and to those for whose benefit they profess to act. That the latter will be the victims of the weak, injudicious, presumptuous and unconstitutional efforts to serve them, a thorough examination of the subject must convince them. The struggle (and struggle there must be) may commence with horrors such as I have described, but it will end with more firmly riveting the chains, or in the utter extirpation of those whose cause they advocate.

“Am I wrong, fellow-citizens, in applying the terms weak, presumptuous and unconstitutional, to the measures of the emancipators? A slight examination will, I think, show that I am not. In a vindication of the objects of a convention which was lately held in one of the towns of Ohio, which I saw in a newspaper, it was said that nothing more was intended than to produce a

state of public feeling which would lead to an amendment of the constitution, authorizing the abolition of slavery in the United States. Now can an amendment of the constitution be effected without the consent of the southern States? What then is the proposition to be submitted to them? It is this:—‘The present provisions of the constitution secure to you the right (a right which you held before it was made, which you have never given up,) to manage your domestic concerns in your own way; but as we are convinced that you do not manage them properly, we want you to put in the hands of the general government, in the councils of which we have the majority, the control over these matters, the effect of which will be virtually to transfer the power from yours into our hands.’ Again, in some of the states, and in sections of others, the black population far exceeds that of the white. Some of the emancipators propose immediate abolition. What is the proposition then, as it regards the states and parts of states, but the alternatives of amalgamation with the blacks, or an exchange of situations with them? Is there any man of common sense who does not believe that the emancipated blacks, being a majority, will not insist upon a full participation of political rights with the whites; and when possessed of these, they will not contend for a full share of social rights also? What but the extremity of weakness and folly could induce any one to think, that such propositions as these could be listened to by a people so intelligent as the southern states? Further; the emancipators generally declare that it is their intention to effect their object (although their acts contradict their assertion,) by no other means than by convincing the slave-holders that the emancipation of the slaves is called for, both by moral obligation and sound policy. An unfledged youth, at the moment of his leaving (indeed, in many instances, before he has left it,) his theological seminary, undertakes to give lectures upon morals to the countrymen of Wythe, Tucker, Pendleton and Lowndes, and lessons of political wisdom to states, whose affairs have so recently been directed by Jefferson and Madison, Macon and Crawford. Is it

possible, that instances of greater vanity and presumption could be exhibited? But the course pursued by the emancipators is unconstitutional. I do not say that there are any words in the constitution which forbid the discussions they are engaged in; I know that there are not. And citizens have the right to express and publish their opinions without restriction. But in the construction of the constitution, it is always necessary to refer to the circumstances under which it was framed, and to ascertain its meaning by a comparison of its provisions with each other, and with the previous situation of the several states who were parties to it. In a portion of these, slavery was recognized, and they took care to have the right secured to them; to follow and reclaim such of them as were fugitives to other states. The laws of congress passed under this power, have provided punishment for any one who shall oppose or interrupt the exercise of this right. Now can any one believe, that the instrument which contains a provision of this kind, which authorizes a master to pursue his slave into another state, take him back, and provides a punishment for any citizen or citizens of that state who should oppose him, should, at the same time, authorize the latter to assemble together, to pass resolutions and adopt addresses, not only to encourage the slaves to leave their masters, but to cut their throats before they do so?

"I insist, that if the citizens of the non-slaveholding states can avail themselves of the article of the constitution, which prohibits the restriction of speech or the press to publish anything injurious to the rights of the slaveholding states, that they can go to the extreme that I have mentioned, and effect any thing further which writing or speaking could effect. But, fellow-citizens, these are not the principles of the constitution. Such a construction would defeat one of the great objects of its formation, which was that of securing the peace and harmony of the states which were parties to it. The liberty of speech and of the press, were given as the most effectual means to preserve to each and every citizen their own rights, and to the states the rights which appertained to them, at the time of their adoption. It could never

have been expected that it would be used by the citizens of one portion of the states for the purpose of depriving those of another portion, of the rights which they had reserved at the adoption of the constitution, and in the exercise of which, none but themselves have any concern or interest. If slavery is an evil, the evil is with them. If there is guilt in it, the guilt is theirs, not ours, since neither the states where it does not exist, nor the government of the United States can, without usurpation of power, and the violation of a solemn compact, do anything to remove it without the consent of those who are immediately interested. But they will neither ask for aid nor consent to be aided, whilst the illegal, persecuting and dangerous movements are in progress, of which I complain: the interest of all concerned requires that these should be stopped immediately. This can only be done by the force of public opinion, and that cannot too soon be brought into operation. Every movement which is made by the abolitionists in the non-slaveholding states, is viewed by our southern brethren as an attack upon their rights, and which, if persisted in, must in the end eradicate those feelings of attachment and affection between the citizens of all the states, which was produced by a community of interests and dangers in the war of the revolution, which was the foundation of our happy union, and by a continuance of which, it can alone be preserved. I entreat you, then, to frown upon the measures which are to produce results so much to be deprecated. The opinions which I have now given, I have omitted no opportunity for the last two years to lay before the people of my own state. I have taken the liberty to express them here, knowing that even if they should unfortunately not accord with yours, they would be kindly received."

The attempt has been made to show that these two documents are inconsistent with each other. A careful comparison of them, however, must bring the candid enquirer for truth, to a different conclusion. On this, as well as upon all other questions upon which general Harrison has been called to act or express himself, there is an exhibition of the same consistency of opinion and character which has marked the whole of his eventful life.

In 1835, at the celebration of the 47th anniversary of the settlement of Ohio, held in Cincinnati, general Harrison was among the invited guests; and in reply to some complimentary toast, offered by the committee of arrangement, referring to general Wayne and himself, general Harrison took occasion to speak of the claims of the subordinate officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the regular army in the west, under Harmer, St. Clair and Wayne, who brought the war of the revolution to a close by the victory of the Miami of the Lake. In this address, the claims of these soldiers were presented in a strong, touching and beautiful manner. From the many admirable sentiments contained in this speech, we cannot forbear quoting the following: "No more fatal idea can be entertained than that our republic is to be preserved, either by the wealth of our citizens or the amount of the revenue of the government. The brightest eras of the republics which have existed, were those when honorable poverty prevailed, and when patriotism was best rewarded."

In the autumn of 1837, general Harrison delivered a discourse before the Philosophical and Historical Society of Ohio, on the aborigines of the Ohio, which has since been published in the first volume of the Transactions of that body. It embraces about fifty pages of the work, and is among the most valuable contributions which have yet been made to that society. This discourse, written with classic elegance, in pure Saxon, is ingenious and profound, presenting the results of much close and accurate observation upon the ancient works and aborigines of the valley of the Ohio. Having space but for a single extract, we take the following, on the reproduction of the forest upon the banks of the Ohio, after it has once been destroyed. The subject is introduced by the author to prove the great antiquity of the ancient mounds and fortifications of this region.

"The process by which nature restores the forest to its original state, after being once cleared, is extremely slow. In our rich lands, it is, indeed, soon covered again with timber, but the character of the growth is entirely different, and continues so, through many generations of men.

In several places on the Ohio, particularly upon the farm which I occupy, clearings were made in the first settlement, abandoned, and suffered to grow up. Some of them, now to be seen, of nearly fifty years' growth, have made so little progress towards attaining the appearance of the immediately contiguous forest, as to induce any man of reflection, to determine, that at least ten times fifty years would be necessary before its complete assimilation could be effected. The sites of the ancient works on the Ohio, present precisely the same appearance as the circumjacent forest. You find on them, all that beautiful variety of trees, which gives such unrivalled richness to our forests. This is particularly the case on the fifteen acres included within the walls of the work at the mouth of the Great Miami, and the relative proportions of the different kinds of timber, are about the same. The first growth on the same kind of land, once cleared, and then abandoned to nature, on the contrary, is more homogeneous—often stinted to one, or two, or at most three kinds of timber. If the ground had been cultivated, yellow locust, in many places, will spring up as thick as garden peas. If it has not been cultivated, the black and white walnut will be the prevailing growth. The rapidity with which these trees grow for a time, smothers the attempt of other kinds to vegetate and grow in their shade. The more thrifty individuals soon overtop the weaker of their own kind, which sicken and die. In this way, there is soon only as many left as the earth will well support to maturity. All this time the squirrels may plant the seed of those trees which serve them for food, and by neglect suffer them to remain,—it will be in vain; the birds may drop the kernels, the external pulp of which have contributed to their nourishment, and divested of which they are in the best state for germinating, still it will be of no avail: the winds of heaven may waft the winged seeds of the sycamore, cotton-wood and maple, and a friendly shower may bury them to the necessary depth in the loose and fertile soil—but still without success. The roots below rob them of moisture, and the canopy of limbs and leaves above intercept the rays of the sun, and the dews of heaven: the

young giants in possession, like another kind of aristocracy, absorb the whole means of subsistence, and leave the mass to perish at their feet. This state of things will not, however, always continue. If the process of nature is slow and circuitous, in putting down usurpation and establishing the equality which she loves, and which is the great characteristic of her principles, it is sure and effectual. The preference of the soil for the first growth, ceases with its maturity. It admits of no succession, upon the principles of legitimacy. The long undisputed masters of the forest may be thinned by the lightning, the tempest, or by diseases peculiar to themselves; and whenever this is the case, one of the oft-rejected of another family, will find between its decaying roots, shelter and appropriate food; and, springing into vigorous growth, will soon push its green foliage to the skies, through the decayed and withering limbs of its blasted and dying adversary—the soil itself, yielding it a more liberal support than any scion from the former occupant. It will easily be conceived what a length of time it will require for a denuded tract of land, by a process so slow, again to clothe itself with the amazing variety of foliage which is the characteristic of the forests of this region. Of what immense age, then, must be those works, so often referred to, covered, as has been supposed by those who have the best opportunity of examining them, with the second growth *after the ancient forest state had been regained?*”

CHAPTER XII.

General Harrison's first nomination for the presidency.—His letter to Sherrod Williams.—His opinions upon duelling.—His letter to Harmer Denny, on the principles upon which the government should be administered.—Second nomination for the presidency, December, 1839.

In the autumn of this year, by a spontaneous movement of the people, in different parts of the Union, gene-

ral Harrison was nominated as a candidate for the presidency. The late period in the canvass, at which this movement was made, prevented that concentration of action among his friends, necessary to secure his election; but, under this disadvantage, and with their other candidates in the field, he received seventy-two electoral votes. In the fifteen states in which Mr. Van Buren and general Harrison were alone opposed to each other, the former received five hundred and eighty thousand, and the latter five hundred and fifty-two thousand votes, being a majority of less than thirty thousand for Mr. Van Buren. This fact evinces—all circumstances considered—the remarkable popularity of general Harrison with the people of the United States.

During this canvass, Sherrod Williams, Esq. a member of congress from Kentucky, addressed a letter of enquiry to general Harrison, on certain political matters, which drew forth the following reply :

NORTH BEND, *May 1, 1836*

SIR:—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th ultimo, in which you request me to answer the following questions :

1st. "Will you, if elected president of the United States, sign and approve a bill distributing the surplus revenue of the United States, to each state according to the federal population of each, for internal improvement, education, and to such other objects as the legislature of the several states may see fit to apply the same?"

2nd. "Will you sign and approve a bill distributing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands to each state, according to the federal population of each, for the purposes above specified?"

3d. "Will you sign and approve bills making appropriations to improve navigable streams above ports of entry?"

4th. "Will you sign and approve (if it becomes necessary to secure and save from depreciation the revenue and finances of the nation, and to afford a uniform sound currency to the people of the United States) a bill, with proper modifications and restrictions, chartering a bank of the United States?"

5th, "What is your opinion as to the constitutional power of the senate or house of representatives of the congress of the United States, to expunge or obliterate from the journals the records and proceedings of a previous session?"

From the manner in which the four first questions are stated, it appears that you do not ask my opinion as to the policy or propriety of the measures to which they respectively refer; but what would be my course, if they were presented to me (being in the presidential chair of the United States) in the shape of bills, that had been duly passed by the senate and house of representatives.

From the opinions which I have formed of the intention of the constitution, as to cases in which the veto power should be exercised by the president, I would have contented myself with giving an affirmative answer to the four first questions; but, from the deep interest which has been and indeed is now felt in relation to all the subjects, I think it proper to express my views upon each one separately.

I answer, then, 1st. That the immediate return of all the surplus money which is, or ought to be, in the treasury of the United States, to the possession of the people from whom it was taken, is called for by every principle of policy and, indeed, of safety to our institutions; and I know of no mode of doing it better than that recommended by the present chief magistrate, in his first annual message to congress, in the following words: "*To avoid these evils it appears to me that the most safe, just and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue, would be its apportionment among the several states according to the ratio of representation.*"

This proposition has reference to a state of things which now actually exists, with the exception of the amount of money thus to be disposed of; for it could not have been anticipated by the president that the surplus above the real wants or convenient expenditures of the government would become so large, as that retaining it in the treasury would so much diminish the circulating medium as greatly to embarrass the business of the country.

What other disposition can be made of it with a view to get it into immediate circulation, but to place it in the hands of the state authorities? So great is the amount, and so rapidly is it increasing, that it could not be expended for a very considerable time on the comparatively few objects to which it could be appropriated by the general government; but the desired distribution amongst the people could be immediately effected by the state, from the infinite variety of ways in which it might be employed by them. By them it might be loaned to their own banking institutions, or even to individuals—a mode of distribution by the general government, which I sincerely hope is in the contemplation of no friend to his country.

2nd. Whilst I have always broadly admitted that the public lands were the common property of all the states, I have been the advocate of that mode of disposing of them, which would create the greatest number of freeholders; and I conceived that in this way the interests of all would be as well secured as by any other disposition; but since, by the small size of the tracts in which the lands are now laid out, and the reduction of the price, this desirable situation is easily attainable by any person of tolerable industry, I am perfectly reconciled to the distribution of the proceeds of the sales as provided for by the bill introduced into the senate by Mr. Clay; the interests of all seem to be well provided for by this bill; and as for the opposition which has hitherto been made to the disposition of the lands heretofore contemplated by the representatives of the new states, there is no probability of its being adopted, I think it ought no longer to be insisted on.

3rd. As I believe that no money should be taken from the treasury of the United States to be expended on internal improvements but for those which are strictly national, the answer to this question would be easy but from the difficulty of determining which of those that are from time to time proposed, would be of this description. This circumstance, the excitement which has already been produced by appropriations of this kind, and the jealousies which it will no doubt continue to produce if

persisted in, give additional claims to the mode of appropriating all the surplus revenue of the United States in the manner above suggested. Each state will then have the means of accomplishing its own schemes of internal improvement. Still there will be particular cases when a contemplated improvement will be of greater advantage to the Union generally, and some particular states, than to that in which it is to be made. In such cases, as well as those in the new states, where the value of the public domain will be greatly enhanced by an improvement in the means of communication, the general government should certainly largely contribute. To appropriations of the latter character there has never been any very warm opposition. Upon the whole, the distribution of the surplus revenue amongst the states seems likely to remove most, if not all, the causes of dissension of which the internal improvement system has been the fruitful source. There is nothing, in my opinion, more sacredly incumbent upon those who are concerned in the administration of our government, than that of preserving harmony between the states. From the construction of our system, there has been, and probably ever will be, more or less jealousy between the general and state governments; but there is nothing in the constitution—nothing in the character of the relation which the states bear to each other, which can create any unfriendly feeling, if the common guardian administers its favor with an even and impartial hand. That this may be the case, all those to whom any portion of this delicate power is entrusted, should always act upon the principles of forbearance and conciliation; ever more ready to sacrifice the interest of their immediate constituents, rather than violate the rights of the other members of the family. Those who pursue a different course, whose rule is never to stop short of the attainment of all which they may consider their due, will often be found to have trespassed upon the boundary they had themselves established. The observations with which I shall conclude this letter, on the subject of the veto power by the president, will apply to this as well as your other questions.

4th. I have before me a newspaper, in which I am

designated by its distinguished editor, "*The bank and federal candidate.*" I think it would puzzle the writer to adduce any act of my life which warrants him in identifying me with the interest of the first, or the politics of the latter. Having no means of ascertaining the sentiments of the directors and stock-holders of the bank of the United States, (which is the one, I presume, with which it was intended to associate me,) I cannot say what their course is likely to be in relation to the ensuing election for president. Should they, however, give me their support, it will be evidence at least, that the opposition which I gave to their institution in my capacity of representative from Ohio, in congress, proceeded, in their opinion, from a sense of duty which I could not disregard.

The journals of the second session of the thirteenth, and those of the fourteenth congress, will show that my votes are recorded against them upon every question in which their interest was involved. I did, indeed, exert myself in the senate of Ohio, to procure a repeal of the law, which had imposed an enormous tax upon the branches which had been located in its boundaries at the request of the citizens. The ground of those exertions was not the interest of the bank; but to save what I considered the honor of the state, and to prevent a controversy between the state officers and those of the United States.

In the spring of 1834, I had also the honor to preside at a meeting of the citizens of Hamilton county, called for the purpose of expressing their sentiments in relation to the removal of the public money from the custody of the bank, by the sole authority of the executive. As president of the meeting, I explained at some length the object for which it was convened, but I advanced no opinion in relation to the rechartering of the bank.

A most respectful memorial to the president in relation to the removal of the deposits was adopted, as were also resolutions in favor of rechartering the bank; but, as I have already said, this was not the purpose for which the meeting was called, and not one upon which, as presiding officer, I was called upon to give an opinion, but in the event of an equal division of the votes.

As a private citizen, no man can be more entirely clear of any motive, either for rechartering the old institution, or creating a new one under the authority of the United States. I never had a single share in the former, nor indeed, in any bank, with one exception; and that many years ago failed, with the loss of the entire stock. I have no inclination again to venture in that way, even if I should ever possess the means. With the exception above mentioned, of stock in a bank, long since broken, I never put out a dollar at interest in my life. My interest being entirely identified with the cultivation of the soil, I am immediately and personally connected with none other.

I have made this statement to show you that I am not committed to any course in relation to the chartering of a bank of the United States; and that I might, if so disposed, join in the popular cry of denunciation against the old institution, and upon its misconduct, predicate an opposition to the chartering of another.

I shall not, however, take this course so opposite to that which I hope I have followed through life, but will give you my sentiments clearly and fully, not only with regard to the future conduct of the government on the subject of a national bank, but in relation to the operation of that which is now defunct.

I was not in congress when the late bank was chartered, but was a member of the 13th congress, after its first session, when the conduct of the bank, in its incipient measures was examined into; and believing, from the result of the investigation, that the charter had been violated, I voted for the judicial investigation, with a view of annulling its charter. The resolution for that purpose, however, failed; and shortly after, the management of its affairs was committed to the talents and integrity of Mr. Cheves. From that period to its final dissolution, (although I must confess I am not a very competent judge of such matters,) I have no idea that an institution could have been conducted with more ability, integrity, and public advantage than it has been.

Under these impressions, I agree with general Jackson in the opinion expressed in one of his messages to con-

gress, from which I make the following extract: "*That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by the government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the states, I do not entertain a doubt.*" But the period for rechartering the old institution has passed, as Pennsylvania has wisely taken care to appropriate to herself the benefits of its large capital.

The question, then, for me to answer, is whether, under the circumstances you state, if elected to the office of president, I would sign an act to charter another bank. I answer, I would, if it were clearly ascertained that the public interest in relation to the collection and disbursement of the revenue would materially suffer without one, and there were unequivocal manifestations of public opinion in its favor. I think, however, the experiment should be fairly tried, to ascertain whether the financial operations of the government cannot be as well carried on without the aid of a national bank. If it is not necessary for that purpose, it does not appear to me that one can be constitutionally chartered. There is no construction which I can give the constitution which would authorize it, on the ground of affording facilities to commerce. The measure, if adopted, must have for its object the carrying into effect (facilitating at least the exercise of,) some *one* of the powers positively granted to the general government. If others flow from it, producing equal or greater advantages to the nation, so much the better; but these cannot be made the ground for justifying a recourse to it.

The excitement which has been produced by the bank question, the number and respectability of those who deny the right to congress to charter one, strongly recommended the course above suggested.

5th. I distinctly answer to this question, that, in my opinion, neither house of congress can constitutionally expunge the record of the proceedings of their predecessors.

The power to rescind certainly belongs to them; and is, for every public legitimate purpose, all that is necessary. The attempt to expunge their journal, now

making in the senate of the United States, I am satisfied could never have been made but in a period of the highest party excitement, when the voice of reason and generous feeling is stifled by long protracted and bitter controversy.

In relation to the exercise of the veto power by the president, there is, I think, an important difference in opinion between the present chief magistrate and myself. I express this opinion with less diffidence, because I believe mine is in strict accordance with those of all the previous presidents to general Jackson.

The veto power, or the control of the executive over the enactment of laws by the legislative body, was not unknown in the United States previously to the formation of the present federal constitution. It does not appear, however, to have been in much favor. The principle was to be found in but three of the state constitutions; and in but one of them (Massachusetts,) was the executive power lodged in the hands of a single chief magistrate. One other state, (South Carolina,) had, indeed, not only adopted this principle, but had given its single executive magistrate an absolute negative upon the acts of the legislature. In all other instances it has been a qualified negative, like that of the United States. The people of South Carolina seem, however, not to have been long pleased with this investment of power in their governor, as it lasted but two years; having been adopted in 1776, and repealed in 1778; from which time the acts of the legislature of that state have been entirely freed from executive control. Since the adoption of the constitution of the United States, the veto principle has been adopted by several other states; and until very lately, it seemed to be very rapidly growing into favor.

Before we can form a correct opinion of the manner in which this power should be exercised, it is proper to understand the reasons which have induced its adoption. In its theory, it is manifestly an innovation upon the first principle of republican government—that the majority should rule. Why should a single individual control the will of that majority?

It will not be said that there is more probability of finding greater wisdom in the executive chair, than in the halls of the legislature. Nor can it possibly be supposed, that an individual residing in the centre of an extensive country, can be as well acquainted with the wants and wishes of a numerous people, as those who come immediately from amongst them—the partakers, for a portion of the year, in their various labors and employments; and the witnesses of the effects of the laws in their more minute as well as general operations.

As far, then, as it regards a knowledge of the wants and wishes of the people, wisdom to discover remedies for increasing the public prosperity, it would seem that the legislative bodies did not require the aid of an executive magistrate. But there is a principle, recognized by all the American constitutions, which was unknown to the ancient republics. They all acknowledge rights in the minority, which cannot rightfully be taken from them. Experience had shown that in large assemblies, these rights were not always respected. It would be in vain that they should be enumerated, and respect for them enjoined in the constitution. A popular assembly, under the influence of that spirit of party which is always discoverable in a greater or less degree in all republics, might, and would, as it was believed, sometimes disregard them. To guard against this danger, and to secure the rights of each individual, the expedient of creating a department independent of the others, and amenable only to the laws, was adopted. Security was thus given against any palpable violation of the constitution, to the injury of individuals, or a minority party. But it was still possible for a willful and excited majority to enact laws of the greatest injustice and tyranny, without violating the letter of their charter.

And this I take to be the origin of the veto power, as well in the state governments, as that of the United States. It appears to have been the intention to create an umpire between the contending factions, which had existed, it was believed, and would continue to exist. If there was any propriety in adopting this principle in the government of a state, all the reasons in favor of it

existed in a tenfold degree for incorporating it in that of the United States. The operations of the latter, extending over an immense tract of country, embracing the products of almost every clime, and that country divided too into a number of separate governments, in many respects independent of each other and of the common federal head, left but little hope that they could always be carried on in harmony. It could not be doubted that sectional interests would at times predominate in the bosoms of the immediate representatives of the people and the states, combinations formed destructive of the public good, or unjust and oppressive to a minority. Where could a power to check these local feelings, and to destroy the effects of unjust combinations, be better placed than in the hands of that department whose authority, being derived from the same common sovereign, is co-ordinate with the rest, and which enjoys the great distinction of being at once the immediate representative of the whole people, as well as of each particular state?

In the former character, the interests of the whole community would be rigidly supported, and, in the latter, the rights of each member steadfastly maintained. The representation from the state authorities in the electoral colleges, I consider one of the most felicitous features in the constitution. It serves as an eternal memento to the chief magistrate that it is his duty to guard the interests of the weak against the unjust aggressions of the strong and powerful. From these premises, you will conclude that I consider the qualified veto upon the acts of the legislature, conferred by the constitution upon the president, as a *conservative* power, intended only to be used to secure the instrument itself from violation, or, in times of high party excitement, to protect the rights of the minority, and the interests of the weaker members of the Union. Such, indeed, is my opinion, and such we must believe to be the opinion of nearly all the distinguished men who have filled the executive chair. If I were president of the United States, an act which did not involve either of the principles above enumerated, must have been passed under very peculiar circum-

stances of precipitancy or opposition to the known public will, to induce me to refuse to it my sanction.

If the opinion I have given of the motives of the framers of the constitution, in giving the veto power to the president, is correct, it follows, that they never could have expected that he who was constituted the umpire between contending factions, should ever identify himself with the interests of one of them, and voluntarily *razee* himself from the proud eminence of leader of a nation to that of chief of a party. I can easily conceive the existence of a state of things by which the chief magistrate of a state may be forced to act upon party principles; but such a course is entirely opposed to all the obligations which the constitution imposes on a president of the United States. The immense influence he possesses will always give to his party the preponderance, and the very circumstance of its being an executive party will be the cause of infusing more bitterness and vindictive feeling in these domestic contests. Under these circumstances, the qualified veto given by the constitution may, if the president should think proper to change its character, become as absolute in practice as that possessed by the kings of England and France. From the great variety of local interests acting upon the members of the two houses of congress, and from the difficulty of keeping all the individuals of a large party under the control of party discipline, laws will often be passed by small majorities adverse to the interests of the dominant party; but if the president should think proper to use the veto power for the purpose of promoting the interests of his party, it will be in vain to expect that a majority so large as two-thirds in both houses would be found in opposition to his wishes. In the hands of such a president, the qualified veto of the constitution would in practice be absolute.

I have, upon another occasion, expressed my views upon the danger of a dominant executive party. It may, perhaps, be said, that the chief magistrate will find it impossible to avoid the influence of party spirit. Several of our chief magistrates, however, have been able to escape its influence; or, what is the same thing, to act

as if they did not feel it. As one mode of avoiding it, it would be my aim to interfere with the legislation of congress as little as possible. The clause in the constitution which makes it the duty of the president to give congress information of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, could never be intended to make him the source of legislation. Information should always be frankly given, and recommendations upon such matters as come more immediately under his cognizance than theirs. But there it should end. If he should undertake to prepare the business of legislation for the action of congress, or to assume the character of code maker for the nation, the personal interest which he will take in the success of his measures will necessarily convert him into a partisan, and will totally incapacitate him from performing the part of that impartial umpire, which is the character that I have supposed the constitution intends him to assume, when the acts passed by the legislature are submitted to his decision. I do not think it by any means necessary that he should take the lead as a reformer, even when reformation is, in his opinion, necessary. Reformers will be never wanting when it is well understood that the power which wields the whole patronage of the nation will not oppose the reformation.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration and respect, sir, your humble servant.

W. H. HARRISON.

To the Hon. Sherrod Williams.

In 1838, a gentleman in New Jersey addressed general Harrison on the subject of duelling. The reply to this letter has been widely circulated, and is justly considered one of the most effective attacks upon the practice of personal combat, that has been made. The concluding paragraph presents general Harrison's own views upon this subject, and we subjoin it.

"I am satisfied, that what I have said above, does not entirely meet your enquiry, and that you will expect me to state what effect the scenes described had in forming,

my own principles, and governing my own conduct. I have already stated an entire change in my sentiments, on the subject of duelling, from those which I entertained upon my first entering the army; and for which no excuse can be offered, but my extreme youth, and the bad examples continually before me. In almost every other case, possessed of the deliberate opinions of a man, you might safely conclude that his conduct would be in conformity to them. But such, alas! is not the case with men of the world, in relation to the laws which form "the code of honor." Abstractedly considered, they all condemn them, whilst in practice they adopt them. In all other cases, independent men act from their own convictions, but, in this case, upon the opinions of others, or rather from what they fear may be the opinions of others. I acknowledge, then, that the change of my opinions, which I have admitted in relation to duelling, had no other influence on my conduct, than to determine me never to be the aggressor. But, although resolved to offer no insult nor inflict any injury, I was determined to suffer none. When I left the army, however, and retired to civil life, I considered myself authorized greatly to narrow the ground upon which I would be willing to resort to a personal combat. To the determination which I had previously made, to offer no insult or inflict any injury to give occasion to any one to call upon me in this way, (for after witnessing the scene which I have last described, the wealth and honors of the world would not have tempted me to level a pistol at the breast of a man whom I had injured,) I resolved to disregard all remarks upon my conduct which could not be construed into a deliberate insult, or any injury which did not affect my reputation or the happiness and peace of my family. When I had the honor to be called upon to command the north-western army, recollecting the number of gallant men that had fallen in the former war, in personal combat, I determined to use all the authority and all the influence of my station to prevent their recurrence. And, to take away the principal source from which they spring, in an address to the Pennsylvania brigade, at Sandusky, I declared it to be my determination to prevent, by all

the means that the military laws placed in my hands, any injury, or even insult, which should be offered, by the superior to the inferior officers. I cannot say what influence this course, upon my part, may have produced in the result; but I state with pleasure, that there was not a single duel, nor, as far as I know, a challenge given, whilst I retained the command. The activity in which the army was constantly kept, may, however, have been the principal cause of this uncommon harmony.

“In relation to my present sentiments, a sense of higher obligations than human laws, or human opinions can impose, has determined me never, on any occasion, to accept a challenge or seek redress for a personal injury, by a resort to the laws which compose the code of honor.”

The proceedings of the National Democratic Anti-masonic Convention, held in Pennsylvania, in 1838, by which general Harrison was nominated for the presidency of the United States, in the canvass of 1840, were transmitted to him, officially, by the Honorable Harmer Denny, of Pittsburgh. Under date of December 2nd, 1838, the general made a reply to Mr. Denny, the substance of which is here given :

“DEAR SIR:—As it is probable that you have by this time returned to Pittsburgh, I do myself the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter from Philadelphia, containing the proceedings of the National Democratic Anti-masonic Convention, which lately convened in that city. With feelings of the deepest gratitude, I read the resolution unanimously adopted, nominating me as a candidate for the president of the United States. This is the second time that I have received from that patriotic party, of which you yourself are a distinguished member, the highest evidence of confidence that can be given to a citizen of our republic. I would attempt to describe my sense of the obligations I owe them, if I were not convinced that any language which I could command would fall far short of what I really feel. If, however, the wishes of the convention should be realized, and if I should second their efforts, I shall have it in my power to manifest my gratitude in a manner more acceptable to those whom you represent, than by any professions of it

which I could at this time make ; I mean by exerting my utmost efforts to carry out the principles set forth in their resolutions, by arresting the progress of the measures "destructive to the prosperity of the people, and tending to the subversion of their liberties," and substituting for them those sound democratic republican doctrines, upon which the administration of Jefferson and Madison were conducted.

Among the principles proper to be adopted by any executive sincerely desirous to restore the administration to its original simplicity and purity, I deem the following to be of prominent importance.

I. To confine his service to a single term.

II. To disclaim all right of control over the public treasure, with the exception of such part of it as may be appropriated by law, to carry on the public services, and that to be applied precisely as the law may direct, and drawn from the treasury agreeably to the long established forms of that department.

III. That he should never attempt to influence the elections, either by the people or the state legislatures, nor suffer the federal officers under his control to take any other part in them than by giving their own votes, when they possess the right of voting.

IV. That in the exercise of the veto power, he should limit his rejection of bills to, 1st. Such as are, in his opinion, unconstitutional ; 2nd. Such as tend to encroach on the rights of the states or individuals ; 3rd. Such as involving deep interests, may, in his opinion, require more mature deliberation or reference to the will of the people, to be ascertained at the succeeding elections.

V. That he should never suffer the influence of his office to be used for purposes of a purely party character.

VI. That in removals from office of those who hold their appointments during the pleasure of the executive, the cause of such removal should be stated, if requested, to the senate, at the time the nomination of a successor is made.

And last, but not least in importance,

VII. That he should not suffer the executive department of the government to become the source of legisla-

tion : but leave the whole business of making laws for the Union to the department to which the constitution has exclusively assigned it, until they have assumed that perfected shape, where and when alone the opinions of the executive may be heard. * * * *

The question may perhaps be asked of me, what security I have in my power to offer, if the majority of the American people should select me for their chief magistrate, that I would adopt the principles which I have herein laid down as those upon which my administration would be conducted ; I could only answer, by referring to my conduct, and the disposition manifested in the discharge of the duties of several important offices, which have heretofore been conferred upon me. If the power placed in my hands has, on even a single occasion, been used for any purpose other than that for which it was given, or retained longer than was necessary to accomplish the objects designated by those from whom the trusts were received, I will acknowledge that either will constitute a sufficient reason for discrediting any promise I may make, under the circumstances in which I am now placed."

In December, 1839, a national convention, opposed to the present administration of the general government, was held in Harrisburgh, Pennsylvania, composed of a large number of delegates, of tried virtue, patriotism and intelligence. In this august body, drawn from twenty-three out of the twenty-six states of the Union, and representing every variety of interest in the slaveholding, as well as the non-slaveholding districts of the country, after full and mature deliberation, William Henry Harrison was unanimously nominated as a candidate for the presidency, in 1840. This nomination was but a formal sanction of that previously made by the public sentiment of the nation. The people themselves, spontaneously, in their primitive meetings, had already most clearly manifested their preference for the patriot statesman of North Bend.

CHAPTER XIII.

General Harrison's civil and military qualifications considered —Parallel between him and Washington.—His integrity and disinterestedness, illustrated by several anecdotes.—His social and literary character.—His enjoyment of a green old age in body and mind.

OUR narrative of the civil and military services of Harrison, is now closed. Brief and imperfect as it may appear, it is sufficient to establish his claim to a high rank as a civilian and a general. He has been thoroughly tried in the council and the field, and in every situation has proved himself equal to the circumstances by which he has been surrounded. No citizen of the United States, it is believed, has ever filled so many civil and military offices, as the subject of this memoir; and certainly no one has ever been more uniformly successful in discharging the trusts confided to him.

If it be true, that to plan and carry on a successful campaign, "requires an almost intuitive sagacity, great powers of combination, with prudence, caution, promptness, and energy, combined with perfect self-reliance and self-control," it may be assumed that general Harrison, who is admitted to possess these attributes,—is an accomplished civil ruler; inasmuch as these are precisely the qualities which fit an individual for acting efficiently upon men and things as they exist around him. But there are other and more practical evidences of his capacity as a statesman. More than twenty years of his life have been spent in various important *civil* offices, many of them requiring inflexible integrity, firmness, intelligence, and wisdom. To prove that he possesses these virtues, in a high degree, it is only necessary to recur to his acts as governor of Indiana, as Indian commissioner and as a member of the national legislature. The messages, letters, and speeches, called forth by these different situations, are not only fine specimens of composition, but exhibit great accuracy of information, consis-

tency of political principle, and maturity of judgment. Rising above all sectarian or party influence, his views were at once national and deeply imbued with the love of liberty; his voice and influence have ever been exerted in sustaining the cause of freedom in this, as well as in other kindred lands.

In his military capacity, general Harrison is not less distinguished. As commander-in-chief of the north-western army, he was entrusted with more extensive and responsible powers, than have been confided to any officer in our country, Washington alone excepted. The command assigned to him, embraced an immense extent of territory, with a frontier of several hundred miles in length, stretching along the lakes (then in possession of the enemy) with harbors, inlets, and rivers, admirably suited to favor their attacks upon our scattered border settlements. To defend this extended line of frontier, the commander's forces were chiefly undisciplined militia—entirely wanting experience in the field—engaged for short terms of service, and held in obedience more by personal influence than the force of authority. But it was not to the *defence* alone of this district, that general Harrison's duties were confined. He was directed by his government, to act *offensively* against the enemy, by retaking Detroit, and capturing the uppermost Canada, defended, as it was, by experienced British officers and soldiers, aided by a large body of north-western Indians. Detroit and Canada were separated from general Harrison's source of troops, munitions of war and provisions, by a trackless and swampy wilderness, without roads, and presenting almost insuperable obstacles to the transportation of army supplies; while at the same time, it was precisely the region of country best adapted to the peculiar mode of warfare practised by the bold and ferocious Indians. Notwithstanding these manifold difficulties, in about one year, from the time when he was invested with the chief command of the north-western army, general Harrison drove the enemy from his extended military district, retook Detroit, defeated the combined army of Proctor and Tecumthe, on the Thames, conquered the uppermost Canada, and passed, as a vic-

torious chieftain, down to the seat of war, on the Niagara frontier.

In many points, the military career of Harrison bears a strong analogy to that of Washington. The same extent of discretionary powers and responsibilities—the same difficulties in procuring supplies of troops and provisions; and in part, the same obstacles in the nature of the country to be traversed, marked the history of both. They never hazarded the grand result, by a minor enterprise, however tempting—they sought no laurels by the wanton sacrifice of their soldiers, but regulated all their movements with a single aim to the public good. Both exercised the extensive powers with which they were invested, without any invasion of the laws, or the rights of the citizen: and, both retired to the peaceful pursuits of agriculture, when the objects which called them to the field, had been effected: finally, to both may be justly awarded the valor of Marcellus, the caution of Fabius, and the disinterestedness of Cincinnatus.

Inflexible integrity and a self-sacrificing patriotism, may be considered the crowning virtues of general Harrison's character. These virtues have marked his career in the council and the field—in youth and in age. When asked by what means he was enabled so successfully to gain the love and obedience of the militia, who followed his banner during the late war, he replied: "By treating them with affection and kindness—by always recollecting that they were my fellow-citizens, whose feelings I was bound to respect, and by sharing with them, on every occasion, the hardships which they were obliged to undergo." Throughout the whole of his military campaigns, he shared with his soldiers in all their fatigues, dangers, and privations. We were lately assured, by a member of his military family in the campaign of 1813, that the table of the commander-in-chief was often not as well supplied with provisions, as those of the common soldiers; and that he has frequently seen the general sitting by the fire, roasting a piece of beef, and then eating it without salt or bread. On one occasion, after marching all day, through a beech bottom, covered with mud and water, without their baggage, or any provisions, the

general, by way of preventing his troops from being discouraged, sat down upon a log, wrapped in his cloak,—the rain falling fast, and the gloom of a night in the wilderness, only broken by a few glimmering camp-fires,—and then gaily calling upon the officers to sing songs, he spread content and cheerfulness throughout the whole detachment. By examples such as these, he gained the confidence and affection of the crowds of volunteer militia, who were attracted to his standard, not less by their patriotism, than the distinguished reputation of the commander-in-chief.

Since his retirement from the army, he has been the chief representative of the military class of our citizens, in the region in which he lives. Those who served under him in the late war, make frequent pilgrimages to North Bend; while the old soldiers, who fought under Harmer, and St. Clair, and Wayne, not only throng his hospitable fire-side, but look to general Harrison, above all other men, to present their claims to congress, for land or pensions, on the score of past services and sacrifices.

While governor of Indiana, and superintendent of Indian affairs, during a period of twelve years, he disbursed, at his discretion, and with but few, if any checks, very large sums of money; and, in the course of the late war, he drew on the treasury for more than six hundred thousand dollars for military purposes. Yet general Harrison retired from public service poorer than he entered it; and has never been a defaulter to his government. There are but two instances, it is believed, in which even a whisper of suspicion, against the purity of his official conduct, has been heard. One of these, made by an army contractor, was investigated in congress, and the charge triumphantly refuted. The other occurred while governor of Indiana. A foreigner, residing in that territory, by the name of McIntosh, and possessing very considerable wealth, having taken some offence, charged governor Harrison with having defrauded the Indians, in the treaty of Fort Wayne, made in the year 1809. The accused, very properly concluded that it was due to his own reputation, not less than to the interests

of the general government, that a charge of this kind, should be fully investigated in a court of justice. He therefore instituted a suit in the supreme court of the territory, and after a full and fair trial, before a judge and a jury of admitted impartiality between the parties, a verdict was rendered against the defendant for four thousand dollars. The evidence was so conclusive in favor of governor Harrison, that McIntosh did not attempt to press the truth of the charge upon the jury, but only sought to lessen the amount of damages, by pleading some matters in extenuation of his conduct. When the property of the defendant was levied upon, to satisfy the judgment, it was bought-in by an agent of the governor, who immediately distributed one third of it among the orphan children of his fellow-citizens that had died in battle; and then restored the remainder to McIntosh himself. It has been well observed, that "no language of praise can add to the truth and force of the simple beauty of such an example of magnanimity, disinterestedness, and generosity."

Some years since, it was discovered that a large tract of land, adjoining Cincinnati, which had been sold long previously, for a very small sum, under an execution against the original proprietor of the Miami country, could not be held under this sale, in consequence of some defective proceedings in court. The legal title to this tract, now immensely valuable, was vested in Mrs. Harrison and another individual, as the heirs-at-law. Immediately upon being informed of the situation of this property, general Harrison procured the consent of the co-heir, and joined him in releasing to the purchasers the whole of this land, without claiming any other consideration, than the few hundred dollars, which constituted the difference between the actual value, at the time when sold, and the amount paid at the sheriff's sale.

In 1804, the governor of Indiana was, upon the suggestion of president Jefferson, made *ex-officio* governor of "Upper Louisiana." Under the impression that it was sound policy to convince the inhabitants of the newly acquired territory, that they had lost nothing by the change, governor Harrison declined receiving the

fees he was entitled to by law, although those for Indian licenses alone would have brought him several thousand dollars. At the same time the proprietor of St. Louis, offered him for a mere nominal sum, an undivided moiety of three-fourths of the town of St. Louis, and the adjoining lands, if he would assist in building up that place. Such, however, was his nice sense of honor, that he declined the offer, fearing it might be said, that he had used his official station to promote his private interest. The property thus voluntarily refused, and which might have been accepted without any violation of principle, is probably worth at this time a million of dollars.

While acting as commander-in-chief of the north-western army, general Harrison's expenses, owing to the extent of his command, and the amount of company he was obliged to entertain at head-quarters, so far exceeded his pay, that he was compelled before the close of the war, to sell a valuable tract of land, to meet the current demands upon his purse.

Soon after his resignation in the army, while the claims of a large family were pressing upon him, general Harrison had made up his mind to ask an appointment for one of his sons at West Point. Before the application was made, however, a poor boy, the child of a neighbor, who had not the means of obtaining an education, made a personal appeal to the general, to procure him a place in this institution. He immediately waived the claims of his own son, and obtained a warrant for this poor lad, who was educated at the academy, and is now a distinguished citizen of Indiana, and takes great pleasure in bearing testimony to the noble disinterestedness of his patron.

Similar instances of integrity and generosity might be multiplied, had we further space to narrate the incidents in the life of the veteran, whose patriotic policy founded, and whose skillful valor defended the vast north-west.

The literary talent and attainment of general Harrison, are uncommonly good. He is a sound scholar, not only familiar with the passing literature of the day, but possessing a familiar acquaintance with ancient history, especially with the classic annals of Greece and Rome.

His own writings and conversation are forcibly illustrated by allusions to these works, and frequently bear evidence of a mind richly imbued with the philosophy of history. The productions of his pen, which are thrown off without an effort, are at once smooth, strong, and perspicuous, and written with remarkable simplicity and beauty of style. As a speaker, he is animated, fluent, and forcible, correct in his language, and peculiarly ready in bringing the resources of a cultivated understanding to bear upon any given subject.

Both in body and in mind, general Harrison enjoys a "green old age." His step is firm, his spirits buoyant, his conversation sprightly, instructive, and rich in anecdote. His countenance is expressive of kindness and genuine philanthropy; and, his dark, piercing eye, has lost little, if any, of the fire and vivacity of his more youthful days. The strength of his memory and the accuracy of his judgment, remain unimpaired. One of the latest productions of his pen—written but a few weeks since—is strongly characterized by the force, raciness, and nice discrimination which belong to the meridian of his life.

In temperament, warm and impulsive—in manners, plain and unassuming—in his habits, generous and hospitable, general Harrison combines, in an eminent degree, the manly frankness of a soldier, with the sturdy independence of a farmer.

1841
 4th March 1841
 THE END.
 4th April 1841









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SKETCHES
OF THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY SERVICES
OF
WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON.

BY
CHARLES S. TODD,
LATE AN INSPECTOR-GENERAL IN THE U. S. ARMY,
AND
BENJAMIN DRAKE,
AUTHOR OF THE LIFE OF BLACK HAWK, &c.

“ ————— quæque vidimus,
Et quorum pars magna fuimus.”

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